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ABSTRACT
Transport systems employing small sized vehicles and 
operated under an informal institutional structure are the 
essence of unconventional wisdom of urban transport planning in 
the Third World. The minibus is one of the many types of 
unconventional passenger carriers which primarily originate 
from indigenous technology. In the Far East, minibuses play a 
crucial role in moving commuters in large urban areas.
Using minibuses in urban passenger transport services is 
interesting phenomena in urban transport planning in both 
developed and developing countries. Being small the minibus can 
ply along narrow streets often seen in crowded residential 
quarters and thus provide users with a high level of 
accessibility to trip ends. Furthermore, providers of minibus 
transport services are profitable, associated with small scale 
business and informal organizational structure and, more 
interestingly, often under private ownership.
The minibus system in Beijing is one of the most recent 
public transport systems established in the Far East. It is 
distinctive in that the providers can be financially viable 
under state ownership and in large fleets. This study examines 
the system's service style, ownership pattern and
organizational structure which are thought to have influenced 
the undertakings' financial performance. The findings suggest 
that neither ownership nor institutional structure contributes
directly to profitability. The main factors for financial 
viability rest upon the self-reliance and entrepreneurship 
within the industry, which stimulates labour efficiency of the 
crews. Besides, the 'near-monopolistic* market and the 
limited total supply serving a huge population, also create 
opportunities for providers to charge high fares.
On the basis of the findings, the study recommends that, 
in order to encourage the passenger transport business, a 
competitive market mechanism should be developed within the
industry, with the participation of all sectors. The major
outcome of this study is the building of a model of transport
planning for developing cities. The essence of the model is 
that in low-income countries, cheap labour is an important 
resource which should be utilized fully in substitution for 
expensive imported technology, and that the use of modern
technology should follow the affordability of the citizens and 
the condition of economic development. In conclusion, the 
study confirms that the unconventional transport wisdom is an 
appropriate approach that should be given proper weight, 
especially in the developing world.
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PREFACE
Transport planning as a discipline is rooted in the 
tradition of engineering problem-solving and had its beginnings 
in the 1950s as an extension of highway design and traffic 
engineering. The primary concern of earlier planning was the 
planning and provision of transportation facilities for the 
motor car in order to ensure maximum mobility for the 
anticipated increase in traffic. Problems of investment 
planning and resource allocation were approached mainly from a 
mechanistic and non-behavioural perspective. In general, 
transportation problems were viewed in relative isolation from 
the more general socio-economic problems and aspects of 
society. Models, methods, and techniques were adopted, 
developed and applied because of their descriptive usefulness 
and without the justification of predictive validity of or 
behavioural content (Fischer 1987).
In the middle and late 1950s, great strides were made in 
the techniques for spatial prediction of transportation demands 
and analysis of transportation system operations. The ability 
to simulate system behaviour with an acceptable degree of 
accuracy, combined with the improvement in the economic 
analysis of system costs and benefits, permitted the generation 
and evaluation of many alternative transportation systems. The 
widespread availability of high-speed digital computers made
the use of these analytic methods feasible. The elements in 
this planning process have been listed by Carter (1984) as 
follows: goals formulation, demand projections, alternative
system proposals, system simulation and performance evaluation, 
and finally, system choice and construction.
Beginning in the late 1960s, disaggregate behaviour models 
were developed and used, allowing transportation planners to 
gain new insight into the relationships between travel demand, 
transport system characteristics, and socio-economic variables. 
Emphasis on urban transportation planning from the late 1950s 
to the mid-1970s led to the development of very sophisticated 
models and computer programme. The early developments followed 
a general sequential approach with the following forecasting 
steps that are described in great detail in the literature: 
trip generation; trip distribution; modal choice; and trip 
(route) assignment (Carter 1984).
The output of these elements was viewed by some as the 
primary basis for system evaluation. The techniques of 
economic analysis permitted the selection of the alternative 
that involved the lowest total transport cost or the highest 
ratio of user benefits to total system costs. Minimizing 
direct transport costs became the most important goal in system 
planning. Since a major purpose of providing transport services 
was to maintain the stability and promote the controlled growth 
of social and economic activities, simple projections of demand 
put the planner in the position of following the trends rather
than leading them (Carter 1984). Hence the fascination with 
computers became ever greater, as in the tendency to formulate 
planning problems around what a PC could do, rather than based 
on the essence of the problems themselves. As a consequence of 
intensive computation, transport planning has been regarded as 
an essentially engineering activity.
Since the early 1970s, as a consequence of increasing
pressures of the private vehicles and the awareness of landuse
limitation, transport planning and policy of transport
investment have somewhat changed their orientations. Emphasis 
now has shifted from the idea of individual motorized mobility 
for all to a combination of motor-car restraint and public 
transport priority. In many metropolitan areas serious attempts 
have been made to regulate and restrain the use of motor cars 
in general and peak-hour commuter travel in particular, to 
develop and improve public transport alternatives to the motor­
car as well as to co-ordinate the existing transport systems. 
This change in emphasis was fortified by facing serious
environmental, social and economic effects of urban traffic 
problems such as traffic congestion, increasing air and noise 
pollution levels, and demographic increases and so forth 
(Fischer 1987).
In the face of a environment-conscious and always watchful 
constituency, it has become more and more difficult to 
implement large scale transport infrastructure projects, such 
as new motorways, rapid transit lines or airports based on
transport studies mainly addressing narrowly defined transport 
objectives. So in a sense the "crisis" of transport planning 
was also one of its methodology. Because of the restricted 
perspective of its analytical tools, transport planning became 
to be thought of as being "technocratic" and was made 
responsible for much of the physical and aesthetic degradation 
of the urban and rural environment. New orientation in 
transportation and mobility research has emphasised the 
importance of a strong theoretical base as a foundation for the 
models and analytical methods used. This requires the adoption 
of more sophisticated concepts of rationality than that 
conventionally applied in transport planning.
It is becoming increasingly accepted "descriptive" 
statistical techniques should as much as possible be replaced 
by more social-science-based methods offering a richer 
potential for gaining insights into human preferences and 
motives, but also into the factual constraints of decisions and 
their influence on the decision outcome. This is because 
mobility and transposition have multiple dimensions, of which 
the physical (or spatial) dimension represents only one aspect. 
The needs and interests of individuals and groups are clearly 
reflected in geographical space, but also in alternative 
"spaces", like social space (focussing on social mobility), 
economic space (focussing on dynamics in production activities 
and production factors) or information space (focussing on 
transfer of ideas and thoughts). This multi-dimensional
projection once more emphasizes the main point that analysis 
and planning of transportation and mobility behaviour will only 
provide meaningful insights and fruitful results in actual 
trends, planning problems, models and techniques and policy 
issues are placed in a coherent broad social context (Nijkamp 
et al 1987).
Thus, the transport element has to be placed within the 
wider context of social planning. Transport planning is a 
relevant component of the design of a regional or national 
development policy and should therefore be treated together 
either physical and economic planning, but it is clear that 
this is no easy task (La Bella 1987).
Chapter I
URBAN TRANSPORT PLANNING IN THE THIRD WORLD: 
THE "PARATRANSIT WISDOM"
1.1 Introduction
In developing countries the rapid rise in population, 
increased costs of fuel and limited financial resources have 
produced the most severe transport problems. For example, 
average bus speeds in Bankgkok are almost half those in London; 
the average load factor on buses in Indian cities is over three 
times greater than cities in the UK (Jacobs et al 1982). At the 
same time, most public bus companies continue to lose money, 
which constitutes a drain on national and local budgets. These 
symptoms of the transport problem underly their effects: 
constraints on national economic growth and individual 
prosperity, widespread frustration and diminution of the 
quality of life, and the failure to deliver the potential 
benefits of city life (ADB 1989). Research on urban transport 
planning in the Third World has become an ever stimulating 
topic.
This opening introduction explains briefly the content 
structure of the thesis. Chapter I describes mainly the two 
major transport planning approaches in the contemporary Third 
World and the theoretical debates over the "Unconventional 
Wisdom". Chapter II explains recent changes in China's economic 
system and transport planning; it also explains the hypothesis 
of this study and the methodology applied. Chapter III 
explores current passenger transport problems in Beijing, while 
chapter IV describes the city's minibus system and its 
characteristics. Chapter V attempts to find out the force 
behind the system followed by chapter VI which analyses its 
constraints. Chapter VII suggests tactics for improvements. 
This is followed by chapter VIII which reaffirms the overall 
role of paratransit, and upon which the chapter attempts to 
construct a model of transport planning for Third World cities. 
Finally the epilogue concludes the ultimate argument.
1.2 The City and its Transport System
Cities are an important component of human settlement in 
most parts of the world. The role of the city in economic 
development is significant in both developing and developed 
countries. There is a growing appreciation of the importance
of cities to the national economy -- they typically generate 
more than 50% of national gross domestic product (GDP) and this 
is forecast to increase to 67% by the end of the century. 
Efficient cities are therefore essential to national prosperity 
(Allport et al 1990).
Cities are made up essentially of buildings and transport. 
The buildings and the activities within them do not exist 
independently of the transport that serves them. Transport 
consists of the transfer of persons and/or goods between 
geographically separate places. The resulting benefits arise
from the linking of human settlements and activities
distributed over space. So it is obvious that there will exist
a close relationship between transport and spatial structure 
(La Bella 1987). Transport does not just serve the city: it is 
also an important part of the city. As Thomson (1979) suggests, 
transport usually occupies 30 - 40 per cent of the land surface 
in the city centre and about 20 per cent of the suburbs.
Whilst the quality and price of other basic services are
usually uniform throughout the city, transport varies greatly 
in both respects from one part of the city to another. Hence 
the other activities that make up the life of the city are 
dependent upon the transport facilities that link them
together. The physical structure of the city, its size and
spread, its way of life and character, are all dependent upon
the nature and quality of its transport system.
Therefore, transport plans cannot be sensibly conceived
without land-use plans, and vice versa. As cities grow, 
congestion spreads, becomes more unpredictable, and the cost is 
alarmingly high in terms of time, energy and efficiency 
(Thomson 1983). Time -- being equally available to everybody 
as a resource and a constraint -- is more easily applicable 
than money as a common denominator for everything that is going 
on. Movement, for example, takes time just as do sleeping, 
eating, working, shopping, playing or merely sitting idle. But 
the primary purpose of movement is to overcome distance. 
Distance itself is a friction obstructing mobility. The 
absolute contrast to immobility is provided by the fantastic 
means of transport existing in ancient tales -- the flying 
carpet -- which in no time takes its passenger to any desired 
destination. Now, assuming that the flying carpet is a real 
possibility, it would be a wonderful asset as long as only a 
few people owned one. If it became generally available -- in 
the way the motor car has become -- the aggregate outcome would 
be absurd. This would be so even if the limitations of space 
and energy could be overcome. Mobility beyond a certain limit 
is in all probability destructive for human society 
(Hagerstrand 1987).
The real test of a transport system is therefore whether 
people can obtain access to their activities without undue 
expenditure of time, money and effort. Accessibility, not 
mobility, is what matters. Accessibility is a function of 
three factors: the pattern of land use, the distribution of
people in relation to the land use, and the transport system. 
Each of these factors is influenced by the other two and 
together they form a triangle of forces that must be balanced 
if people in a large city are to obtain efficiently the many 
amenities and opportunities it offers (Thomson 1983). Clearly, 
the imagined case of maximum mobility is in itself of little 
interest, since the flying carpet will for ever remain in the 
world of tales (Hagerstrand 1987). It is not surprising that 
tackling urban transport problems is a learning process with a 
long time frame. There are few "quick fixes". Indeed most urban 
infrastructure projects take ten years from identification to 
operation and their subsequent benefits accrue over an economic 
life of at least 20 years (ADB 1989).
1.3 Demand for Travel in Third World Cities
Demand for urban public transport services is growing at 
a rapid rate throughout the developing world due largely to 
growth in city area, population and small increases in wealth. 
Over the last twenty years, the demand for public transport in 
the Third World has grown rapidly due largely to the 
considerable rise in population in major cities. In 1960, the 
UN reported 53 cities in developing countries with a population
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of more than 1 million: by the year 2000, the UN forecasts that 
there will be a total of about 300 such cities and by 2025 a 
total of about 500. By the end of the century it is forecast 
that there will be 144 cities in the world with populations in 
excess of 4 million, with 123 (85%) of these in the developing 
world (Jacobs et al 1987). Of the 57 cities expected to have 
population in excess of 5 million by the year 2000, 41 will be 
in the Less Developed Regions (LDRs) and 18 will be in the 
poorest countries, where income per capita is below $360 per 
annum (Fouracre 1984).
Currently the 340 million urban dwellers in cities of over 
1 million population in Less Developed Countries (LDCs) 
undertake something like 400 - 500 million trips per day, of 
which perhaps 30 - 40 percent will be by some form of public 
transport. The additional 600 million inhabitants expected to 
settle in these, and similar size emerging cities by the end of 
the century will add not only proportionately to total trip 
making (assuming that present rates of trip making per capita 
do not change appreciably) but more than proportionately to the 
total person-kilometres generated. As cities expand in size 
and area, so trip lengths will undoubtedly increase and as a 
consequence, person-kilometres, which for transport operators 
is a more relevant expression of transport demand, will 
increase at a faster rate than person trips (Fouracre 1984). 
It has been suggested that for every additional 1,000 people in 
Third World cities, an extra 350 - 400 public transport trips
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per day will be generated. Similarly, for every additional 
square kilometre of city growth, an extra 500 public transport 
trips per day will be generated (Jacobs et al 1987).
Relationships have also been found to exist between income 
and public transport usage. In contrast to what is found in 
the developed world, in developing countries an increase in 
income leads to a marked increase in bus patronage. And overall 
the personal motorized vehicle ownership is likely to increase 
with real incomes, and continue to be concentrated in urban 
areas. Despite continued high growth in private motor vehicle 
ownership (cars and motor-cycles), together with walking and 
cycling, public transport remains the backbone of urban travel 
in the Third World. With increasing city size the burden of
commuter trips will increasingly fall upon public transport as
longer trip lengths will discourage walking and cycling as 
convenient alternatives (Fouracre 1984).
Meanwhile, the urban public transport sector in developing 
countries is broadly characterized by its high growth rate, its 
diversity and in many cases its poor financial performance 
(See, for example, table 1). Typically there are 10 to 30 buses 
per 100,000 population in Third World cities as compared to 50 
to 80 per 100,000 population in European cities (Fouracre
1984). The estimated half-million buses operating in cities 
of over 100,000 are unable to meet the total demands of the 
travelling public (Jacobs et al 1986). It has been estimated 
that there were on average about 40 percent fewer buses per
12
head of population in Third World cities even though the levels 
of car and motor cycle ownership were much lower than in the 
industrialized countries. Similarly, the number of route 
kilometres per head of population was about half that in Europe 
and North America (Jacobs et al 1987). While 80% of cities 
in the developed world of more than 2 million population have 
metros, only one quarter of similar sized cities in the 
developing world have such a facility (Fouracre 1984). (See 
fig. 1) (This will be discussed further in the next section).
One of the greatest challenges to financing urban 
development in developing countries is the relatively low 
income of the urban populations. Not only are many cities 
growing at unprecedented rates but the income levels are 
strikingly low. National GNP per capita figures illustrate that 
high urban growth is occurring in countries with very low per 
capita incomes. Moreover, the incidence of urban poverty is 
high with ranges from 20 to 80 percent of total urban 
population estimated for Asian countries (See, for example, ADB 
1989).
Overall, the soaring rates of population growth and 
private car ownership pose a real threat to the existing Third 
World urban system. Despite the much greater volume of private 
vehicles in developed cities, it is the developing cities that 
in general suffer most from traffic congestion, road accidents, 
environmental pollution, overcrowding of public transport and 
poor conditions for pedestrians and cyclists. On the other
15
hand, developed cities tend to 
difficulties and infrequent public
suffer more 
transport.
from parking
Table 1:
Government-owned Bus 
Selected Southeast
Companies in 
Asian Cities
City, country and company Date founded Performance
Bangkok, Thailand
Great City Transport Company
Bangkok Mass Transit Authority
1976
1976
na
loss
Jakarta, Indonesia 
Penang Kutan Penumpang 1979 loss
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 
Sri Jaya Denderaan Sdn. Bhd. loss
14
Manila, Philippines
Metro Manila Transit Corporation 1974 loss
Penang, Malaysia
Lembaga Pengurus Kerajaan Tempatan loss
Singapore
Singapore Bus Service Ltd. 1978 profit
Surabaya, Indonesia 
PN Damri 1974 loss
Source: after Rimmer 1986a; Roschlau 1989.
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1.4 Metro: A Distant Dream
During the 1950s and 1960s policy-makers in the Third World 
were bombarded with advice to concentrate their resources upon 
large-scale, capital-intensive transport activities such as 
light railways, metro systems and fleets of large buses. In a 
way, the governments have been encouraged to assume control of 
the public transport industry, expanding state ownership and to 
penetrate local market for transport equipment and consulting 
services (Roschlau 1989). The question is: Can sophisticated
transport systems, such as metros, and direct state control
save the Third World city?
In the developed world metros have become the backbone of 
the transport system in most large cities (outside the USA). 
They are often recognized as essential to civilized urban life 
and thus their image shines brightly in developing countries. 
After the shabby, crammed bus jolting along seething, smelly 
roads in the sweltering or pelting climate of the tropics, the 
sleek, clean efficiency of the metro, with its "first world" 
air of modernity, comes as a prodigious improvement. Thus
metros are politically popular -- that "metros gain votes", 
something which improvements to bus operations cannot achieve. 
In this context, a metro brings prestige to the city and also
to the man who "built" it. It is perhaps not surprising to see 
that some metro projects have been closely linked with the
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mayor and have been a major selling point at elections. Several 
others have been promoted by the personal intervention of the 
head of the state. The credit that politicians hope to acquire 
from the opening of a metro is thus an important factor 
(Allport et al 1990). Indeed, for governments seeking landmarks 
and monuments in their honour, political prestige, internal 
control and international status have often clouded the purpose 
of building a metro (Roschlau 1989).
In respect of mass movement, the motive for constructing 
metros is a revolution in the quality of public transport, as 
regards speed and comfort. It is thought that a metro would 
relieve congestion by reducing the number of passenger vehicles 
on the road, as well as release the tension of land use on the 
ground. This prospect particularly appeals to the private 
motorists, who often have little intention of using the metro 
themselves.
However, experiences from Cairo, Sao Paulo and many other 
cities indicate that metros are no cure for traffic problems. 
First, the capacity of the metro is limited. This is because 
the typical developing city is rather class conscious in that 
the citizens are segregated geographically by income level, 
whilst the metro network is often designed to serve high 
density corridors which are usually in lower income areas. In 
the absence of integration with buses, its catchment-area is 
confined to passengers within walking distance from tne 
station. Second, in contrast to the expectation of relieving
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congestion, the construction of a metro seems to cause even 
more disruption. Construction is usually cut-and-cover or 
elevated along the most important traffic arteries. When 
building metros through old, heavily built-up areas in 
developing countries, difficulties and delays are unavoidable. 
And since construction seldom goes according to plan, 
implementation tends to be longer than expected. (Typically it 
would take 5 years for each line). For instance, in Hong Kong 
the disruption from the first lines, which were cut-and-cover, 
was so bad that the Island line had to be designed as a tunnel. 
In Manila the closure of two main roads created such an outcry 
from the owners of frontage properties, faced with bankruptcy 
as they became inaccessible to customers, that new construction 
methods were needed (Allport et al 1990). Overall, metros do 
not significantly improve traffic conditions. In most cases 
they carry only a small or modest proportion of all public 
transport passengers. In Beijing, for example, the metro 
carries less than 1% of the total public transport passenger 
volume (BRIUPD 1990).
If constructing a metro has already represented the 
greatest investment a city will ever make, causing a heavy 
drain on foreign exchange, then the running of the system could 
cost even more. Metros are hugely expensive to run and almost 
certain to lose money. So far, no metro appears likely to be 
financially viable, only the Hong Kong Mass Railway approaches 
financial viability. Most metros (two thirds) in fact require
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an annual operating subsidy (Allport et al 1990).
In terms of social equality, metros bring little benefit 
to the poorest people who cannot afford to use public 
transport. The low-income group can use the metro only when it 
is heavily subsidized. On the whole, metros offer no real 
solution to the transport problem in developing cities as their 
proponents often believe. They can best play a partial role in 
solving the transport problem. For this reason nowadays few 
international aid agencies would support them. Finance is 
therefore a crucial problem and consequently, the dream of a 
metro remains distant for many developing countries wishing to 
build a metro.
1.5 The "Cradle" of Paratransit
The urban transport problem is fundamentally similar in all 
large cities. But while the problems are similar, the solutions 
are not. Rich cities can afford motorways, multistorey 
carparks, rapid transit and sophisticated control systems and 
can fund lavish subsidies if they so wish (Thomson 1983); 
whereas poor countries cannot. Therefore, there is a wide 
disparity in the supply of public transport between cities.
By international standards, in most Third World cities.
2 0
public transport supply is characterized by a wide variety of 
physical and organizational forms; compared with the First 
world cities, the level of provision of conventional bus 
services is low. This shortfall is to a large extent made up 
by the operation of "Paratransit" services (Table 2). In the
Far Eastern cities -- the "cradle" of paratransit -- there are
not only paratransit services but also what may be called 
"paratransit cultures".
Before explaining paratransit in detail, it is necessary 
to introduce briefly the "cradle" in which this form of 
transport service originated. First of all, the term "Far 
East" refers to the region of Asia adjoining the Pacific Ocean. 
Apart from Japan, which itself is a world economic power, most 
countries there are categorized by the United Nations as
developing countries, including the "capitalist" ones such as 
the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and so on and
the "socialist" economies such as China and Vietnam. 
Geographically, these countries are in the western area of 
Pacific Basin. Taken collectively, with exceptions, the group 
is unique in the Third World because of its development 
success. Despite variations in the level of growth, these 
countries share many common features in economic development 
as well as in culture and political life (See, for example, 
Leinbach 1989). (NB: save the political systems in China,
Vietnam, Laos and Campuchia)
There are many cities of over one million inhabitants in
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this region. The most apparent similarities in urban geography 
are implied in the pattern of land use and traffic flow. For 
instance, in the classic Western stereotype of the city, with a 
Central Business District (CBD) surrounded by residential 
areas, one can often expect to find a heavy tidal flow of 
passenger movements at the beginning and end to the working day 
and for this to be concentrated into relatively few corridors 
in which high-capacity modes, such as rail, might be 
appropriate; whereas in the Far Eastern countries, most cities 
show high residential densities even in their geographical 
centres and their office and commercial functions may be fairly 
dispersed. This very mixed pattern of land use results in a 
diverse criss-cross of movements in addition to the "classic" 
radial flow. Therefore, in respect of urban transport planning, 
this group of countries is almost an ideal regional laboratory 
for examining and contrasting the functions of urban transport 
systems and especially their role in urban development.
Although the urban transport problems are similar among 
most Far Eastern developing countries, differences exist in the 
level of motorization and in the distribution of ownership by 
mode, caused in part by differences in income levels and, more 
importantly, by differences in urban transport policies. For 
example, Kuala Lumpur has an automobile ownership rate over 
seven times that of Seoul, although Malaysia and South Korea 
have similar per capita incomes. Bangkok has one and a half 
times as many automobile owners per capita as Manila, although
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Thailand's per capita income in 1982 was roughly equal to that 
of the Philippines (Linn 1987). Whereas in the socialist 
countries, private car ownership is almost negligible.
In common with most Third World countries, the public 
transport systems in the Far East developing cities consist of 
a wide assortment of modes ranging from traditional man-powered 
rickshaws and horse drawn carts, minibuses to the conventional 
taxi, bus, tram and rail systems of the industrialized world. 
These systems are categorized by operational features (either 
flexible or fixed route) and by the conventionality of the 
hardware employed (vehicles being either standard or small 
sized) (See table 3). This latter attribute is arbitrary; it 
simply reflects whether or not the vehicles fit the 
"conventional" model of road-based urban public transport as 
found in the western world, i.e., the standard single-deck, 
double-deck, and articulated vehicles, operated in large 
fleets.
The most common physical feature of paratransit is their 
small capacity, which can vary from only two seats to twenty 
five seats. Thus the jeepneys, "mosquito", songthau or silor, 
opelet, kolt, mikrolet, bemo and xich-lo are classified as 
unconventional. The "professional" minibus can be seen as the 
latest version of "paratransit family" (See, for example, 
Spencer 1989; Silcock 1979; Case et al 1981). In the Far East 
most minibuses are 16-seaters, whilst the 25 - 30-seaters are 
known as "midibuses". By contrast in Britain and some other
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developed countries passenger vehicles of up to 35 seats or 
even over are just referred to as minibuses. On the whole, the 
catalogue of unconventional transport covers small vehicles of 
various types and there is no universal definition based on 
capacity. However, it should be noted that, the conventional 
taxi is excluded from paratransit for it does not offer 
collectively-consumed services. It charges one fare per any one 
charter service rather than one fare per passenger.
The early stage of paratransit development in Southeast 
Asia did not actually go through any formal pattern, rather, 
it was a spontaneous process. In the case of Manila, the 
"Jeepneys" - a sister version of the minibus, actually grew out 
of army jeeps left by American G.Is after the Second World War. 
(Now many operators have replaced tne jeepneys witn formal 
minibuses - See, for example, JICA). In Hong Kong, tne early 
minibuses were initially vans or van-like vehicles used by 
factory-owners to carry tneir employees when the public 
transport system was paralysed during waves of general strikes 
in the late 1960s; and after tne industrial disputes tnese 
vehicles were gradually licensed to provide passenger services 
for the general public (See, for example, Barden et al 1986). 
Thus, on the whole, most paratransit systems have developed in 
an unplanned and informal way, often illegally at first though 
later incorporated into some sort of regulated pattern. Some 
services have developed because there is no other form of 
transport available, others compete directly witn conventional
24
rail or bus operations; some are licensed, others may still be 
illegal. In general, most paratransit services have "just 
grown", rather than resulting from sophisticated plans. Whilst 
such evolution does not guarantee desirability in a social 
context, or ensure "adequate" standards of safety, the systems 
which have evolved do seem to perform well with respect to 
local conditions and needs. Above all, it is generally accepted 
tnat paratransit is a spontaneous innovation in the Far Eastern 
cities. The term "paratransit" or "unconventional transport" 
does not occur in local parlance but is nonetheless a useful 
generic term to describe these various forms of transport 
services.
Paratransit vehicles may vary in shape and differ in terms 
of decor, motive power, capacity, and other features, yet they 
do share similar features in various aspects, and it is because 
of these common features that paratransit is also known as 
"intermediate", "unincorporated", "unregulated", and even 
"informal" transit to emphasise the "spontaneous", "artisan", 
and "freebooting" character (Bovy et al 1979). The next section 
will discuss these common features in detail.
25
Table 2
Public Passenger Transport Systems 
in Selected Far Eastern Cities
Ci ty Population
(million)
Metro & lignt Rail Conventional Minibus 
bus & Trolleys
Bangkok 5.5 59km light rail 5,574 vehic. 7,000 to 
15,000
Beij ing 8.7 35km full metro 4,007** 1,200**
Hong Kong 5.35 26km full metro 3,494
(exclu, trams)
4,350
Jakarta 7.2 Suburban railways 
47km*
2,350 Numerous
small
vehicles
2 6
Kuala Lumpur 1.1 15km light rail* 591 423
Manila 7.5 15km light rail 321 3,000
(plus 2,500) minis 
Private buses & 28,000
j itneys
Source: modified from Jane's Transport Systems 1985.
* extracted from Roschlau 1989.
** Beijing: Conventional buses include articulated buses and
trolleys. Figures based on data from BRIUPD, 1990. Minibuses 
include state-owned and collectively-owned.
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Table 3:
Conventional and Unconventional Transport Systems
In Far Eastern Cities
Mode Subtype Routes Stops Fares Capacity
Conventional
Rail Suburban rail Fixed Fixed Fixed 1,000+
Me tro Fixed Fixed Fixed 1,000+
Lignt Rail
(LRT) Fixed Fixed Fixed 250
Standard bus
Double decker Fixed Fixed Fixed 90
Single decker Fixed Fixed Fixed 50
Taxi Flexible Flexible Meter or
negotiated 4
Unconventional
28
Man-powered Flexible Flexible negotiated 1-2
(Vietnam)*
Xich-lo
(Indonesia, Malaysia)
Oj ek
Pedal trishaw 
Pecak
Philippines
Tricycle
(Thailand)
Samlor
(Beijing)*
Sanlunche
Horse-drawn Flexible Flexible negotiated 2-4
(Indonesia)
Bendi
(Philippines)
Calesa, Tartanilla 
Mechanized Fixed Flexible Fixed or 6-13
negotiated
(Indonesia)
Opelet 
Bemo
(Philippines)
Jeepney
2 9
(Thailand)
Songthau
Silor
'Professional' Unconventional vehicles (in most cities)
Midibus Fixed Fixed Fixed 20-35
Minibus Fixed Fixed Fixed 14-20
Variable Flexible Flexible
Source: after Rimmer 1986a; Spencer 1989. * from the author's
own material.
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1.6 Informality of Technology, Structure and Service Style
Paratransit, or unconventional transport has commonly been 
regarded as part of the "informal sector" of the urban economy. 
The term "informal sector" was introduced by the economist 
Keith Hart to denote self-employed occupations recruiting 
labour on a casual rather than a regular basis, and which
people resorted to as a means of survival and which they would 
leave if regular paid employment became available (Hart, 1973). 
The concept was subsequently adopted by the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) which attempted to draw up a series 
of criteria for classifying occupations or enterprises as 
either "formal" or "informal".
According to criteria (See, for example, Dick et al 
1980), the "formal sector" often involves foreign or state
ownership and large-scale corporation. The organizational 
structure is often characterized by high levels of bureaucracy 
and complexity which tend to increase with firm size. By 
contrast, the "informal sector" is mainly based on non­
corporate structure and traditional working practice, under 
which the relationships between the employees and the 
undertaking largely rely on personalized control and kinship
ties. Paratransit vehicles lend themselves more directly to
small-scale private enterprise, because smaller vehicles are 
less expensive and easier to build (Ocampo 1982). Consequently,
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in developing countries, generally paratransit operators 
embrace a continuum from unincorporated individual and family 
undertakings (*informal*) to registered limited companies owned 
by a group of investors. In most cases the employees hire a 
vehicle for a fixed daily rate, pay their own fuel, oil and 
protection money out of fares collected and take home the
surplus revenue. On the other hand, because of the huge amounts 
of capital required, the more sophisticated conventional 
systems tend to be confined to government-owned enterprises and 
foreign-owned firms (See, for example, Dick et al 1980).
The technology used by the paratransit industry is also 
"informal" in that it is innovative and largely based on 
locally obtainable hardware. The "intermediate" category 
embraces all the modified or converted vehicles that are
tailored for local taste. Most of these vehicles or parts are
obtainable because they are locally produced at knockdown costs 
with indigenous technology and materials. They are either 
converted jeeps or vans, improved cab versions of a motor-cycle 
or a bicycle or just small buses. The human-powered becak, 
which appeared on the Indonesian scene shortly before World War 
II and flourished thereafter, was essentially a pedal-driven 
tricycle with an open cab that could seat two, or sometimes
three, passengers (Pendakur 1984). Although some paratransit 
vehicles (i.e., the 'professional* minibus) do come from 
abroad, they too can be repaired and maintained satisfactorily 
with local technology. Thus, in comparison, whilst
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unconventional transport is originally a popular innovation, 
conventional transport equipment, on the other hand, is 
normally purchased through certain high-cost distribution 
channels; and in developing countries where motor vehicles are 
mainly imported through custom offices, it is not uncommon to 
see that capital costs are an increasing function that 
gradually rises with the size of vehicle (or the number of 
seats) (Chujoh 1989).
However, the "informality" of unconventional transport 
does not merely refer to ownership, organizational pattern and 
technology; the style of operation is also distinctively 
informal compared with conventional bus services. Generally, 
operators are free to choose routes, frequency, and hours of 
operation. The services they provide do not entirely resemble 
those of the taxi or the conventional stage-bus, but rather 
they lie between the two. They can be seen acting as small
buses, on fixed routes with fixed fares, as do the jeepneys in
Manila. They can be seen with variable routes, variable fare 
operations (minibuses in Hong Kong), and as variable-route 
shared taxis (the silor in Chieng Mai); on the whole, fixed 
stopping points are not usually followed while fares are
normally determined by a crudely-enforced consensus among the 
operators themselves (Spencer 1989; see also Silcock 1981). 
Overall, the range of spatial and temporal characteristics of 
paratransit services contrast with the fixed space (the 
'route') and fixed time (the 'schedule') attributes of
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conventional transport (See fig. 2). There is no obvious means 
of classification or particularly appropriate title which 
successfully describes the paratransit services in existence.
Above all, the "informality” of paratransit includes ease 
of entry, reliance upon local rather than foreign capital and 
resources, small-scale family operation, labour-intensive 
methods using adapted rather than purpose-built technology, 
freely competitive rather than regulated markets, flexibility 
in its times and places of operation, and a tendency of 
flouting official regulations (Dick et al 1980). Thus, 
paratransit services, as pointed out by Grava (1978), "...
appear to be different, but this is primarily because of 
variations in hardware -- from bicycle rickshaws to sleek 
European minibuses. The institutional structure and basic 
operations are quite similar: private individuals acquire tne
highest technology vehicle that they can afford, and respond to 
the mobility demands of their neighbours at a tariff that most 
of them can pay".
Following the unplanned forms of genesis in the early 
days, some later paratransit systems have been facilitated in a 
rather formal fashion. For example, in 1975, an entire system 
of 400 minibuses was introduced in Kuala Lumpur under the 
assistance of the World Bank (See, for example, Walters 1979a; 
1979b; White 1981a). During the 1980s the use of minibus as an 
innovative measure for urban passenger service spread out 
further. Today minibus transport has proliferated in areas
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well beyond its cradle (See, for example, Hamer 1983; Murrell 
et al 1986; Heels 1987a, 1987b; Walmsley 1985).
1.7 The Theoretical Debates
That paratransit has an important role to play for mass 
movement in cities has been an inclusive argument for more than 
a decade. On the whole, it has been argued that as a
passenger carrier, the paratransit vehicle is effective and 
efficient, especially in urban areas with mixed land use 
pattern. Furthermore, most paratransit undertakings are likely 
to be profitable whereas nationalized giants or publicly-owned 
huge bus fleets are often loss-making (see, for example, 
Walters 1979a; 1979b; 1982; Roth 1985; 1987; Rimmer 1986a;
Barden et al 1986). Thus public bus companies are in general 
vulnerable to competition from paratransit undertakings. 
Manila's bus network for example, has contracted in the face of 
the jeepneys and would have shrunk even more had the government 
not ceased to permit jeepney franchises along main bus routes 
(Dick 1981).
The theoretical debates about paratransit, therefore, 
surround its three main features: small vehicle size, private 
ownership and small business scale. Advocates of minibus, for
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example, argue that small size is an obvious advantage in 
urban traffic. It is claimed that with a compact body, 
minibuses are more manoeuvrable than conventional sized buses 
and can accelerate and decelerate faster. Often, they are the 
only form of transport able to to penetrate the labyrinth of 
narrow streets sometimes found in the old quarters of cities 
(Dick et al 1980; UN 1989; Walters et al 1980; Rimmer 1984; 
Pendakur 1984; Banister et al 1990). Furthermore, the lower 
capacity means that, on average, fewer passengers will be 
carried, so that minibuses make fewer stops to pick up and set 
down passengers and that total boarding and alighting times at 
each stop will be lower; therefore they can achieve higher 
journey speeds than conventional buses do (Ocampo 1982; 
Banister et al 1990), which in turn improves its output of seat 
miles and benefits passengers by reducing their time in the 
vehicle (See, for example, Glaister 1985). Small size is also 
thought to have implied positive effects on service frequency 
and convenience. Since more minibuses than conventional buses 
are required to provide the same passenger carrying capacity, 
it is therefore argued that minibuses will provide a higher 
service frequency. A higher frequency service will operate at a 
lower mean headway, and so offer a shorter average passenger 
waiting time (see, for example, Oldfield et al 1988).
Obviously, in order to penetrate narrow streets, small 
size is a necessity. In addition, flexibility of service is 
also a key determinant. Since minibus services are more closely
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aligned with taxis than conventional buses, as well as offering 
flexibility over space, minibuses offer flexibility over time 
(Jansson 1980). What is more, several small vehicles can serve 
a wider range of destinations than one large vehicle, and 
because each carries fewer people it can more easily adopt ad 
hoc route variations to suit individual passengers. Thus, they 
are particularly suitable for low levels of off-peak patronage 
and scattered inhabitants (Glaister 1985, 1986).
Besides the physical factor, private ownership is also 
essential for high service quality. For instance, paratransit 
drivers are most familiar with the precise nature of passenger 
demand and they are able to adjust their service to suit 
changes very rapidly. Vehicles occasionally deviate from their 
usual routes to bring passengers closer to their destinations, 
or can alter the route to allow for shifts in demand patterns. 
They are thereby also able to circumvent accidents, traffic 
bottlenecks or other temporary problems (See, for example, 
Roschlau, 1989).
The reasons for the financial viability of the privately- 
owned transport firm, be it a taxi driver, or a bus operator, 
are well known and typical of other types of small business in 
the service sector. Within the paratransit industry, operators 
have to assume all costs involved and the net incomes of the 
employees are usually related to their performance. In Manila, 
for example, bus crews receive a commission on the basis of 
fares collected and are in a sense self-employed; Jakarta's
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private operators hire their buses to the crews, who then 
retain the fares they collect. Thus, with private ownership, 
"... the owner is willing to work longer and less regular hours 
than is a paid bus driver in a large fleet. He will clean his 
own vehicle (or enlist the help of family members) and is 
likely to do the routine servicing and maintenance himself. He 
will not have his own depot but will service his vehicle on 
the street or at a local garage. His recordkeeping will be 
minimal; just sufficient to keep the tax inspector at bay. He 
will make a greater effort than a paid driver to collect fares 
from passengers and to ensure that the amounts collected do not 
get lost on the way" (Roth 1985). Since whatever profit that 
is gained is put into his pocket, he has every incentive to 
ensure that his operations are efficient and to make quick 
decisions regarding his service such as modifying fare levels, 
trying out new areas, opening up new routes, and in general, 
trying his best to reduce costs and maximize profits (See, for 
example, HKTD 1988).
Therefore, Dick et al (1980) conclude that the fertility 
of paratransit is due mainly to private ownership, whereby 
higher productivity can be gained at lower costs. Within the 
non-corporate organization, such as a family transport firm, 
"there is usually a close link between ownership and control 
and heavy reliance upon personal relationships based upon 
kinship and common ethnic or geographic origin to ensure 
loyalty to individuals within the organization rather than to
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the organization itself". Dick et al (1980) note that, "these
personal loyalties are usually reinforced by financial
incentives in the form of profit-sharing systems of 
remuneration. Whereas the corporate form of organization is 
'rational bureaucratic* and there is usually a separation of 
ownership and control: professional managers and their
employees are expected to subordinate their own personal goals 
to those of the impersonal organisation in a mechanized way", 
whereby employees work for salaries rather than for extra 
dividends. Apparently, workers' indifferent attitudes within 
the corporate company are thought to have demoralizing effects 
on its business vitality. By contrast, higher labour efficiency 
is the most decisive factor which makes the private firm more 
energetic.
Besides small vehicle size and private ownership, however, 
institutional structure is also observed to have contributed to 
financial viability of the paratransit firm (Walters 1979a; 
Roth et al 1984; Roth 1985; 1987). Large number of small sized 
firms means that the concentration of ownership within the 
industry is low and thus competition is fierce. "Here is 
evidence that a high level of service over a wide area can be 
provided by small firms, as long as the organisational 
structure of the industry is appropriate". "Taxis are a case in 
point", writes Roth (1985), "while some may be operated as one- 
person firms, and some in large fleets, there is no need for 
any formal coordination to achieve an acceptable level of
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service. Taxis find their way to where the business is most 
profitable and provide an example of coordination through 
competition. Obviously, a single operator cannot cover a whole 
route, but a route can be covered by a large number of 
individual operators organized, if necessary, as a route
association".
Apart from better utilization, flexible routing, lower 
capital cost, and ease of maintenance, the tendency towards 
small vehicles stems from a number of other factors, as argued 
by Armstrong-Wright et al (1987): "Drivers of small buses often 
have to meet less stringent requirements for driving permits 
than do drivers of large buses and thus can be paid less; 
inspection requirements for small buses may also be less costly 
than for large buses". What is more, "Fares are easier to 
collect on small buses than on large buses, and the chances of 
revenue leakage are much reduced". As several operators may 
be serving a route, they organize dispatchers at terminals to 
ensure that the vehicles leave in an orderly and equitable 
sequence so that unhealthy competition is avoided. Thus, when 
comparing the two types of buses, most commentators (See for 
example, Roth 1985) have come to the conclusion that large 
buses have higher costs than small ones, even when providing 
similar services, because "they have less flexibility in making 
the best use of their resources and because they pay more in 
total to their (typically larger) workforce".
In conclusion, the dynamics of paratransit has been
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attributed mainly to four factors which lay the keystone of the 
theoretical expectations for minibus transport:
a. Small vehicle size,
b. Small scale business,
c. Private ownership, and
d. Effective co-ordination.
1.8 The "Wisdom" Thinking in Urban Transport Planning
While the failure of the metros and rapid light railways 
casts a shadow over the solution that relies on conventional 
hardware, paratransit, on the other hand, offers some hope for 
transport planners in the Third World. As the jeepneys in 
Manila, the converted vans in Bangkok, and the minibuses in 
Hong Kong have demonstrated, economies of vehicle size do not 
appear to exist in urban bus operations; rather, there are 
diseconomies of size. The case of Kuala Lumpur is particularly 
instructive.
The contrast in institutional framework between the 
operators of conventional vehicles and unconventional vehicles 
is sharpened by the comparative profitability of the two types; 
privately owned small fleets of unconventional vehicles are 
profitable whereas conventional buses, usually organized in
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large fleets and often run by local or central government, are 
seemingly difficult to maintain as a commercial enterprise. 
Public urban bus companies in serious difficulties are found in 
Jakarta, Bangkok, and Manila, just to mention three. They are 
characterized by poor services and maintenance, a low 
proportion of buses in service, labour strife, poor management, 
and serious financial losses. In contrast, Walters (1979a, 
1979b) reports that private bus companies have operated very 
successfully in Chiangmai and Hong Kong. In Seoul, ninety 
privately operated bus companies provide comprehensive urban 
services without subsidization. And in Bangkok and Manila 
successful private bus operators coexist with the troubled 
public bus companies (Linn 1987).
Inevitably the question is raised as to why loss-making 
conventional bus services should be maintained and developed 
when paratransit systems should seem to offer a cheaper 
alternative. This view recognizes that in an environment 
isolated from local control and competition, centralized public 
transport systems increasingly are being challenged as 
unresponsive, inefficient, and inflexible (Rimmer 1987). A 
considerable debate has been generated from this simple 
question of which type of public transport system to encourage 
(Rimmer 1980). The debate has often been confused because it 
involves two quite separate issues:
a) Whether the provision of public transport should be left 
entirely to the government;
43
b) The technical and economic benefits of different sized 
buses.
The development of paratransit systems has, therefore, 
generated controversy over the use of small or large vehicles, 
the encouragement of small or large enterprises, and whether 
the public transport sector should be privately-operated or 
nationalized (See, for example. White 1981b; Rimmer 1987; 
Walters 1988; Lave 1985). The argument arises as some World 
Bank economists, notably Roth (1985), have been at the 
forefront of arguing that minibuses, for example, have 
functions beyond that of the feeder role for line-haul vehicles 
mapped out for them by planners. There is no reason why 
minibuses should not also offer: (1) metropolitan-wide services 
(for example, jeepneys in Manila); (2) higher quality services 
(for instance, public light buses in Hong Kong); or (3) 
specialized line-haul services (for example, supplementary 
public transport services in Singapore) (Britton, 1980a, 
1980b).
Central to this conception of how public transport systems 
should function are the principles of choice, diversity, and 
competition. There is a school of thought that challenges the 
conventional wisdom that large buses in large organizations 
with subsidies to produce optimum frequencies are the best 
arrangement for urban road passenger transport . Hence the 
policies adopted, or proposed, for public transport in 
developing countries generally have been classified into those
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which follow the "conventional" and the "unconventional" wisdom 
(Rimmer et al 1980). This distinction is made on the basis of 
the types of transport which the planners favour: the "formal" 
(or corporate) or the "informal" (non-corporate) sector, with 
the former including the metro, light rail and standard buses, 
whilst the trishaw, pecak, jeepney and the professional minibus 
are perceived as the linchpin of unconventional wisdom (Rimmer 
1980).
In terms of tactics, the conventional wisdom is meant to 
stress the problem of congestion and to attribute it to a 
failure of indigenous technology and the market mechanism. The 
unconventional wisdom, in contrast, lays more emphasis on the 
issues of resources and of affordability and blames the 
transport problem on excessive reliance on capital rather than 
cheap labour. The dispute over these two "schools of thought" 
has been going on over the past decades. In this respect, the 
recent developments of minibus services in the People’s 
Republic of China have provided a platform for looking into 
this i s s u e a  fresh perspective.
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Chapter II
CHINA: A CHANGING CLIMATE AND NEW CHALLENGE
2.1 Introduction
The first three sections of this chapter describe the 
strategic changes that have occurred in China's development 
policy since the Communist Party came to power in 1949. There 
had been some fundamental changes in urban economy prior to the 
end of the "Cultural Revolution", though marked shift of policy 
in fact gained momentum in 1978 when the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party announced the plan to reduce the influence 
of party politics imposed on industry. Enterprises were given 
greater power in management and decision-making. Old fashioned 
business practices were abolished while a market-orientated 
production policy was gradually established. These changes have 
had profound impacts on virtually all sectors of the urban 
economy. At the same time, because of the increasing population 
within the cities, pressure on the existing public transport 
systems grew rapidly. The state-dominated transport industry 
could no longer meet the challenge, the need for change was
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obvious. Thus, restructuring within the transport sector took 
place.
The last two sections set the scene for the case study: 
the hypothesis and research methodology applied.
2.2 The changes of Development Policy and the Economic 
Reform Since 1978
China - the "Middle Kingdom" - has been the most populous 
nation on Earth for the last two thousand years, and still is 
today. Its population has always constituted about one quarter 
of mankind throughout this period of world history (Schinz 
1989). Since the Second World War China's involvement in 
international affairs increasingly becomes significant. "The 
success of the Far Eastern Newly Industrializing Countries 
(NICs ) has left in disarray much of the conventional wisdom 
concerning economic development in poor countries... Japan and 
the East Asian NICs, however, are not the whole of the region, 
nor can they entirely monopolize the limelight of economic 
triumph... economic growth in China since the new reforms began 
in 1978 has considerably increased in pace, bringing China much 
closer to the exceptional speed of development of her East 
Asian capitalist rivals. Thus, the study of East Asia's
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success must now include China... China's participation in the 
regional economic miracle suggests that the explanation of that 
miracle may lie deeper than ideological distinctions" (Gray
1988).
Although being a socialist nation, since the 1980s China 
has claimed to be distinguished from the rest of the Communist 
world in that she possesses the so-called "Chinese
characteristics". What does this exactly mean is not entirely
clear, nonetheless some studies do regard the PRC as belonging
to a unique category, being neither entirely "socialist" (that 
is, similar to Eastern Europe) nor "developing" (Third World), 
nor "Western". However, in order to understand its process of 
economic development, it is necessarytolook back briefly the 
country's recent political and economic history.
Since* the founding of the People's Republic in 1949 until 
late 1978, China had been mainly implementing economic 
strategies based on the Soviet model. Under this autocratic 
planning system, almost all major economic sectors were 
nationalized. There was no private ownership for business 
enterprises. Investments in extended reproduction and other 
expenses were also centrally controlled and allocated to 
various localities, enterprises, and institutions through the 
government ministries by designated items (See, for example, 
Wang 1982).
During this period, too, the Chinese government emphasized 
on a full employment policy. For all classes of workers, China
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implemented a system of lifetime employment that is quite 
unique: workers were assigned to an enterprise and
subsequently the bulk of real income was supplied in kind from 
the enterprise. Reinforcing this system was that workers 
typically received their housing, health care, and often even 
education for their children directly form the enterprise. 
However, there was little scope for increasing one's real
income, save through the important mechanism of obtaining 
employment for family members. Wage increases were based only 
on seniority though the distinction between managers and 
workers was not great. Nonetheless, workers were assured of 
their "Iron rice bowls" and able to "eat from the same big 
wok". That is to say, notwithstanding what actual contribution 
one has made to the enterprise, one would share the same 
benefits as other workers and could not be quit or be fired. 
Egalitarianism thus became prevalent and workers had little
incentive to work regularly, diligently, or efficiently.
Absenteeism, waste of raw materials, low quality of output, and 
the like were strongly affected by whatever attitudes were 
pervasive in the general work force (See, for example. Dollar 
1990; Thomas 1989; Chen 1989; Granick 1990).
Consequently, the policies implemented in China in this 
period did not facilitate economic development in a successful 
manner; rather, they at times led to labour redundancy and made 
it hard to stimulate productivity. Even with "make-work" 
employment, china's economy by the late 1970s was not providing
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jobs for growing numbers of unemployed (as many as 20 million), 
or ways to improve the living standards of the 200 million 
Chinese living below China's poverty line (Thomas 1989).
Although, by and large, China's economic policy during 
this period had pursued the Soviet model, nonetheless, there 
had also been some "self-reliance" efforts, especially after 
the country broke up its relationship with the leadership in 
the Kremlin in the late 1950s. Thus, during the Second Five 
Year Plan, the Chinese government implemented the so-called 
"Walking on two legs" policy. The theme of this policy is that 
economic development should be based on more than just one 
method or resource, i.e., industry should rely on both
indigenous and foreign technology, and on large and small scale
businesses. Hence, besides large state-run enterprises, the 
government encouraged small scale business in the form of 
collective ownership. As a result of this policy, many
backyard workshops were established during the 1950s and early 
1960s (See, for example, Xiao 1932). These included craft- 
making, tailoring, repairing and many other small scale 
informal industries. They were either set up by residents from 
adjacent neighbourhoods, in the case of urban areas; or by 
peasants from the same village, in the case of rural areas. 
Many of them are still existing and going strong. Today these 
cooperatives have formed an important sector within China's
economic system (See, for example. He et al 1982).
However, under the socialist system, even these
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collectively-owned small undertakings are not entirely private 
properties as those conceived in the capitalist economies (See, 
for example, Xiao 1982). Since, apart from a few exceptions, 
they were initially supported (in many cases with financial 
assistance), and licensed by local authorities, such as the 
commune or the neighbourhood committee, thus they are 
controlled and in fact owned by the local authorities in 
question. In a way, it implies another form of (local) 
government ownership, because members of the cooperative 
possess no direct financial interests over the existence of the 
undertaking. The financial relationship between the worker and 
the organization ends as soon as the worker leaves or retires. 
The main characteristics of these cooperatives are that they 
are much more informal in terms of organizational structure and 
that the workers may share some of the dividends, if any, on 
top of the basic wages. Whereas on the other hand, there used 
to be no such rewards for the workers of the nationalized 
enterprises until the reforms in the 1980s*. This kind of 
collective ownership is apparently very different from the 
partnership business prevalent in the capitalist economies.
Beginning in late 1978, the People's Republic of China 
introduced sweeping reforms into its management of state-owned 
industry. This reform policy was initiated by the Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party at its Third Plenum in 
December that year. Concrete plans for reforms were announced 
by the state council in mid-1979. The centrepiece of reform
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has been the devolution of economic control to the enterprise 
level. Management expertise has taken up a major role in 
business decision making, replacing the absolute influence of 
party politics imposed before and during the Cultural 
Revolution (Dollar 1990). From now on, China has entered an 
era of what is labelled "Building socialism with Chinese 
characteristics".
The reforms have provided enterprises with more freedom in 
hiring or purchasing inputs, including capital, materials, and, 
to a lesser extent, labour. Enterprises now have limited 
ability to alter their product line and introduce new products 
and typically self-market a significant share of their output 
at prices largely free of government control. Most importantly, 
enterprises are permitted to retain a share of profits on self­
marketed output. (The exact profit retention rate is negotiated 
between the enterprise and the state). Enterprises typically 
pay out some of the retained profits as bonuses to workers and 
managers and invest the balance in new productive activities of 
the firm. These reforms have clearly created some incentive for 
enterprises to economize on the use of resources and to produce 
products (or provide services) for which there is demand from 
consumers and from other firms (Dollar 1990).
Besides the reforms within major state-run industries, the 
government has made considerable effort to encourage the 
participation of the private sector (See, for example. He et al 
1982). As a result, the cooperative sector gradually evolves in
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both the scale of economic activity and structure of ownership. 
Privately-owned partnerships have been set up allover the 
country, though they are fundamentally different from the 
traditional ones in terms of ownership and to a large extent, 
of management tactics. Furthermore, because of the limitation 
in raising capital, most of the locally-based cooperatives are 
relatively small; nonetheless they are a new injection into 
China's economic entity.
From a broad perspective, the Economic Reform has had 
tremendous influences to the country's economy. Throughout the 
1980s China's economic output has been reported to be growing 
rapidly. Yet behind these achievements hides another side of 
the story. The reforms within the economic system have 
nonetheless brought about new problems to the Chinese society. 
As well as social and economic changes, there emerges a new 
horizon of political ideology. After the Tienanmen outcry in 
the Spring of 1989, the reform programmes in China have somehow 
bogged down to a low peak. Some commentators argue that this 
is a time when China is wandering at a cross-roads of 
ideological thinking and that planners and decision-makers of 
higher hierarchies within the political machinery are 
vacillating over how to catch up with the Developed World.
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2.3 Urbanization and Insufficient Public Transport
With a total population of over 1000 million, China is one 
of the many developing countries with a high level of urban 
inhabitation. It is striking to observe that the number of 
urban inhabitants per square kilometre of cultivated land is as 
high in China as in Europe, the most urbanized area on Earth in 
absolute numbers. It is even more striking that a much higher 
proportion of the urban population is living in the big cities 
of China than in those of Europe, although there are fewer such 
cities in China. This suggests that China is as urbanized as 
Europe in relation to the unit of inhabitable land (Schinz
1989). No doubt the urban question always appears to be one of 
most interesting issues in Chinese politics and a research 
topic for urban geographers and academics alike of both China 
and the West in attempting to understand the Chinese model of 
urbanization.
The process of urbanization in the socialist countries has 
been largely different from those in other countries of the 
developing world. Under the socialist system, the state plays 
a decisive role in the process of urbanization through the 
centralized planning mechanism. Government policies affect the 
nature, performance and growth of cities, and the rise and fall 
of the urban population. Therefore the alternating rise and 
fall of the urbanization process seems to be closely related to
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organized population movements. Generally, it may be said that 
urbanization in China during the period 1949 - 1981 was largely 
manipulated by the government in that the changes occurred in 
the cities over this period reflect the ideology of the 
Communist Party, The most obvious change has been the city's 
function from what is described as "consumptive" to 
"productive" in urban economy. Hence, the over-emphasis on 
industrialization, and the unitary system of nationalized 
industry and property ownership have brought about new spatial 
patterns: a uniform spread of industries and little segregation 
of residential sectors. In respect of population control, 
however, China is said to have made tremendous efforts to 
restrain the growth in the cities, especially the large ones. 
Prior to the late 1970s, the Chinese Government had implemented 
a policy to disperse urban population to the countryside and 
remote rural areas. As a result, urban population increase 
during that period had been due mainly to natural increase, and 
the overall pace of urban population growth had also been 
relatively slow (See, for example. Sit 1985),
However, since the 1980s, alongside the reform programmes, 
the Chinese Government has implemented new policies in urban 
development. These include the designation of "Open Cities" 
and New Economic Zones (NEZs) along the country's coastline in 
an effort to boost foreign investment (Fig, 3), Cities thus 
have been growing rapidly with populations increasing to higher 
levels and physical size sprawling outwards to surrounding
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areas. At the same time, the reforms within the industrial 
sector has brought about changes in the structure of urban 
economy. Industries in cities have developed in vertical as 
well as horizontal pattern. Not only does industrial output 
increase, but the ownership pattern of industries is now also 
diversified. There are now not only state-owned enterprises and 
local government-controlled cooperatives as those mentioned 
above, but also many privately-owned undertakings operating 
within the economic system. One interesting point is that many 
of these partnerships proliferate in either urban hinterlands 
or in the fourteen "Open cities", especially in the latter, 
where restrictions are more relaxed for private ventures. The 
main reason for this geographical preference is that many of 
these cooperatives, in the case of urban hinterlands, have been 
set up mainly by farmers who were either made redundant as a 
result of increasing mechanization of farming techniques, or 
else attracted by the high turnovers of the petty production 
sector, and who subsequently took up the opportunity to seek 
their luck in the cities; or in case of the "Open cities", by 
the more enterprising figures, who have the necessary capital 
as well as the enterprise spirit to venture on for more 
business achievements.
The difference in locality between these suburban and 
coastal cooperatives means that the types of their businesses 
are somewhat differentiable. For the cooperatives in the 
coastal cities, the services being offered or the products made
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tend to be more export-orientated; whereas most of the suburban 
based cooperatives are engaged in informal urban service 
provision, such as casual construction contracts, warehousing 
and distributing of farm produce, local transport services and 
road repairs and so on. It is important to note that, some of 
the privately-owned companies in the Open cities are either 
joint ventures partly financed with foreign capital or else 
entirely owned by foreign investors. Thus, in some cases their 
scale of business can be quite large.
The restructuring of urban economy in the past decades in 
China, however, has not been problem-free. Indeed, many cities 
are now facing severe problems that had not occurred before, such 
as shortage in service provision, increasing level of 
unemployment, overcrowding, housing crisis and so on. Of these 
problems, the inefficiency of urban transport services is the 
most critical which implies a direct threat to everyday life in 
cities. Despite the rapid growth of passenger transport 
facilities in recent years, the mobility of people in China is 
still relatively low; it reached 270 pkm per capita in 1982 
versus 785 in India, where GNP per capita is lower than in 
China [pkm = passenger-kilometre]. The low mobility in China 
most likely results from demand restraint combined with 
inadequate supply of passenger transport capacity. Demand 
restraint is partially a consequence of the comparatively low 
share of GNP going to household consumption, perhaps 50% in 
China as compared with some 75% in India (World Bank 1985).
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Although, in respect of urban public transport provision, 
there has been considerable development over the past 40 years 
and passenger transport systems in most Chinese cities have 
evolved from simple and backward facilities, such as rishaws, 
to vast systems equipped with considerable technology, e.g., 
electrified trams, or in the case of Beijing and Tianjin, the 
metro, nonetheless, the level of overall supply is 
comparatively low. The number of buses per 10,000 people in 
the extra-large cities rangers from 2.32 to 6.51, which is a 
much lower proportion than in the major Asian Pacific Region 
cities. As privately-owned motor vehicles are almost unknown 
in China, a large proportion of the public must rely on the 
bicycle for their spatial movement. Apparently, inadequate 
public transport services have plagued many Chinese cities (Sit 
1985).
In addition to inadequate supply, during the past decades, 
several conceptual myths derived from the West have been 
accepted by some radical urban transport planners in developing 
countries, including China. It has been presumed that 
transport was part of the welfare function (like education, 
clean water) and public ownership by itself could provide 
efficient and economic service. Thus, in China, major planning 
institutions have been centralized in the hands of a few 
authoritarian organizations; and under the umbrella of 
nationalization, the government had long been the sole provider 
of urban public transport services. Even until today, the role
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of the private sector in the public transport industry is still 
insubs tantial.
As other sectors of the nationalized industries, the
public transport sector has also been characterized by the
"eating from the same big wok" syndrome. Until now state-owned 
public transport companies have been making huge losses while 
quality of service remains poor. This indeed has been the
background for the need to make change. The use of minibuses 
for passenger movement in large cities in the 1980s, to a large 
extent, represented such a shift in transport planning. The
next section will focus on the Beijing's case in adapting to 
planning changes.
2.4 The Introduction of "Unconventional Transport"
Beijing may be described as a "Third World" city equipped  ^
with many modern hotels that are almost exclusively for guests 
from the "First World". In terms of urban structure, generally 
it has been a planned city since its foundation as a capital 
about 800 years ago. The development of the city has processed 
through many dynasties but the most rapid changes occurred in 
the past 40 years since the founding of the People's Republic, 
yet the most visible progress in terms of urbanization actually 
happened in the 1980s, following the implementation of the
f''
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Open-door policy and Economic Reform.
These urban changes include economic growth, population 
increase and physical sprawl. Of course how much has Beijing 
achieved in terms of economic development is a contentious 
issue, it is beyond the sphere of this study to discuss the 
matter in great depth. What is concerned here is primarily 
the question of public transport planning. In terms of 
transport facility, the city's public system has developed from 
man-powered rishaws (See, for example. Strand 1989) to the 
possession of sophisticated system (i.e., metro). Its path of 
development has not been a smooth one, though. Like other 
industrial sectors, the planning of public transport system in 
Beijing has gone through a period full of ideological disputes, 
thus in many ways Beijing's transport development can be viewed 
as a miniature for all large cities in the country.
In respect of passenger movement, although Beijing's 
problem had long been recognized but it was not until the 
1980s that the authorities came to a deeper comprehension of 
the critical impacts of this long term disease (See, for 
example, Quan 1990a, 1990b; Ren 1990). Influenced by the myth 
of "conventional wisdom", the authorities have for decades 
rested their hope on the hardware -- the power of the more 
advanced vehicles and equipment. To Chinese planners, the 
ultimate solution for the transport problem in a metropolis is 
inevitably the use of conventional technologies. It is partly 
because of this belief that prior to 1985 the number of
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articulated buses and trolleys in Beijing continued to grow,
whilst at the same time the traditional rishaws were banned 
from the streets. The pursuit of tne conventional approach 
has been accelerated by the extreme orthodoxy of socialist 
development philosophy, under which the capital city is taken 
as a showcase and symbol of the nation's progress and 
achievement. Throughout the past 40 years, the government has 
been trying to build a capital city with a "First World" image.
Consequently, urban developments in Beijing have been 
given high priorities in resource allocation, i.e., in 
infrastructure provision, road construction, housing
development and so on. In the early 1970s the government began 
to initiate the construction of the first metro line in 
Beijing. The expansion of the public transport system in the 
city is indeed unprecedented allover China. Overall, during the 
past ten years alone, there has been an increase of 92% in 
total seat capacity in real terms within the conventional 
modes, including two tube lines (Quan 1990a).
However, despite the increasing amounts of government 
investments on public infrastructure and of the rolling-stock 
of conventional vehicles, right until today, many residential 
areas are still inaccessible to the articulated buses, trolleys
and the metro; and both metro and conventional buses have to
rely heavily on government subsidies. So far there seems to be 
little sign of improvements in the conventional bus system in 
financial as well as operational terms. It was because of
62
these symptoms that transport planners in the city began to 
realize that the expansion of large buses -- the articulated 
vehicles -- was somewhat limited in effect and that the metro 
could offer no ultimate solution to the travel demand of the 
citizens.
It was at the brink of the dilemma that the thinking of 
applying the "Paratransit” was imported from abroad. In this 
context, the use of minibuses for passenger services in Beijing 
was a very first example of such a "paratransit solution" in a 
socialist country.
As described earlier, there had already been minibus 
systems operating in many cities outside China, nonetheless 
there was no formal transfer of the so-called "minibus wisdom" 
to the country. Rather, the establishment of minibus transport 
in cities like Beijing and Shanghai of The People's Republic of 
China was the result of foreign inspiration in urban transport 
planning. The channel in which the "wisdom" of minibus 
transport "travelled" through was the Chinese southern border 
city of Shenzhen, a designated "Open Economic Zone" where 
passenger minibuses owned by Hong Kong investors had appeared 
on the city's streets in the early years of the 1980s. The 
novelty of the minibuses there enlightened transport 
authorities of that city and later of Beijing and other Chinese 
cities who then began to initiate their own minibus plans. At 
the very early stage, small fleets of minibuses owned by 
government transport companies were put on service for
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passenger movements in Shenzhen and the surrounding areas.
Before long, Quangzhou, Shanghai and so on, altogether ten big 
cities, followed suit. Beijing was one of these ten cities. 
Its minibus system was officially established on April 1st, 
1984, when the first passenger minibus run on the streets of 
the Capital, approximately nine years later than the World 
Bank's Minibus experiment in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Similar to the establishment of the system in Kuala
Lumpur in 1975, originally the objective of the Beijing minibus 
service was set to alleviate the problem of passenger movement 
and to provide travellers with wider modal choices; though 
over the years, in the wake of fleet expansion and business
growth, the role of the system has gradually enhanced. Today,
the minibus service has been established firmly within the 
city's public transport system.
2.5 A Hypothetical Perspective
Although, since the "unofficial birth" of the Hong Kong 
minibus system in the late 1960s, minibus transport has 
"officially" existed in the Far East for nearly three decades, 
today the minibus issue as a transport planning discipline is 
still a contentious subject amongst transport planners in both 
developed and developing countries. Following the establishment
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of minibus fleets in some British cities in the 1980s, this 
issue has attracted even greater attention. Over the years 
there have been a series of writings about minibus transport in 
the United Kingdom (See, for examples. Banister 1990; White et 
al 1987; Glaister 1985; Turner et al 1990a, 1990b, 1990c; Watts 
et al 1990). It appears that the original findings about 
paratransit in the Southeast Asia have provided a theoretical 
test-stone for minibus transport around the world. 
Nonetheless, since the world itself is a changing environment 
and there are always newly emerged issues within the human 
society, all theoretical postulates must be verifiable against 
time.
Of all the minibus transport systems in the Far East, 
those in the Chinese cities are youngest and newest in terms 
of age and experience respectively. What is more, in terms of 
public transport facilities, Beijing is comparable to large 
cities outside China. Its minibuses are operating in a traffic 
environment similar to those in other cities in the Developing 
World. Although, it is obvious that "developing countries" are 
different in experiences and needs, nevertheless they still 
have many similarities in respect of transport planning (See, 
for example, Orn 1983). Thus, from just a viewpoint of mass 
movement, the arrival of the minibus in Beijing has in fact 
created an opportunity for re-examining the role of paratransit 
in solving the urban transport problem in the Third World.
More importantly, the performance of the minibus business
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in Beijing has also opened a niche for further debates over
the theoretical aspects of paratransit. In April 1988, just
four years after the establishment of the Beijing minibus 
system, the Minibus Administrative Office (MAO), under the
supervision of the Beijing General Public Passenger Transport 
Corporation (BGPPTC), carried out a major survey aiming to
observe the overall performance the system. The survey has
produced some very interesting figures about the financial
viability of the minibus undertakings (Figures shown in section 
4.6). It appears that the original findings need further 
attention. For this reason researching into Beijing's minibus 
transport is a particularly challenging but also rewarding 
task.
Since the urban transport problem is in its nature an 
epitome of social and economic issues, one cannot look at it 
as an isolated phenomenon; and since China's socialist economic 
system is different from its capitalist counterpart, how does 
paratransit work in a socialist system is thus an interesting 
issue. The search for the fundamental factors which contribute 
to the success of Beijing's minibus business is thus the main 
objective of this study; on this basis, the hypothesis lays 
emphasis upon the essence of the entrepreneurial spirit of the 
paratransit industry in capitalist cities, which can also be 
made to work in socialist economies, provided appropriate 
policies are implemented.
6 6
2.6 Research Methodology and tne Course of Study
The way that researches on social sciences are exercised 
in some Communist countries is somehow different from that in 
the Western societies. In China, before the Reform, there had
not been much academic research on urban transport planning.
If any, most were concerned with physical planning rather than 
social and economic planning. Altnough since the early 1980s 
there are increasing concerns on this topic, and voices have 
been raised for a much more liberal and comprehensive planning 
perspective, the overall literature on this subject is still, 
on the whole, relatively limited, if not entirely scarce. Thus 
any attempt to carry out a study on urban transport planning in 
China, has to rely heavily on on-the-spot observation rather 
than on existing literature and information stored in 
libraries. Access to data is never easy, though. One of the 
obstacles in getting access to information and data is that, in 
China, statistics concerning major transport facilities are 
[lormally regarded as secret, for reasons that are often 
described as of public security (i.e. transport facilities are 
strategically sensitive).
As far as this project is concerned, the research 
(methodology involves two major phases, observation and
analysis; though there have been different steps during the
course of study. The very first step was an extensive 
literature review on transport planning in Third World cities.
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concentrating particularly on unconventional transport. After 
almost a year-long literature review and on-going preparation, 
the area which the research intended to deal with was 
eventually identified. Minibus transport in Beijing was chosen 
as the subject for investigation.
The second step concentrated on intensive work on the case 
study, during that time a number of tasks were exercised. One 
of the tasks was tnat the present author spent a month-long 
period of fieldwork in Beijing. The main objective of toe 
field-trip was to carry out on-the-spot investigations on the 
city's minibus service. On the basis of the information 
collected, a data base was gradually built up and subsequently, 
a rough yet distinct picture of the current minibus service in 
the city was constructed.
During the field-trip, information and data were collected 
from both primary and secondary sources, though a substantial 
proportion has actually come from the former. In order to 
enrich personal knowledge over the existing situation, the 
autlior travelled extensively on tne public systems (trolley, 
metro and minibus) and visited major transport facilities such 
as bus termini, parking bays as well as bus-stops to observe 
the differences between various service characteristics. In 
doing so tne author has experienced directly the service style, 
reliability, comfort and general quality of the services 
provided by different passenger transport modes in tlie city.
Thus, the primary information is mainly based on interviews 
with local residents and visitors, users and non-users of the
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public transport service. Two questionnaires (in Chinese) were 
used: One for passengers, and the other for drivers. The foririer 
emphasized on variables such as service quality, convenience 
and travel costs; whilst the latter on operation time, service 
style, revenue and so forth.
Most interviews taken randomly at bus-stops and coach 
stations were conducted in a rather "informal" way (e.g. 
without looking at tne questionnaire!). "Informal" also because 
there was no pre-set sample size. Instead the author tried to 
talk to as many people as possible. Most interviews took 
be tween 5 and 20 minutes (depending on factors such as whether 
tne respondent had used the minibus before or detailed comments 
were made). In the first few days only about 8 to 9 people were 
interviewed per day; later up to 20 each day. Altogether some 
350 people (plus 20 crew members) were interviewed during the 
whole period.
Besides, there were also some formal interviews with those 
working "in the field": Managers of the Minibus Administration
Office, senior engineers of the Beijing Research Institute of 
Public Transportation (BRIPT), and academics from both Peking 
and Northern Jiaotong Universities. Through these personal 
contacts the author was given access to some official documents 
regarding both financial and structural aspects of the state- 
owned minibus fleets and tiie future prospect of minibus 
transport in tiie city. Opinions, comments and in many cases, 
complaints from transport planning experts, academics as well 
as from ordinary people were recorded. These notes have later
69
becofiie important inputs to tiie data base; for they reflect a 
high degree of originality on tiie quality of the public 
transport services which the respondents themselves use and 
hence perceive. On the whole, in respect of data collection, 
tiie field-trip was unexpectedly fruitful.
For secondary sources, a series of periodicals, magazines 
and research papers have been consulted all the way tiirough as 
basic information for the study. The majority of tliese have 
been serials published by the West, though there were also some 
Chinese periodicals and newspapers which occasionally contain 
some interesting information about public transport in Beijing 
and other Chinese cities. In addition to academic serials, 
official publications by various research institutions and 
governments agencies, especially reports by the World Bank and 
by the Transport and Road Research Laboratory on urban 
transport in Third World cities have also been very useful for 
comparative studies.
After the initial work for tne information required, the 
next step was to examine the data collected and to find out 
tne relationships between different factors. Efforts were made 
to dissect different components of tiie minibus system. Unicjue 
characteristics and current limitations were then identified. 
Further work was then Concentrated on analysis and comparative 
studies. The discussion was narrowed down to the generalization 
of findings. The initial writing was attempted at this stage, 
even tiiough tliere had been mucii rough draft-work earlier. The 
work on writing up has taken much of tiie effort and time. Up-
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tO“uate information continued to be monitored a[id injected 
into the project. This was to ensure, whenever possible, that 
recent cnanges have been covered.
It may be necessary to repeat tiiat, up to now, tiiere have 
been almost no independent academic studies about China's 
minibus transport. Altnough some Chinese periodicals do 
occasionally contain articles about urban transport planning, 
most of tliese seem to concentrate on examining conventional 
transport and on the planning of infrastructural facilities. 
Studies on unconventional systems on the whole, and on 
minibus transport in particular are therefore rare. Until 1990 
when the field-trip took place, the only official survey on the 
minibus system in Beijing was the one mentioned earlier, 
carried out jointly by M A 0 and BGPPTC in 1988, which mainly 
aii.ied to observe the physical operation of the state-owned 
minibuses ; there was no attempt to tackle other issues, and tne 
suDse<juent documents produced contain solely raw material about 
the fleets owned by the state companies otiier than tne 
independent undertakings. Therefore, tiie survey was far from 
being a analytical study aiming to solving tiie problei.is 
concerned. Nevertheless, it should be made clear that, by 
Chinese standard and according to tiie Chinese custom of 
academic documents, the data recorded in tiie reports and that 
provided by officials, can all be regarded as of a high degree 
of reliability and accuracy. Indeed, it is this faithfulness 
whicii, explicitly, provides tne fundamentals for this
particular research project to be carried out.
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Chapter III
BEIJING: GEOGRAPHY AND THE ROOTS OF THE TRANSPORT PROBLEM
3.1 Introduction
This chapter continues to focus on the case study.
There are two main parts to this chapter. The first part 
briefly describes the city's physical location and the public 
administration system, the patterns of population distribution 
and land use, followed by a description of the current public 
passenger transport system. The second part deals with the 
problems of passenger movements in Beijing and the likely 
causes of these problems in an historical perspective.
Let us first look at the city structure.
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3.2 Location, Administration and Infrastructure
Beijing, the capital of the People's Republic of China, is 
located on the alluvial fan of the Yongding and Chaobai Rivers 
at the north-western edge of the North China Plain. The city 
occupies a strategic position in relation to the Mongolian 
Plain, the North-east China Plain and the Lowlands of the 
Huang He (Yellow River) and the Huai River. Beijing Shi, or 
Metropolitan Beijing, is one of the three municipalities 
directly under the Central Government (the other two are 
Shanghai and Tianjin). Beijing comprises 19 districts and xian 
(counties), covering a total area of 16,800 sq.km.. It is 
about three times the area of Shanghai, making it the largest 
municipality in China in terms of administrative territory 
(Dong 1985). (See fig. 4).
Under the Communist Government, the city is divided into 
three major zones according to the level of built-up 
infrastructure; the inner city zone, the suburban zone and the 
outskirt zone. Each zone has several administrative districts: 
(a) four City Districts (the inner city zone): East City
District, West City District, Xuanwu District and Chongwen 
District; (b) four Suburban Districts (the Suburban zone): 
Haidian, Fengtai and Shijingshan; and (c) ten outskirt Xian 
(counties) (the outskirt zone): Tongxian, Changping, Shunyi,
Miyun, Yanqing, Pinggu, Daxing, Fangshan, Mentougou and Huairou
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(Dong 1985). The four City Districts are where the old city 
was while the present built-up area includes the old city and 
the four Suburban Districts (i.e., City and Suburban Districts) 
(Fig. 5). It might be of interest to note that the built-up 
area of Beijing with its 300 Square Kilometres in 1978 was by 
far the largest of all cities in China, i.e., twice the size of 
the two next largest cities, Tianjin and and Shanghai with 
their 150 sq.km of built-up area in 1979 respectively (Schinz
1989).
The structure of urban administration in Socialist China 
is more or less similar to that of the former Eastern Bloc. In 
Beijing, apart from the urban districts, the rural xians are 
rather independent and self-administered in a number of 
aspects, such as the provision of local public amenities. Each 
xian is governed by a County Council. Together with the built- 
up area these counties are under the overall administration of 
the Beijing Municipal Committee, which is the highest 
administrative authority for the entire metropolis. The idea 
to designate rural counties around urban centres is rather 
common in the socialist countries; Vietnam, for example, is 
also a country whose major urban centres are "guarded" by a 
vast area of agricultural activities. It is a way of socialist 
public administration supposed to secure the supply of 
necessary farm produce, such as vegetables and fruit, for 
citizens living in the entire catchment area. In the past two 
decades or so, most large cities in China actually had their
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outskirt areas expanded. To avoid technical confusion, 
therefore, it should be stressed that the "built-up area" in 
this study is referred to the four City Districts plus the four 
Suburban districts. Altogether they make up what is known as 
Beijing city (or urban Beijing). Those satellite towns at the 
xians are excluded from tnis definition. And the whole area 
which includes urban Beijing and the xians is on the other hand 
known as Metropolitan Beijing or Beijing Municipality.
For over 3,000 years Beijing has been an important centre 
of transport and communications in northern China and, since 
its establishment in 1153 as the capital of the Jin Dynasty, 
Beijing has become a national capital of successive kingdoms. 
Being an historical administrative centre for over centuries, 
the city is predominantly rich in cultural treasures and 
ancient architecture. The building structure of the old city 
is embodied by the presence of both the big and the small, the 
high and the low, reflecting the typical features of a feudal 
capital. This can be seen by looking at the overall arrangement 
of the street layout: On the one hand, residential quarters are 
characterized by a uniform pattern of traditional Northern 
Chinese bungalows -- small quadrangular compounds situated one 
after another along narrow alleyways; and on the other hand, 
the "Forbidden City" complex, a magnificent royal palace for 
generations of monarchies, dominates the skyline of the 
historical city at the very heart of the built-up area (Fig. 
6).
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Generally speaking, the land use pattern in the old city 
area of Beijing is similar to that of cities in the developing 
world, e.g., Karachi, Hanoi, Cairo and so forth, where the city 
centre is often the workshop of factories of various kinds and 
warehouses of different sizes, as well as the home for most
government offices and political institutions. In a word, 
industry, commerce and residence are inter-mixed. For example, 
in Bangkok, the old city centre shows a diverse land use 
pattern. It contains the city hall, museums, government
ministries and the Grand Palace. In addition there are various 
shop-house and commercial activities including tailoring, 
basket sales, metal fabrication, silver crafting automotive
repairs, warehousing, furniture manufacturing, soft drink 
bottling and many other industries (See, for example, Jones et 
al 1982). In Saigon, too, there is no distinct separation
between commercial and residential zones within the city. On 
the whole, cities in the Third World share many common features 
in terms of urban functions and land use. (In the next section 
this will be mentioned further).
However, the current urban development strategy in 
Beijing focuses on physical expansion. Major development 
projects are concentrated on the extended built-up areas, with 
special attention on constructing public infrastructure to meet 
long term demands (See, for example, Zhu 1986). Today, in 
terms of urban topography, the check street pattern in the old 
city is somehow inherited in the suburban areas. Besides the
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traditional narrow streets, there are many newly built broad 
avenues interlocking one another, lying on a fairly flat 
landscape right across the city. As well as trunk roads,
there are now three major ring roads circling in and around the 
built-up area, each acts as a major artery of the traffic 
network. Commuting traffic forms the most important part of 
urban passenger flow in Beijing but, unlike Western cities, in 
Beijing as well as in other Chinese conurbations, the overall 
commuting pattern is less focussed. Although there are 
railways, as Howard (1990) points out, rail networks are not 
designed to carry short-distance passenger into the city 
centre; they are mainly for long-haul inter-city movements.
Over the past 40 years, the built-up area of Beijing has 
expanded rapidly and continues to spread out. Today's Beijing 
has grown several times bigger than it had been decades ago,
from 109 sq.km in 1949 to 340 sq.km in 1979 (Dong 1985); and
the present proposal is to expand it to 440 sq.km by the year
2000 (Schinz 1989). Undoubtedly, with the current speed of 
urban development, Beijing will become one of the world's major 
metropolises in the Twenty First Century.
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3.3 Population Distribution and Land Use
Beijing has the second largest urban population in china 
after Shanghai; it is also one of the most populated cities in 
the world. The current population in metropolitan Beijing is 
about 11 million, of which 6.5 million or so live in the built- 
up area (Urban Beijing), including roughly one million short­
term residents counted up with successive waves of visitors 
from other provinces. These short-term dwellers are constantly 
staying in various places such as hostels, residential halls 
and lodging facilities or in some cases, just outside railway 
stations. Some of them are sightseers, whose tenancy could be 
as brief as one or two days, others may be on various kinds of 
temporary employment in the Capital, some of which could last 
as long as a couple of years. On the whole, because of the
temporary nature and the "footloose” style of their residence, 
they are thus classified locally as "Floating population".
The population in metropolitan Beijing is unevenly
distributed at an average density of 518 persons per sq.km (Li
1990). And although it has been acknowledged that, over the 
past 40 years since the Communist government came to power,
efforts have been made to decentralize both the population and 
some public amenities from the city core to suburban areas, yet 
so far the effects of decentralization have not been
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satisfactory; hitherto, the majority of the population still 
live in the heart of the city and the overall pattern of land 
use has hardly changed. The concentration of population in the 
city centre reflects the traditional pattern of residential 
distribution in an Eastern city. Overall, it can be described 
as an hierarchical distribution pattern whereby the core of the 
city is highly populated with a gradual decline of density 
towards the suburbs and outskirts. In the built-up area, the 
average population density is 13,000 persons/sq.km. (Schinz 
1989). Major concentrations are found within the 87 sq.km. of 
the historical City Districts in which the density is many 
times higher than the average figure; at a level of 27,000 
persons/sq.km. (Li 1990), with the highest density recorded in 
the busy commercial areas of Qianmen (the Front Gate) and 
Dashanlan (the Great Railings) where the average figure reaches 
the level of over 50,000 persons/sq.km.. Thus it is not 
surprising that the four City Districts alone have accommodated 
26.3% of the Metropolis' total population (Dong 1985). If only 
these four City Districts are considered, then the population 
density of Beijing far exceeds that of London, Tokyo or Paris. 
(See Table 4 next page & fig. 7).
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Population Density of Selected Capital Cities
(1979)
Beijing Tokyo London Paris
Central city area 87 
(sq.km.)
578 300 105
Population 2.29 
(million)
8.64 2.75 2.7
Density
(persons per sq.km) 26,300 14,948 9,166 25,714
Source: After Dong Liming 1985 In Sit V. ed. "Chinese Cities"
Oxford University Press.
This residential distribution pattern indicates that, 
despite the Government’s effort to decentralize the population 
from the old city, the City Districts remain to be the main 
residential zone as well as the core for commercial and trade
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activities. In 1980, factory sites occupied 6.6 sq.km., or 11% 
of the inner city area (Dong 1985); until today, there are 
still 4.27 million square meters of land for industrial and 
warehouse purposes (Quan 1990a). Obviously, with a variety of 
opportunities, the old city zone acts as a magnet where many 
travellers are drawn from all directions of the environs.
Moving outwards to the four Suburban Districts, the 
average figure of population density here begins to decline, at 
a level of 1,800 persons/sq.km.. This is because their overall 
size of 1,283 sq.km. is comparatively spacious, much larger 
than the City Districts (Dong 1985). The most visible forms of 
land use in the suburban zone are sites for workers' 
residential estates, for higher educational institutions and 
recreation, for warehouses of food and agricultural produce, 
and for as much as about 60% of Beijing's industrial complexes. 
Put in another way, the Suburban District are the most 
"productive" area of the city.
Further outwards are the Xian (counties) lying on the 
outskirts, where the population density is even lower. Mainly 
rural in character, these xians altogether cover a vast area of 
15,437 sq.km. and contain 80% of the rural population of the 
metropolis (Dong 1985), even though each of which does have a 
county town plus some other built-up areas here and there. 
Since the primary economic activity in these xians is farming, 
the labour force is thus mainly locally-based in terms of 
employment. There are few instances whereby people have to
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commute into central Beijing for work. In fact, long distance 
commuting has not yet become common in Beijing, nor in any 
other city in China.
The geography of Metropolitan Beijing indicates that its 
urban context is rather unique compared with the West in that 
it consists of rural as well as urban components, (fig. 8). 
Nevertheless, in terms of land use and population distribution, 
there are many similarities between Beijing and other Far 
Eastern metropolises, especially the mixed pattern of land use 
and high concentration of population within the historical 
quarter of the city. It is these similarities that provide for 
this study a basic frame-work for grouping the Far Eastern 
cities in a category whereby the performance of the transport 
systems may be compared meaningfully.
Because of the vast rural areas within the municipality, 
when considering the urban transport system in Beijing, one 
should bear in mind the distinction between the sub-systems in 
the rural areas and that in urban Beijing. For the sake of a 
comparable perspective, it may be important to note that, the 
system which operates in the built-up area is the subject 
matter to be focussed here; whereas those in the outskirt xians 
should be viewed in a different context and excluded from the 
urban transport system in question, as far as this study is 
concerned.
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3.4 The Public Transport System
As the nation's capital city, Beijing is served by the 
best public passenger transport facilities of the entire 
country. First, Beijing has the most spectacular urban 
infrastructure amongst all cities in China, Second, the public 
transport services are more sophisticated in terms of hardware 
and modal variety. Up to now Beijing is one of the only two 
cities in China which have a metro system (The other is 
Tianjin, China's third largest city, with a 5km metro line). 
Being an important industrial base as well as a political 
centre, Beijing is well linked with other provinces through a 
long-distance national railway network. The Beijing Railway 
Station, with some 150,000 passengers on more than 170 trains 
depart and arrive every day, is the largest railway terminal in 
China. Located at the heart of the city, the Station is not 
only the nerve centre of the country's railway network but also 
a key position of the capital's urban passenger transport 
system upon which most city centre-bound bus routes converge.
Beijing's intra-urban passenger transport network is made 
up of different modes, both underground and ground-based, 
conventional and unconventional. Except for a small proportion 
of unconventional vehicles, the majority of the city's public 
transport vehicles are owned by the state, and all under the 
umbrella of the Beijing General Public Passenger Transport
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Corporation. The ground-based system is served largely by
conventional vehicles, namely the large buses and trolley­
buses. In Beijing both large buses and trolley-buses are the 
same size and are articulated vehicles. The trolleys are not 
running on a track. Thus apart from the fact that they are
electrified rather than diesel-driven, there is no other
physical difference between the big buses and the trolleys,
(fig. 9). Since the trolleys require above-ground electric- 
cable facilities, most suburban routes are thus served by 
diesel-driven articulated buses rather than trolleys. 
Nonetheless because of their identical appearance and service 
characteristics, they are both regarded as belonging to the 
same category of conventional transport system. According to
BRIUPD (1990), currently there are more than 4,000 of these 
conventional buses running on over 180 routes across the city.
The other conventional mode is the metro system, which 
began its operation in the late 1970s and presently has two
lines, totalling only 35 km in length. It is served by a 
rolling stock of 790 underground trains, though plans are being
considered to extend the network. Table 5 shows a breakdown of
the capacities of different modes, including private transport; 
and table 6 shows the volumes of passengers carried by these 
modes (both 1988 figures). These figures indicate that on the 
public transport side, the conventional modes, namely the 
articulated buses, trolleys and metro are the backbone for 
passenger movement. Altogether they carry nearly 10 million
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Fig. 9. A trolley bus in Beijing ( the "conventional" bus 
Ji\€$zl -operated, running without a track). The 
l^ecTn^ f ^  -operated buses are also of the same size and shape.
Photo H Lam
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passengers everyday (BRIUPD 1^90). By contrast, the 
contribution of other public modes is still insignificant.
Table 5 :
The Capacity of Different Transport Modes in Beijing
(1988)
Mode Seat/Vehicle Fleet size Total capacity % Group %
Conventional
Buses 137 4007 548995 9.3
Minibus 15 398 5970 0.1 10.2
Metro 180 252 45360 0.8
Rental taxi 4 9349 37396
Vehicles van 20 1304 26080 1.9 1.9
coach 40 1227 49080
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Company &
private
vehicles
big
small
40
4
10874
44729
434,960
178,916
10.3
11.4
Motorbike 1.91 36015 68,788 1.1
Bicycle 1 4,540,000 4,540,000 76.5 76.5
Total 5,935,509 100 100
Source; after "The Comprehensive Report" BRIUPD. July, 1990. 
NB. a) The term "company" in here refers to factories, 
production units, government institutions, and all sorts of 
organizations generally.
b) This table is based on the information gathered in 
1988, it should be noted that since then the numbers of 
bicycles and minibuses have risen to higher levels.
c) The minibuses here are referred to those owned by the 
state; independent minibuses are excluded.
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Table 6 :
The Volumes of Passengers Carried by Different Modes
in Beijing (1988)
Mode Volume of passengers 
(million persons)
Public transport:
Conventional bus and trolley bus 3,003
Minibus (state-owned fleet) 24
Taxi and other rental vehicles 59
Metro 307
Private transport:
Social vehicles & private motorized vehicles 247
Bicycle & other personal vehicles 2,949
Total 6,589
Source: after the "Comprehensive Report" BRIUPD. July, 1990
NB. a) The data are concerned with the built-up area only, 
b) Independent minibuses are excluded.
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Table 6 also shows that in 1988, roughly a half of 
person/trips is made by private modes - mainly the bicycle. On 
the other hand, the ownership of motorized vehicles in Beijing 
is low, at a persons/vehicle ratio of 115:1 only; and most of 
the privately-owned motorized vehicles are motorbikes rather 
than cars (Ren 1989). Private car ownership is almost non­
existent in Beijing, or indeed in most other places in China, 
except some very special cases, especially perhaps the city of 
Shenzhen where the richest fraction of the country's population 
reside.
On the unconventional side of public transport service, 
there used to be (man-pulled) rickshaws in Beijing decades ago, 
now there are virtually no such vehicles for passenger 
transport in the city (See, for example. Strand 1989). The new 
unconventional modes are mainly the tricycle (fig. 10) and the 
minibus. The former is a pedal-powered three-wheeler and 
mainly for carrying tourists for short journeys; and the the 
latter is a relatively new mode in Beijing and the subject 
matter of this particular study.
Besides, there are a large number of taxis serving in 
Beijing, mostly for foreign visitors. Local residents seldom 
travel by taxi because the costs are extremely high for the 
majority of the wage earners. As a result of their "export- 
orientated" style of services, the taxis tend to wait outside 
large international hotels rather than cruising around the 
streets for customers. This is also a common feature of taxi
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Fig. 10 Beijing's Tricycles. Nowadays they are 
mainly for sightseers on short journeys.
Photo H Lam
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services in many other Third World cities.
On the whole, in terms of infrastructural facility and
public transport provision, today's Beijing is perhaps what
provincial cities may long for for tomorrow. Nonetheless, even
with these facilities, Beijing is by no means problem-free.
Although it has been enjoying so much privilege in receiving
government's financial assistance that is so greatly envied by
not
other cities, the Capital s passenger transport problem has^yet 
gone away. Much to the contrary, it is even getting worse. 
According to official figures, for the articulated bus and 
trolley system, there was a 2.7% decrease of vehicle utility 
rate during the ten year period between 1978 and 1988, in which 
the average daily distance per vehicle dropped from 173km in 
1978 to 157km in 1988 (BRIUPD 1990). Above all, the areas 
that currently being served by the entire public transport 
network (including conventional buses, trolleys, minibus and 
metro) remain sparse and yet rather imbalanced; the overall 
geographical coverage of these modes is limited (See fig. 11 & 
fig. 12). It has been observed that areas where some form of 
the public transport service is available within 500 metres of 
distance occupy only 17% of the whole built up area and that 
tney can cover only 52% of the total urban residents; what is 
more, of those who are covered in these areas, 74% of them 
either cannot or do not want to use public transport modes for 
one reason or another (Quan 1990a).
Furthermore, since 1986 patronage on the conventional bus
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and trolley system has stagnated and then declined slightly 
(See table 7 & fig. 13); whilst on the other hand, demands for 
travel in the city continue to increase. What then, is the 
cause of this dilemma? Let us now examine the roots of the 
problem in the following sessions.
Table 7 :
Fleet size and passenger volume of conventional bus & 
trolley systems in Beijing (1978 - 1988).
Year Fleet size Total passengers 
carried (000)
passengers carried 
per vehicle (000)
1978 2,627 1,694,650 645.1
1979 2,889 2,009,180 695.5
1980 3,001 2,314,770 771.0
1981 3,259 2,574,780 790.1
1982 3,459 2,767,020 800.0
1983 3,711 2,919,770 786.8
1984 3,932 3,108,000 790.6
1985 4,033 3,175,630 787 .4
1986 3,905 3,080,670 788.1
1987 3,994 3,060,360 766.2
1988 4,007 3,003,730 749.6
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Source: after the "Comprehensive Report of BRIUPD", July, 1990. 
N.B. The above table also shows that, in 1982, passenger 
utility rate per vehicle reached the highest level. This rate 
fluctuated and declined slowly ever since.
3.5 Urban changes and Pressures on Traffic
The process of rapid urbanization in Beijing over the past 
decades has largely contributed to the transport problem. The 
following sub-sections describe the causes of the problem in an 
historical perspective.
3.5.1 The Population Increase:
As what has been happening in other large developing 
cities, the rapid increase of population is a major cause for 
Beijing's passenger transport problem; this includes both the 
increase of permanent population and floating population (Not 
to mention that in comparison Beijing has fewer vehicles - see
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table 8).
Although the government had previously planned to control 
the increase of the city's population to under 10 million by 
the year 2000, it is estimated that by 1988 the figure already 
reached that limit (Quan 1990b) (fig. 14). In fact, Beijing's 
population in 1949 within the present administrative boundaries 
is estimated to have been about 4.14 million only, of which 
1.76 million might be considered as urban. Since 1949, though, 
the growth of industry and other social and economic activities 
has caused a rapid increase in the city's overall population. 
By 1979 the city had a population of 8.71 million, of which 
about 5 million were urban residents. The average annual net 
growth between 1949 and 1979 was 110,000 persons. This annual 
increase of 3.64% was higher than that of other major cities 
such as shanghai, Tianjin and Guangzhou. And of the total net 
growth, the actual figure through natural growth was 3.37 
million and that through in-migration 1.2 million (Dong 1985).
What is more, Beijing's population continued to grow 
throughout the 1980s. Between 1978 and 1988, the total increase 
during this ten year period was 17.6%, or roughly by 140,000 
persons per year. In the meantime, the proportion of floating 
population over the city's total has also increased from 6% to 
18% (Quan 1990b). At the end of 1988, the total floating 
population in Beijing was recorded to have reached 1.31 million 
(Quan 1990a).
Together with the increase of permanent population, this
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huge number of visitors has increased the burden on the city's 
public transport system. It has been observed that visitors 
are more likely to travel and use the public transport 
facilities than local residents. At the individual level, the 
average number of trips per day made by a visitor is 1.4 
times of that by a local resident (Quan 1990b). Thus, although 
Beijing's floating population accounts only about 16% of the 
population within the built-up area, the total number of trips 
made by these people as a whole is much higher than this 
percentage. For example, statistical figures show that, of 
all the person/trips by public transport in 1986, 35.5% were
made by floating population (Quan 1990a). This percentage may 
have become even higher in the 1990s as the number of visitors 
has since then increased further.
Clearly, as a consequence of rapid population increase, 
the volumes of spatial movements in terms of person/trips have 
increased rapidly. As early as in 1980, the daily average 
number of passengers carried by all means of public transport 
already reached 7 million. Peak periods' carriages were 
particularly heavy. The hourly volume carried during peak 
hours amounted to 930,000 persons; 600,000 of whom were 
commuting between the Suburban and the City Districts (that is 
to say, within urban Beijing) (Dong 1985).
In addition to the growing volumes of passengers carried 
by the public system, the increase in overall trips made 
private transport facilities has also been remarkably high.
1 0 4
Thus the total increase of trip volumes during the past decade
has been very huge. For example, in 1986 alone, the daily
number of trips made within the built-up area totalled 11.23 
million; those made by local residents 9.26 million, and by 
floating population 1.97 million (Quan 1990b). All told, during 
the ten year period between 1978 and 1988, the overall increase 
of trips made by both public and private transport modes in 
urban Beijing was 80%; if interpreted in actual terms then the
net increase amounted to 230 million person/trips (excluding
walking trips). It should be noted that, however, 58% of these 
were made by either bicycle or the so-called "social vehicles" 
belonging to the organizations where the travellers worked 
(Quan 1990b). Again, in 1986 only, of all the person/trips
made in that year, only 24% were made by public transport, 
while 54% by bicycle. Comparatively, the increase of patronage 
on the public transport system has been low. Nevertheless, if 
the past 40 year period is considered as a whole, then the
absolute number of passengers using the public transport 
service has actually increased by 108 times (Ren 1990). As one 
can see, although not all the modes have shared the same
percentage of growth, the rapid increase of population in
Beijing has indeed exerted tremendous pressure on the urban 
passenger transport system.
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Table 8: Bus and Metro Systems in Selected Far Eastern Cities
City Population 
(million)
Standard Bus Metro 
Bus Trolley
& Light Rail 
(Km)
Bangkok 5.5 5,574 59.0 RL
Beijing 8.7 3,183 528 35.0 MT
Hong Kong 5.4 3,494 163 (tramcar) 26.1 MT 
Light Rail
'— (-ptaîmed^-
Jakarta 7.2 2,350 Suburban
rail
Kuala Lumpur 1.03 647 549 (tramcar) Light Rail 
(planned)
Manila 7.5 2,821(Private & state-owned) 15 LR
V -
10 6
Source: Modified from "Jane' s Transport Systems" 19^8^ 
NB. Paratransit vehicles are excluded.
3.5.2 The Physical Sprawl:
After a long period of implementing the policy of urban 
depopulation and controlling urban growth in the 1950s, 1960s 
and early 70s, the Chinese Government was still unable to 
modernise the economic activities in the countryside 
successfully. In the 1980s the authorities changed their 
strategies on economic development and adopted new policies to 
develop major urban centres in an attempt to boost urban 
economy and raise living standards of the citizens.
In Beijing, throughout the last decade, there has been a 
large scale construction programme to upgrade the image of the 
city. Apart from luxurious hotels in the central area, the 
suburbs sprawled out rapidly to the outskirts with new 
residential estates built on the urban fringes. Tens of 
hundreds of flats and tower blocks were constructed on what 
previously had been the farming land for greenstuff. Several 
satellite settlements were also designated and built in and 
around the Suburban Districts. The idea to expand the city was 
supposed to decentralize and disperse commercial and cultural
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activities from the historical city centre, and to ease the 
overcrowding situation in the whole urban area.
In terms of transport infrastructure, emphasis has been 
focussed on building trunk roads and ring roads. Over 6 million 
square metres of roads have been constructed during the period 
between 1978 and 1988 (Quan 1990a); many are spectacular six- 
lane avenues connecting sub-centres lying in the Suburban 
Districts. Some of the major streets in the old city have also 
been widened by cutting off corners and contracting pavement.
Overall, Beijing is growing fast. Altogether the built-up 
area has grown by 2.4 times over the past 40 years since 1949 
(Li 1990). In planning a national capital symbolic of socialist 
achievements, the Chinese authorities have deliberately 
compared Beijing's urban development with major First World 
cities. Taking London, Tokyo, Paris and New York as examples, 
Chinese planners are convinced that the problem of congestion 
in Beijing is not because the city is too large, as they
themselves used to think, but, on the contrary, too small and 
concentrated (fig. 15). For example, Dong (1985) argues that 
the road system in Beijing forms only 6.9% of the total built- 
up area, whereas comparable figures for most cities in the West 
are in the regions of 20 to 40 per cent. It is therefore 
believed that the corresponding percentage in Beijing must be 
raised gradually to between 20 and 30 per cent to keep pace 
with the rapid increase of motor vehicles and that in order to 
tackle congestion, further urban expansion is necessary.
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Currently, the authorities plan to increase public open space 
to an average of 10 sq.m/person. To achieve these targets, it 
is argued, that the city must be expanded further by 40 to 50 
sq.km. in size. And according to the Chinese planners, if 
urban Beijing is supposed to accommodate some 6.5 million 
residents by 2000, then the built-up area will need to double 
(Dong 1985).
Whether the outward sprawl of residential estates on the 
urban fringes has helped to alleviate congestion and 
overcrowding in the urban core or not is not clearly visible, 
since there is very little quantitative evidence available to 
indicate any such change. Nonetheless it is generally accepted 
that the larger the city size the greater the need for 
motorized travel and the longer the average travel distance. 
Until now, despite all the efforts to decentralize the 
population, the highest population density figure still remains 
in the four City Districts; in fact, over the past 40 years, 
this figure actually increased by 20% (Quan 1990a).
According to the present author's informal interviews with 
some local residents, many of those newly built flats adjacent 
to the urban fringes mainly accommodate the peasants, who used 
to live in the villages that had existed there, rather than 
citizens relocated from the city centre; and above all, people 
living in the City Districts are generally reluctant to move to 
the urban fringes where public services are seen as inadequate. 
If this is the case, then the decentralization policy which
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mainly relies on urban physical sprawl may indeed have been 
futile. Obviously, by implementing this kind of rehousing 
policy, the authorities have actually absorbed more rural 
residents into the expanded built-up area, rather than
dispersing the population from the overcrowded city centre and, 
because of the increased number of urban residents, 
consequently, it creates greater inadequacy of public 
amenities, including transport services, not to mention that
the acquisition of arable land from the farming communities 
around the urban area could, in effect, destabilize the supply 
of seasonal vegetables for the whole city.
Another impact result'm^ from rapid urban expansion is the 
increase of average travel distance. In this respect the 
increase has been considerably significant. For instance, 
during the three year period between 1983 and 1986 alone, the 
average travel distance for each public transport user in 
Beijing increased by 4.3% per trip. As the built-up area
continues to spread out, this percentage is likely to keep
increasing. It is estimated that by 2000, the increase in 
average trip distance per person would reach one kilometre in 
actual length and that the frequency of trips per day per 
person would also increase from 2.22 in 1990 to 3.0 by then 
(Quan 1990b).
Again, in short, it is quite clear that the increasing 
expansion of the built-up area has, to a large degree, 
contributed to the existing urban problems, notably to the
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problem of mass movement. The strategy of déconcentration of 
urban land use has not been particularly effective in 
controlling the increase of population nor in taming the 
traffic in the built-up area, even though the expansion of the 
city can be regarded to have been carefully planned by the 
authorities.
3.5.3 The Increase in Vehicle Volumes:
Besides rapid physical expansion and population growth, 
Beijing faces another even greater problem in planning and 
managing urban transportation. This is the dramatic increase 
of vehicles of various types and different sizes. Although 
there is often the image that more vehicles could mean greater 
mobility for the citizens, the sheer number of growth that 
without effective control has on the other hand created many 
problems in intra-urban traffic owing to severe congestion, not
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to mention other related problems such as environmental damage, 
noise, accidents and so forth.
Indeed, since 1949, the total number of vehicles registered 
in Metropolitan Beijing has increased fast, though the most 
dramatic increase actually occurred between 1978 and 1988, when 
motorized passenger vehicles increased from 81,300 to 312,100, 
or by 2.83 times during that ten year period; it was at a rapid 
upward trend of 10,000, 25,000, 33,000 and 56,000... in the
successive years throughout the second half of the 1980s (Quan 
1990b). Again, considering the 1980s alone, in actual terms, 
the number of motorized vehicles increased by 300,000; non­
motorized vehicles by nearly 5 million. There are now about 
400,000 motorized vehicles in the Chinese Capital (including 
both commercial and passenger vehicles) (Ren 1990).
One of the "Special characteristics" in China is perhaps 
the use of the so-called "Social vehicles", whose total number 
increased so rapidly during the past decade across the country. 
The aggregate term "social vehicles" is a Chinese-style jargon 
used to describe motorized vehicles belonging to public 
organizations, such as production units, factories, farms, 
state-owned shops, hospitals, educational institutions, 
research establishments and so on. To a large degree a social 
vehicle is the Chinese version of what is known as a "company 
vehicle" in the U.K.. The main difference is that most "social 
vehicles" in China are either coaches or vans equipped with 
seats rather than cars. They are used for carrying the
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company's employees when required, and mostly on business 
trips or for official duties. As a consequence, they are only 
used occasionally and thus have lower utility rates and often 
low load factors than a "full-time" passenger bus. According 
to official figures, on average, only about 63% of all social 
vehicles in Beijing are in constant use. If considered from a 
perspective of utility against time, then, again, on average, 
only 18% of each hour is used; that is to say, during most time 
of the day, the vehicles are parked idle (BRIUPD 1990). Indeed, 
it is estimated that, on average, about 58.2% of all the trips 
made by social vehicles are run with empty seats (Quan 1990a).
Compared with the growth rates of the social vehicles, the 
increase of big buses and trolleys has been slower. These 
conventional buses indeed had their "golden years" in the mid 
1980s (i.e., 1985) when both fleet size and passenger volume
reached a peak. Since 1986 their growth rates have approached 
to zero (Ren 1989). In 1988, even though the fleet size went 
up again close to the level of 1985, the number of passengers 
carried however, fell to a level lower than that of 1984. This 
declining trend, to some extent, suggests that the performance 
of the conventional bus and trolley systems has actually 
deteriorated and that the acquisition of further vehicles will 
not on its own bring passengers back onto their seats.
The rapid increase of motorized vehicles is not the end of 
the story, though. If non-motorized vehicles are also counted, 
then the overall growth rates recorded are even higher and the
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total number of (motorized and non-motorized) vehicles 
registered in Beijing is remarkably high; for in addition to 
all kinds of motorized vehicles, there are now 7.87 million 
bicycles in metropolitan Beijing (Ren 1990).
The growth of bicycles actually built up its momentum in 
the late 1970s following the reforms and relaxation of the 
commodity market, since when the growth of bicycles in Beijing 
has grown at an annual rate of 555,000 vehicles. Between 1980 
and 1988 the total number of net growth was 4.44 million. It 
was estimated that in 1978, the ratio of persons per bicycle in 
Beijing was only 2.93; until 1988 this figure has grown up to 
1.4; that is to say, there were 2 bicycles between 3 persons 
(Ren 1989). And then in 1990, the average ratio of persons per 
bicycle eventually reached 1.3 (Ren 1990), making it roughly 8 
bicycles per every 10 citizens in the city. (See table 9 & fig.
16). One of the reasons for the bicycle boom was due to the 
inefficiency of the conventional modes, whose overall 
accessibility is limited in a diversified urban traffic 
environment; whilst in comparison the bicycle is much more 
suitable for traffic within residential neighbourhoods. 
Therefore it is not surprising to see that the corresponding 
ratio between public transport users and bicycle riders has 
dropped from the previous 50:50 to 36:64 over the last decade 
(Ren 1989).
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Fig. 16 A "bicycle-park” at Qianmen (the Great Front 
Gate - near Tiananmen Square), where population density 
in Beijing is at its highest.
Photo H Lam
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Table 9: The Growth of Bicycle Volumes ( 1949 - 1988)
Year Interval Total volume 
(year) (000)
Accumulated 
growth (000)
Annual growth 
(000)
1949 140
1967 18 1,140 1,000 55.6
1975 8 2,230 2,090 136.6
1981 6 3,210 3,070 163.6
1983 2 4,290 4,150 450.8
1985 2 5,510 5,370 607.8
1987 2 6,710 6,570 598.9
1988 1 7,320 7,180 614.8
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Source: Ren Baoxing "Comments on the Issue of Bicycle Expansion 
in Beijing", in Beijing City Planning & Construction Review. 
1989, PP30.
Overall, over the past 40 years, in Beijing, motorized 
vehicles have increased by 158 times and bicycles by 55 times 
in volume respectively, yet the mileage of roads has only 
increased by 20 times (Ren 1990). There is obviously an 
imbalance between the growing volumes of vehicles and the
space that needed to accommodate them. Considering the rather
undisciplined traffic behaviour of the bicycle riders and the
low load factors of the social vehicles, it is not difficult to 
imagine that the massive volumes of these vehicles on the roads 
are one of the main factors responsible for serious congestion 
in the city. What is more, huge volumes of moving bicycles 
are also a common cause of road accidents. In Beijing, between 
1980 and 1990 there had been 23,693 road accidents involving 
bicycles, of which 22,105 persons were injured and 1,644 dead; 
the numbers of the injured and deaths accounted for 40% and 32% 
of the city's total (road accidents) corresponding figures 
recorded over that period, respectively (Ren 1989). (See fig.
17).
Indeed, the problem of traffic congestion and mass 
movement in Beijing is critical. It has been observed that of 
the 128 major road junctions within the City Districts, 34 
frequently experience heavy congestion, and on average, normal 
traffic flow can be maintained at about one-quarter of these
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aFig. 17 A bicycle dump near the People's Square, in
central Shanghai. This is a vivid example of 
environmental pollution and illegal occupation of road 
space in urban centres.
Photo H Lam
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junctions only (Dong 1985). However, whilst congestion is 
typical in Chinese cities, it is rather different from those in 
the First World and the Middle-income countries. This is 
because congestion in Beijing and other Chinese cities is
chiefly caused by non-motorized vehicles and pedestrians,
rather than by cars. Nonetheless, the impacts of congestion
are obvious. The average speed of motorized vehicles in
Beijing is low even though the city is almost "private-car
free" by any standard (Unconfirmed sources estimate that there 
are about 600 privately-owned cars in Beijing). Currently, the 
average speed for motorized vehicles on main corridors is only 
15.8km/hour, which indicates a decrease of 40% compared with 
what had been ten years before. As a result of decreased
average speed, longer travel time is now needed for most
journeys. Indeed, during the past decade, there has been a 
10.3% increase of average travel time per each vehicular trip 
made in the city (Quan 1990a).
For public passenger services, bus speeds have also been 
affected. The conventional buses become more crowded and less 
punctual than ever. In 1983, for example, average travel-to- 
work times for the City Districts and Suburban Districts of
Beijing were 44 minutes and 66 minutes; by 1986 these had 
increased to 60 and 90 minutes respectively (Smith 1991). In 
many cases, travellers would find it faster to ride the bicycle 
than travel by big bus or trolley, especially for short 
journeys or where the bicycle can take a short cut. It has now
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been observed that, ironically, about 64% of bus travellers 
have to spend 87% longer in terms of average time per trip 
compared with riding a bicycle; that is to say, on average, 
more than a half of the bus-users would find it much quicker to 
travel by bicycle than otherwise by conventional bus or trolley 
(Quan 1990a). Above all, apart from showing the effects of 
congestion, these figures have indicated that in Beijing, the 
average journey distance is relatively short, and thus big 
buses are generally unsuitable for most local residents.
3.6 Summary
Beijing's passenger transport problem is common in large 
cities in China, yet its causes are also of a typical nature. 
Overall, there are three main causative factors;
a) Population growth,
b) Physical sprawl, and
c) Increase of vehicle volumes.
Of these three the growth of population in absolute terms 
is perhaps the most important factor that exerts heavy 
pressures on demand for travel. Adding to the problem is the 
physical sprawl of the city which causes greater needs for 
motorized trips and longer journeys to be made. In respect of
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traffic congestion the problem is partly a consequence of the 
speedy increase of vehicles without effective control and 
management. Thus, technically speaking, there is a mismatch 
between demand and supply in terms of type of vehicles and 
style of service; and in this way, the public transport service 
has failed to meet the requirements of the citizens. Above all, 
the transport problem in Beijing is rather typical in Third 
World cities, thought the level of problem each city faces may 
differ.
Bearing in mind the persistent domination of conventional 
buses and trolleys on the streets previously, the arrival of 
the minibus in Beijing was indeed an injection of new blood 
into the city's public transport system. The next chapter will 
look at the development, structure and characteristics of the 
minibus transport in Beijing in detail.
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Chapter IV
BEIJING'S "UNCONVENTIONAL TRANSPORT" 
THE MINIBUSES
4.1 Introduction
As introduced earlier in chapter I, in many Far Eastern 
cities, apart from conventional buses, small passenger vehicles 
are a major component of urban transport system; most all of 
these "paratransit" vehicles are owned by the private sector: 
some belong to small groups of investors; others are owned by 
families or individuals. Therefore it is not unusual to see 
that the driver himself/herself is the owner of the vehicle and 
that the whole "unconventional" system in a city is made up of 
many small fleets.
Here in Beijing the picture is quite different. The most 
visible differences are ownership pattern and institutional 
structure of the minibuses. This chapter aims to bring the 
argument onto the table by introducing the special features of 
Beijing's minibus service; these include routeing, service 
style and fare structure.
123
4.2 Fleet Structure and Ownership Pattern
Beijing's minibus transport service was established in the 
climate of the Chinese Economic Reform during the 1980s. Under
the assistance of the Municipal Government, several state-owned
bus companies began their minibus business one after another. 
The Rental Company was the first to launch the minibus 
operation in Beijing, followed by four more companies later, 
making it five major minibus providers altogether (Interview 
notes 1990). Along with these companies there are now many 
small undertakings too; though, because of the "informality" 
and the restrictions imposed upon their operation, they are 
often excluded from official statistics. Further details about 
these small fleets will be discussed later.
Of the five major transport companies in the city, four 
provide intra-urban minibus services, whilst one mainly 
operates inter-city services, i.e. between urban Beijing and 
the satellite towns located in the outlying counties. There
are differences in terms of fleet size between the four
companies which provide intra-urban minibus services. Until 
1990, the First Automobile Company had 174 vehicles; the Second 
Automobile Company 169; the Trolley-bus Company 165 and the 
Rental Company 60. All told, the number of registered vehicles 
that belong to the four major intra-urban service providers was 
568 in 1990 (Manuscript data provided by M.A.O officials.
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1990. The total number excludes the fleet of the Long-distance 
Coach Company). However, it should be noted that, the new 
figure in 1992 may have already passed the 600 mark.
Generally speaking, the minibus fleets of these companies 
are, with perhaps exceptional cases, larger than those owned by 
individual undertakings in other Far Eastern cities. For 
instance, in Hong Kong, in the early 1970s, 96% of minibus
owners owned only one or two vehicles (HKPWD 1973). What is 
more interesting is that, although the minibus fleets in 
Beijing are not particularly huge, the companies themselves 
are actually quite large, because they also run conventional 
bus and trolley-bus business and in fact, the minibus operation 
is just a small proportion of their concerns.
In practice, each of these companies is responsible for 
everyday operations of its own minibus teams. That is to say, 
much of the operational activity is managed by the executives 
of the companies in question, such as actual routing, 
dispatching vehicles, frequency control, allocating vehicles 
for hire, arranging extra schedules, personnel matters and so 
on. On the other hand, in terms of overall business management, 
they are all under the control of the Minibus Administrative 
Office, which itself is an internal department of the Beijing 
General Public Passenger Transport Corporation. The Minibus 
Administrative Office makes decisions over the overall planning 
and development of the minibus business, looking after 
financial gains and losses. Thus, although the minibuses are
125
separated in different companies, they are all under the 
umbrella of a state-owned organization (See fig. 18). Their 
business licences are controlled by the municipality's public 
security and transport authorities and fare charges are
regulated by the Pricing Department. It is entirely up to the 
government's approval to invest or hold up in their business. 
In contrast, the managers of the companies act as agents 
operating within the framework of a nationalized enterprise.
However, as mentioned above, there are actually more 
minibuses running on Beijing's streets than just those owned by 
the major transport companies. According to the present
author's interviews with some experts in the field, altogether 
the small undertakings possess even more minibuses than the 
state-owned fleets. Unfortunately, there is no official
information on how many of these minibuses are constantly 
operational. Conservative estimates put their total rolling 
stock (in 1990) at around 600 vehicles or even more.
Hence, the overall picture of minibus transport system in 
Beijing is a large fleet surrounded by small fleets, and under 
two major forms of ownership. What is the ownership structure 
of these small undertakings? Let us move on to explore this 
in greater detail.
In comparison with state-owned fleets, the ownership 
structure of the independent minibuses is somehow distinctive. 
The term "informality" of the independent minibuses actually 
refers to their ownership as well as organizational structure:
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Unlike those directly owned by the state companies, these 
minibuses belong to various cooperatives (Most of which are 
those mentioned in section 2.2). From the original business of 
various kinds of petty commodity production the earlier 
cooperatives seized the opportunities of the 1980s* Reform to 
expand their production line and start the minibus operation. 
Thus, in some cases, the vehicles are owned by a production 
unit, or a backyard factory; in other cases, by a neighbourhood 
workshop or a group of relations or friends, though the latter 
case of family business is by no means common. Technically 
speaking, their ownership is more close to "public" than 
"private" because the vehicles are collectively owned by the 
"people", rather than by any individual. In a sense, it is 
another form of state-ownership.
Since the cooperatives are small scale undertakings, their 
minibus fleets are also small; some are as small as having only 
a few vehicles. As a result, their overall institutional 
structure is likely to be simple, normally without obvious 
managerial hierarchies. The staff are more or less in equal 
terms in that they are supposed to carry the same burden over 
the business performance of the undertaking. In this context, 
the staff are self-employed rather than being hired by someone 
else; this is a unique element which does not exist in a 
"state-owned" institution. Nevertheless, on the whole, it has 
been a tradition in socialist China to categorize all 
collectively-owned business concerns, and hence these minibus
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cooperatives, as "individually-owned", or "independent" 
enterprises, as in contrast to companies directly owned by the 
state. (More about the impacts of their ownership and structure 
will be analysed in section 5.5 of the next chapter).
It is perhaps useful to note that, unlike the state-owned 
transport companies, the majority of these independent minibus 
undertakings are based at the satellite towns and areas close 
to the urban boundaries, rather than within the built-up area. 
The reason that few of them are based in the urban zone is 
because for decades, passenger services in the urban area have 
been monopolized and dominated by the state-owned conventional 
bus fleets, small scale enterprises in the urban area thus find 
it too risky to enter the business and face the challenge from 
a heavily subsidized entity. Whilst in some small urban 
settlements adjacent to the city, there were some routes here 
and there that had not been covered by the conventional bus 
network; this created opportunities for the petty commodity 
workshops already existing there to set up passenger services 
to fill the vacuum. As a consequence, many of these small 
independent minibus fleets are registered locally in the 
counties and supposed to operate in the immediate catchment 
areas.
Hence, strictly speaking, there are no privately-owned 
minibuses or owner-drivers in Beijing as those in the Southeast 
Asian "capitalist" economies, i.e., Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Hong Kong and so forth. One of the main reasons is that unlike
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their overseas counterparts, people in Beijing (indeed, in
China as a whole) have little money saved in the past for them 
to acquire the means of production -- the vehicle, which is far 
beyond the purchasing power of any individual wage earner.
Imagine a worker can earn a monthly wage of Y250 (probably a
typical amount for a driver). For a mere Y50,000 (the price of 
a Chinese-made minibus in 1990), it would take the individual 
more than 15 years to save, not to mention that if he/she could 
save any substantial amount at all after expenditure on other 
basic items for living, since saving is very much dependent on 
the size of the family that one has to support.
Another reason concerns the barriers to entry existing in 
the transport sector. These refer to the problems one has to 
face when trying to enter the transport business, such as 
obtaining a driving licence and getting the business 
registered, which in China have never been easy under the 
bureaucratical system. Furthermore, fuel is almost entirely 
controlled by the state, who does not supply petrol to private 
vehicles on a sufficient basis. All these, together with the 
state monopoly mentioned above, have created invisible
obstruction within the passenger transport industry. This is 
why so far there has been little involvement of private capital 
in the provision of passenger transport services, except 
perhaps for the man-powered rishaws.
On the whole, in broad terms, Beijing's minibus system can 
be considered to have consisted of two major sectors, one owned
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by the state and the other by cooperatives. There is no private 
ownership as is commonly known in capitalist economies.
In terms of fleet size, one may easily see the similarities
between the cooperatives in Beijing and the family- or 
individually-owned concerns in other Far Eastern cities. On the 
other hand, as an independent business unit, the state-owned
fleet in Beijing as a whole is remarkably large, probably
larger than any fleet owned by any single privately-owned
minibus undertaking found in the whole region. Nonetheless, as 
will be discussed further later on, there are zonal 
restrictions between these two sectors in respect of operation.
4.3 Routeing and the Boundary Restriction
The physical size of the minibuses in Beijing is a 
feature that should be given special attention. Unlike the 25 
- 30-seaters seen in the U.K and some other Western cities, 
the vehicles employed by the operators in Beijing are smaller, 
similar to those in Hong Kong. The average seat capacity is 
within the range between 14 and 16 passengers according to
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different models, though the Rental Company does have some 22- 
seaters. (fig. 19). There is no obvious difference in external 
decoration between the minibuses. According to officials of 
the Minibus Administrative Office, for the state-owned fleets, 
97% of the vehicles are Chinese-made, with many actually built 
by the city's own automobile factories. The imported vehicles 
are mostly from Japan and more expensive than locally-built 
ones.
Since there are differences in terms of locality between 
the state-owned and the independent fleets, the routes they run 
are also geographically differentiable. Let us first consider 
the state-owned vehicles. The whole fleet under the management 
of the Minibus Administrative Office is divided into 12 site- 
teams, each of them is based at a nodal location of the city's 
main traffic. Altogether they form a thinly distributed network 
of routes across the built-up area, covering mainly trunk roads 
and busy streets. (See table 10). At each site there is 
usually a parking bay. Performing as a small terminus the bay 
provides facilities such as sign-posts and spaces for the 
minibuses to line up and wait for their turns to pick up 
passengers. Some of the minibus termini are adjacent to 
underground stations, others are close to a similar bay 
provided for the conventional buses and trolleys. Nonetheless, 
for various reasons, such as the big differences in fare 
charges, nodal integration between the minibus and the 
conventional buses remains poor.
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Fig. 19 Beijing's minibuses collecting passengers 
at the Nortii gate of the Forbidden City. The words on 
the sides of the vehicles read: "Hail and ride. Get off 
wherever convenient".
Photo H Lam
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Table 10;
Number of Routes, Average Route Length & Average Distance 
Travelled per Vehicle in Urban and Suburbs 
(State-owned Minibuses)
(16 April 1988) /
y
Route No. of 
routes
Length of 
routes (km)
Average distance 
per vehicle (km)
Urban 21 174.42 5.73
Suburban 18 393.22 19.44
Total in built 
up area 39 567.64 12.16
Source: Modified from "The Collection of Major Data on the
Survey about Passengers". December 1988b, BGPPTC & MAO. 
NB: a) Data based on a one day survey.
b) Information on Independent minibuses is not available.
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Compared with those operating in other Far Eastern cities, 
the minibuses in Beijing are rather unsettled in terms of 
regular routeing and service intervals. According to official 
document (BGPPTC 1988a), altogether there are five different 
forms of services (Table 11 & fig. 20); though, on the whole 
they can be classified into two main categories: routed and
non-routed services.
1. The first category is the routed services. These are 
provided by the state-owned operators. There are (in 1990) 
39 routes, totalling 567.64 km in length. This category can be 
divided into three forms:
a. Eleven fixed routes: Like the conventional buses, they 
are fixed in business hours, and supposedly with fixed 
frequency and bus-stops along the route. Each minibus displays 
a route-plate on the windscreen to show the destination of the 
route.
b. Twenty six non-fixed routes: The main difference
between the a fixed route and a non-fixed route is that the 
latter is more variable. That is to say, though the minibuses 
normally begin their journeys from a bay, the crew may divert 
the route when necessary. There are no fixed business hours nor 
fixed bus-stops. Route diversions often fluctuate with changes 
of traffic pattern, for example, in the morning the minibuses 
tend to ply between rail and coach stations and recreational 
sites, and in the afternoon between recreational sites and 
hotels or entertainment facilities.
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c. Two special routes for tourists: They mainly link 
major sight-seeing areas and the city centre. One of which is 
the route from the former royal park of Summer Palace in the 
west end of the city, via Beijing Zoo to the world famous 
Tiananmen Square. On these tourist-routes the minibuses operate 
in the form that more or less resembles long distance coach 
services in that they start from the origin and terminate at 
the destination without making fixed stops en route unless 
demanded.
ii. The second category is the non-routed services. There 
are two kinds of non-routed services.
a. Collective rental services: Passengers are collected 
at normally a beauty spot or a transport terminus, who all want 
to travel to the same destination and thus share the costs 
amongst themselves. There is no schedule or fixed route but it 
is rather like a taxi service.
b. Contracting out services: Charter-service where both
the driver and the vehicle are hired out. Prearrangements are 
usually made so that specific requirements on timing, duration 
or distance can be negotiated before hand.
It is interesting to note that, whilst only a small 
proportion of state-owned minibuses provide rental and 
contracted out services, in their operations within the built- 
up area, the majority of independent minibuses are engaged in 
these forms of services. The reason that most independent 
minibuses do not have fixed routes in the built-up area but
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rely mainly on non-routed operations is because the authorities 
have imposed zonal restrictions to prevent them from operating 
there where routes are properly identified and designated for 
the state-owned minibuses. Under these restrictions, 
independent minibuses based at the satellite towns or areas 
adjacent to the urban boundary are only allowed to provide 
services locally in the county areas where they are registered. 
On the contrary, those based at the urban area (mainly state- 
owned ones) may not cross their urban limit to travel to the 
county territories. For those who break this rule and operate 
beyond the permitted boundaries, an instant fine will be 
imposed on the spot if seized.
Nonetheless, these zonal restrictions cannot entirely 
deter those county-based operators who are determined to strive 
for higher earnings. It has been observed that, in practice, 
many of the minibuses from the Xian counties and areas close to 
urban boundaries prefer to face the risk of possible penalties 
to operate in the urban zone, where more and probably "richer” 
customers are easier to be found.
The independent minibuses from the counties and border 
areas normally travel into the urban zone in a "demand-pull" 
fashion; that is to say, they start to go into the city area by 
carrying in a load of urban-bound passengers; thereafter, they 
may stay there and continue to provide intra-urban services, or 
else return to the counties with another load of outward-bound 
passengers, provided they can fill up the vehicle. Clearly,
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because of the nature of non-routed services whereby 
destinations are highly variable, it is not always easy to 
enforce the boundary restrictions throughout and, since the 
routes of these minibuses are so unpredictable that they 
travel into the urban area without any regular basis, no 
official record on the total volume of their urban business is, 
and perhaps never will be, kept.
Nevertheless, the volumes of passengers carried by these 
county-based minibuses are really remarkable. Though partially 
restricted, they are in fact part of an entire minibus network; 
and together with other modes, they make up Beijing*s passenger 
transport system.
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Table 11: The Five Different Forms of Services
(State-owned fleets)
Service No. of 
routes
Length of 
routes (km)
Average distance 
per vehicle (km)
Fixed routes 11 128.55 8.77
Non-fixed routes 26 329.59 10.27
Tourist routes 2 109.50 48.09
Collected rental 517.96 7.87
Contracted out 18.16
Total 39 12.01
Source: Modified from report by BGPPTC & MAO, December 1988b.
NB: a) Data based on a one day survey.
b) Information on Independent minibuses not available.
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4.4 Service Characteristics
Although there are supposed to be routed and non-routed 
styles of services as described above, in practice, the crews 
are rather independent over their routeing as well as schedule; 
as a result most services provided are relatively flexible in 
accordance with actual needs. Overall, compared with those in 
other Far Eastern cities, the operational characteristics of 
Beijing's minibuses are different in a number of ways, which 
require some detailed description.
First of all, most minibuses in other Far Eastern cities 
are one man operated. Each vehicle is driven by a driver who 
also acts as a conductor. Here in Beijing each minibus is 
manned by a crew of two people, a driver and a fare collector. 
Interestingly in most cases the driver is male and the fare
collector female but they are not necessarily relations as
those of family business found in Manila or Jakarta; in fact 
there are not many cases where the crew members are relations, 
especially within the state-owned fleets. The conductress is 
seated by the door to collect fares and operate the door for 
passengers alighting and boarding the vehicle.
Except for contracted out services whereby fares are paid 
according to prearrangement, in all other forms of services,
fares are collected on board the vehicle. There is no monthly
or weekly ticket available for using the minibus system in
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Beijing, regardless of the ownership of the fleet.
Unlike minibus services elsewhere where no ticket is given 
to the passenger, here in Beijing each passenger will normally 
receive a ticket for the fare paid, the reason is that in 
China, especially for office workers or professionals, the 
money spent on business-trips are normally returnable by the 
organization where the passenger works, tickets are thus 
retained as proof for claiming travel expenses.
Another (W i q ue^eature of the Beijing minibuses is that 
each minibus is equipped with a loudspeaker. This is for the 
conductress to make announcements when collecting passengers 
at the starting point or the stops along the route. Sometimes 
the driver joins in to solicit passengers too. With a route- 
plate displayed on the windscreen, the minibus crews compete 
with each other by shouting out like stall traders to the 
waiting crowd. The conductress gives information about the 
destination and fares charged, so that potential passengers may 
"shop around" and decide what particular service they need and 
which minibus they want to board. If a passenger wants to 
alight at a stop, the conductress is often to be informed the 
intended destination when the vehicle is about to approach it. 
The message is then passed to the driver who will make the 
stop accordingly.
For the 11 fixed routes operated by state-owned minibuses, 
the services are supposed to be scheduled with a fixed 
frequency. According to information available at some parking
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bays, the designed service frequency is at an interval of ten 
minutes, giving a mid-headway of five minutes. However, in 
practice, neither schedule nor frequency is properly followed. 
When starting a trip from a parking bay, the crew would always 
try to collect as many passengers as the seating capacity can 
hold rather than running to a schedule without having a 
considerable number of passengers on board. In fact, in most 
cases, they would wait and depart only when most of the seats 
are occupied.
In Beijing, perhaps as in other cities in China, bus 
routes tend to be designated on major corridors.(fig. 21). 
Probably it is because most Chinese citizens travel by bicycle 
for short journeys, thus bus routes are supposed to serve 
longer trips. Another feature is that the average distance 
between bus-stops is quite long, much longer than that seen in 
London. But the main point here is that, it is not just 
conventional buses that ply along major arteries, the fixed 
minibus routes are also concentrated on trunk roads. Hence in 
many cases, minibuses share the same routes with the 
conventional buses and trolley-buses; and in many locations, 
minibuses not only duplicate the routes of the conventional 
buses but also call at the same bus-stops. Nevertheless, 
minibuses are more flexible in that they would stop for 
passengers to get on or get off wherever required along the 
route, similar to the "hail and ride" style; whilst the 
conventional buses would only call at designated bus-stops.
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Fig. 21 Nanjing Road -- the main commercial street in
Shanghai. Both trolley-buses and minibuses share the 
same route.
Photo H Lam
144
Although minibuses do offer "hail and ride" services to
travellers at any point along the route they run, it is quite
common for passengers to wait for a bus at a bus-stop rather 
than at a random location. The reason is that in most cases, 
both conventional buses and minibuses call at the same stops of 
the route, therefore waiting at a bus-stop could increase the 
probability of getting on whatever bus that arrives. As a 
consequence of this "on-the-spot" waiting, it is not unusual to 
see a fixed-routed minibus to have stopped at designated stops 
only along the route it runs.
However, there is some difference in stopping time amongst
the minibuses themselves, as well as between the minibus and
the conventional bus. For the minibus, the stopping time 
varies at different bus-stops. This is because occasionally 
fare negotiations may take place, thus the length of stopping 
depends on how long the fare haggling lasts. When a 
negotiation is locked in a stalemate, the stopping could last 
as long as up to several minutes. On the other hand, if the 
minibus is approaching a bus-stop at which the driver reckons 
that the chance of collecting potential passengers is slim, 
then he tends not to make a complete stop but may only slow 
down the vehicle to make a few announcements in an effort to 
attract those who otherwise might have been thinking of waiting 
for a conventional bus. In that case, the stopping time may 
actually be reduced to minimum or equal to zero. By contrast, 
there are no fare negotiations for using the conventional bus.
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No doubt, difference in stopping does contribute to difference 
in journey time.
In summarizing the actual service characteristics of 
Beijing*s minibuses, there are two major points on routeing and 
flexibility. First, most routed minibuses ply on major trunk 
roads, duplicating the routes of the conventional buses (The 
impacts of trunk road concentration will be discussed further 
in section 6.2). Second, the non-routed ones are generally at 
large to run where and when they feel more suitable to do so. 
For them, schedules are mainly dependent on "load factor" 
rather than time.
Table 12 on the next page gathers all the information 
about the state-owned fleets (Performance based on a one day 
survey). It indicates that the majority (76%) of the minibuses 
are engaged in non-routed services.
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Table 12;
Structure, Capacity and Performance of Minibuses 
Owned by BGPPTC (1988)
Fleet size 510 vehicles
Vehicle capacity 15 seats
Number of routes 39 routes
Total route length 567.64 km
Non-routed operation 387 vehicles (76% of total fleet)
Total passengers carried 24,500,000 person/trips
Actual vehicles operational 339 (66.47%)
Distance travelled per vehicle 115.3 km
Passengers carried per vehicle per day 119 person/trips
Average load factor per day 81.77%.
Average trip length: 12.01 km
* built up areas 5.71 km
* outskirts 19.44 km
Average journey speed: 23.53 km
* built up areas 16.74 km
* outskirts 29.79 km
Source: Modified from Comprehensive Report BRIUPD 1990.
NB. a) data were based on a one day survey; since the actual 
number of vehicles operational might differ each day, the daily 
performance could vary, b) The survey was carried in 1988, the 
fleet has increased ever since, so has the corresponding data.
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4.5 Fare Structure and Travel Costs
It has been argued that small vehicles tend to incur 
higher operation costs per seat than larger ones (See, for 
example, Bly et^a^1986); thus in order to cover costs involved 
minibuses often have to charge higher fares than conventional 
buses do. In Beijing, although the rates of fare charges are 
subject to restrictions set up by the city's Pricing 
Department, in practice, for various reasons they are higher 
than the proposed rates and are very costly. First let us look 
briefly at the fare structure of minibus service.
Similar to the big buses and trolleys, the minibuses are 
supposed to operate at a graduated fare rate whereby fares are 
charged according to the actual distance travelled. At present 
the minibus fare rate is YO.15/person/km and the basic fare is 
set on a 5km journey; any further distance travelled beyond 
this basic journey would be charged under what is known as the 
"Two out three in" principle for each additional 5km (Interview 
notes, 1990). The general idea of this principle may be 
interpreted as a method of rounding off between the figures 2 
and 3 in a sum of 5. What this actually means is that, once a 
passenger boards a minibus, his or her basic fare is Y0.75 for 
any distance within the first 5 kilometres (at the rate of 
YO.15/person/km). Now after the first 5 kilometres, if a 
further journey travelled is within 2.5km (considered to be 2),
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then it would be dropped and this additional journey is 
gratis, the passenger only has to pay the basic fare. On the 
contrary, if a further journey is between 2.5Km and 5Km 
(considered to be 3), then an additional fare is chargeable at 
the rate of Y0.15 per kilometre calculated under this 
principle. Put in another way, if a passenger altogether has 
travelled 8km, then the amount that he/she has to pay is the 
sum of two basic fares, which is Y1.50.
Of course, because of the diversity of travel distances, 
in reality it is impossible to measure the exact distance 
travelled by each passenger and hence charge the fare at the 
prescriptive rate. Operators have thus adapted a more practical 
method in charging fares. This working fare rate is interpreted 
into the form of total bus-stops travelled and displayed at 
parking bays and on the vehicles:
Three stops: Y0.50.
Six stops: Yl.OO.
Over six stops: Y1.50.
However, even fare charges are based on the number of 
bus-stops travelled, it is not always possible to follow the 
rate strictly. In practice, instead of a graduated rate, each 
route charges a flat fare in accordance with the length of the 
route. Although most collectively-owned minibuses do not run 
on a fixed route, in most cases, they do adapt a flat fare for 
each trip they run. There are exceptions, though. For example,
if the trip is too long, then the cost for a mid-way journey
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may be reduced (normally to two-thirds of tne whole fare).
Currently, the typical flat fares are Yl.O, Y1.5, Y2.0, 
Y3.0, Y4.0 and Y5.0, and depending on the time of the day as 
well as the length of the route. In other words, the fares 
are not fixed at any time; the crew would increase the normal 
fare whenever they see the chance that is suitable for them to 
do so. As a result, peak-time fares are often doubled. 
Overall, whether during peak-times or off peak-times, minibus 
fares are generally very expensive compared with the fares
charged by the subsidized conventional bus and trolley 
services. For instance, the average fare for a ride on the big 
bus or the trolley costs just Y0.30, with the lowest extreme at 
Y0.05 and the highest at about Y0.50 respectively. Thus, the
flat fares charged by the minibuses and the graduated fares
charged by the conventional buses differ remarkably. (The cause 
of high travel costs will be analysed in section 6.3).
Another feature is that, unlike minibuses in other Far 
Eastern cities where peak fare charges often occur in the early 
part of morning and late afternoon when commuters are on the 
move, in Beijing, peak fare charges tend to occur from late
morning to mid-afternoon, roughly between 10.00 hours and 15.30 
hours during the day. Put in another way, the demand curve for 
minibus travel reaches a peak in the mid-day period, rather 
than in two separate periods in the morning and afternoon 
respectively. This is obviously a reflection of the demands by 
tourists, in that the mid-day period is normally the busiest
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time for sightseeing activities. (See table 13 & fig. 22). 
Furthermore, since tourists are busier on public holidays, 
there are fare fluctuations throughout the working week as well 
as the working day; peak fare charges are likely to occur at 
weekends and on public holidays.
On the other hand, there seems to be little difference in 
terms of fare charges among the minibuses. The crews, though 
may belong to different companies, tend to adhere to the usual 
rates. In other words, they are somehow "self-regulated" and 
supposed to stick to the same flat fare. In fact, they seldom 
compete with each other for passengers by offering cheaper
fares. The most obvious form of competition is their industry 
and hardworking spirit, e.g., their patience and friendliness 
towards the potential passengers. Therefore, when deciding to 
board a minibus from a terminus, a passenger would often 
choose the one that will depart first, rather than any vehicle 
that may charge a lower fare, since in most cases, a lower
offer at the beginning of a journey would hardly happen.
Although, in general, a flat fare is charged for each 
route or each journey, negotiations for fare reductions do 
occur occasionally, especially with passengers who join the 
vehicle in the mid-way of the route. Fares are normally
adjusted according to the crew's judgements over whether there
would be any more potential full-fare passengers waiting at the 
forthcoming stops. Since the nearer to the end of the route, 
the fewer the passengers would board the vehicle who would pay
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the full fare; the crew thus make the reductions so as to 
maximize marginal revenue. Understandably, fare reductions tend 
to take place when the minibus is approaching to the second 
half of the route, where the possibility of picking up full 
fare payers is rapidly diminishing.
Perhaps it should be mentioned that, although there is 
little direct competition between routed services, from time to 
time a competitive atmosphere does exist within the non-routed 
services. This is because contracted out and rental services 
are often various in space and irregular in time, it is 
therefore practically impossible to compare the costs for each 
and every trip and thus charge different services at identical 
rates; such incommensurability consequently creates a situation 
whereby some crews may charge less than others. Nevertheless, 
due to the differences in service requirements, the competition 
between non-routed services is unlikely to influence the fares 
charged by routed services.
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Table 13;
Classification of Travel Purposes 
(1988)
Purpose of Travel %
Tourism 40.01
Work 25.37
Shopping 14.36
Visiting friends & relatives 7.77
Commercial activities 5.35
School 3.81
Medical engagement 1.98
Cultural activities 1.06
Meeting and conference 0.11
Other 0.18
Total 100.00
Source: Official data, BGPPTC December 1988b.
N.B. information on independent minibuses is not available
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4.6 Patronage Growth and Financial Achievements
Although, in comparison, the establishment of Beijing's 
minibus service was later than those in other Far Eastern 
cities, the Government authorities and the operators have been 
very anxious in trying to explore the problems as well as 
potential of the system. The survey carried out between the 
19th of March and 16th of April 1988, was an ardent attempt to 
identify the current issues. A total of 88,900 persons, some on 
board the minibus, some at bus-stops, were interviewed during 
the survey over various aspects of the service.
Of the 12,000 regular public transport users interviewed 
at bus-stops, 56.87% of those from the local residents said 
they had travelled by minibus before; the figure for those from 
the floating population was 69.96%. And of the 37,000 minibus 
passengers interviewed on board the vehicles, 60% said that 
they had travelled by minibus regularly, 40% just travelled the 
minibus for the very first time (BGPPTC 1988a).
In respect of patronage, until December 1988, just four 
years after the initial operation, the total number of 
passengers using the state-owned minibuses had increased by 14 
times in volume, from just over 1.5 million person/trips in 
1984 to 24.5 million (See table 14 & fig. 23). At the same 
time, the collective sector has also proliferated, even though 
they have been officially barred from operating within the
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urban zone.
Table 14;
Annual Passenger Volumes of State-Owned Minibuses
(1984 - 1988)
Year Passenger volume (million person/trips)
1984 1.633
1985 9.630
1986 15.830
1987 20.360
1988 24.500
Source: BGPPTC December 1988a; 1988b.
N.B. information on Independent minibuses is not available.
The figures shown above suggest that the increase of 
minibus patronage in Beijing is highly significant and its rate 
of increase is the fastest compared with that of any other 
system. The most remarkable increases have been in the first 
two years when the yearly increase amounted to 8 million in 
1985 and 6 million in 1986 respectively. These annual increase 
rates each on its own approximately equals the entire 
population of Greater London. In this sense it is not too
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difficult to imagine how huge the increases have been. More 
interestingly, it has also been observed that the proportion of 
local residents using the minibuses is gradually increasing. 
After all, a sizable market for minibus service is now firmly 
formed and the demand is set to grow.
However, the achievements are not only reflected in fleet 
expansion and patronage increase, but more importantly, the 
industry has flourished without financial subsidies from the 
Government. In a way, the minibus industry is seen as the 
"flagship" implying the success of China's Economic Reform. 
With such a rapid speed of increase in patronage one could 
expect turnovers to be impressive. Indeed, until now, of the 
major public passenger modes owned by the state in Beijing, 
only the minibuses are profitable. Revenues earned by both
state-owned as well as independent undertakings are high, 
making them among the most successful enterprises in the city 
(See table 15 & 16). For example, between 1985 and 1988, 
altogether three state-owned companies, namely the First 
Automobile Company, the Second Automobile Company and the 
Trolley Company received a combined gross revenue of Y53.03 
million from their minibus operations and paid Y5.52 million of 
income tax to the government. The total net profits during 
that three-year period amounted to Y19.27 million (Interview 
notes 1990). In 1987, revenue gained from minibus operations 
alone of these three companies amounted to 11% of their total 
revenue that year, even though their minibus fleets were much
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smaller than their conventional bus fleets (BGPPTC 1988a). And 
in 1988 the four state-owned minibus companies as a whole 
earned Y8 million (Interview notes 1990).
Meanwhile, although there are no official data showing the 
turnovers gained by the small independent undertakings, it is 
still possible to assess their profitability by drawing 
inference on the basis of findings elsewhere. This will be 
discussed further in chapter V, section 5.6.
On the whole, the minibus transport system in Beijing has 
strengthened greatly since its maiden operations. There are now 
increasing sights of public approval to expand the service (See 
table 17). Survey shows altogether the respondents want a 
total of 61 new routes to be designated. If the plan for these 
new routes is to be materialized, then the total length of 
minibus routes in Beijing will increase to 1,501 kilometres, 
which is "hwo and a half times of the current length. Along 
with the demand for new routes, the respondents want further 
improvements to be made in the quality of service on 20 
existing routes. The survey also indicates that most travellers 
request that the current minibus service hours to be 
lengthened, from early morning well into the night time period 
(BGPPTC 1988a). For these and other reasons the authorities 
have now begun to realize the importance of the minibus and the 
increasing need of a more flexible approach in urban transport 
planning.
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Table 15:
Total Trips Made, Passenger Volumes & Earnings 
(State-owned Minibuses; on 16 April 1988)
Company Total No. of 
trips made
No. of 
passengers
Earnings
(Yuan)
First Co. 888 15,306 21,100
Second Co. 958 14,037 25,297
Trolley Co. 496 8,284 15,575
Rental Co. 92 l,o60 3,753
BGPPTC (total) 2,434 39,287 65,726
Source: Modified from BGPPTC & MAO report December 1988b. 
NB: a) Data based on a one day survey.
b) Information on Independent minibuses not available.
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Table 16:
Earnings, Average fare/Trip & Load Factors 
of Urban and Suburban Routes 
(Beijing*s State-owned Minibuses)
(16 April 1988)
Zone Earnings
(Yuan)
Fare/trip 
(Yuan)
Load Factors 
%
Urban 22,691.50 1.16 80.12
Suburban 38,235.00 2.22 84.35
Total 60,926.50 1.66 83.40
Source : Modified from *The Collection of Major Data on the
Survey about Passengers*. December 1988b, BGPPTC & MAO.
NB: a) Data collected on one day basis.
b) Information on Independent minibuses not available.
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Table 17:
Passenger Opinions on the Importance of the Minibus Service 
(in 1988)
Grade %
Very Important 53.8
Important 46.0
Not important 0.20
Total 100.00
Source; "The Compilation of Major Passenger Survey" by MAO & 
BGPPTC, 1988b.
162
4.7 The Ultimate Question
Operating in a business environment in which rival 
conventional modes charge as low as close to a "free-commodity" 
level, yet the minibus undertakings in Beijing are not merely 
sustainable and hold their own financially, but lucrative and 
thriving; their turnover figures are indeed stimulating. It is 
undeniably of great relief for the fiscal department of the 
municipality, for during the recent few years alone, subsidies 
given to the conventional transport systems in Beijing have 
exceeded Y200 million per annum (Quan 1990a), eating up huge 
amounts of government's budgets.
What is even more interesting is that, unlike its 
counterparts in the South East Asian cities, the Beijing system 
can be profitable under public ownership and in a large 
business scale. These discoveries are somehow novel compared 
with previous findings whereby minibus systems were largely 
believed to be financially viable only under private ownership 
and in small scale business. Thus the most crucial question is: 
What makes these large, and state-owned, minibus undertakings 
financially viable? The following chapter will be attempting 
to explore the dynamics of the minibus transport in Beijing.
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Chapter V
THE DYNAMICS OF THE MINIBUS SERVICE
5.1 Introduction
Earlier in section 1.6 it was discussed that there were 
four major factors which contributed to the success of 
paratransit. Since the economic system in China is different 
from those where these factors were found to be important, 
there emerges a question: to what extent can they influence the
performance of Beijing's minibus service? Thus this chapter
mainly looks at the dynamics of minibus transport in a 
socialist urban environment.
The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part 
deals with the operational advantages of the minibuses: the
service quality derived as a consequence of small physical 
size. The second part tries to analyse the possible effects of 
ownership and organizational structure in relation to
profitability. In other words, the discussion will be
surrounding on trying to examine the hypothesis. First of all, 
let us start by looking at how fast the minibus can travel on 
Beijing's streets.
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5.2 Journey Speed
The average travel speed of a motorized vehicle in an 
urban environment is very much subject to the condition of the 
road surface and congestion rather than its engine capacity. 
As mentioned earlier, empirical studies in other Far Eastern 
cities have indicated that small vehicles can travel faster 
than big conventional buses in cities with narrow streets (See, 
for example, Walters 1979b; Pendakur 1984; Rimmer 1986a). In 
the case of Beijing, the average travel speed of the minibus 
is observed to be faster than that of the conventional bus and 
trolley bus, at 16.74 km/h for the minibus and 14km/h for the 
conventional buses respectively (BRIUPD 1990). Based on 
findings elsewhere, it may be assumed that the faster travel 
speed is mainly due to the fact that the small minibus is more 
capable of travelling amongst a large number of bicycles as 
well as being more penetrable to narrow streets, rather than to 
anything related to the engine power, although how it can 
achieve this is a question of how well it can cope with the 
congested traffic.
Assuming the congestion effect is minimum, faster vehicle 
travel speed may result in less in-vehicle time needed for the 
passenger. However, in reality, it is impossible to travel in 
a large city without encountering some kind of congestion. 
Clearly, urban passenger movements depend upon many other
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factors than the motive force of each vehicle. These are 
sometimes known as "non-mechanical" factors and exist in 
various forms, e.g., they include route design, service 
frequency, stopping time, end-to-end service, modal integration 
and so forth. What makes minibus service more significant is 
its journey speed, which is influenced by a combination of 
these elements. Interestingly, some of these elements, such as 
stopping time and end-to-end service, are in turn determined by 
the size of the vehicle and its manoeuvrability on the one 
hand, and its route adaptability and penetrability on the 
other. In other words, the minibus service's flexibility over 
time and space is a primary feature in achieving higher average 
journey speed.
With flexible schedules the minibus is quick in responding 
to travel demand. For the non-routed minibuses, by offering a 
"hail and ride" style of service the minibus is able to reduce 
the passenger's waiting time to a minimum. In terms of time 
saving, when a minibus is hired for chartered service, 
theoretically speaking waiting time can be reduced to as little 
as zero. In Beijing, examples of time saving due to non­
scheduled operations can be found in many places, such as 
major modal connecting points, i.e. at coach depots and railway 
stations, where modal changes normally take place. For 
instance, at the South Beijing Railway Station, known as the 
Southern Gate of the Capital, both conventional buses and 
minibuses meet in front of the Station to pick up passengers.
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When a train arrives at the railway station, there are normally 
a large number of people wanting to continue their journeys 
to other places across the city. This sudden influx of people 
often creates a peak demand for intra-urban travel. Here
passengers will not only find the conventional buses
overcrowded but what is even worse is that their fixed
schedules often cause long delays. For those who have not
been able to board the first wave of conventional buses, 
waiting for the second wave of buse.s could mean further delay 
and additional uncertainty. Many travellers at this stage 
choose to board the minibus. The minibus is more responsive 
since it has no fixed service schedule and would depart as soon 
as most seats are occupied. And it is often easy to fill up a 
minibus under these circumstances.
The non-routed services are adaptable in terms of areas 
covered as well as in routes; when offering rental services, 
they are practically responsive to destinations required by the 
passengers. With responsive service style and flexible 
routing, the minibus not only reduces passengers' waiting 
time, but can also increase journey speed greatly by reaching 
close to passengers' alighting point, without further modal 
changes or unwanted walking which may possibly be needed if 
otherwise travel by conventional bus or trolley. On the whole, 
minibus services in Beijing are attractive to users who value 
time higher than travel costs. It is therefore not difficult 
to understand why roughly two thirds of the state-owned
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minibuses choose to run on non-fixed routes.
Of course, in any city, travel costs are also an important 
factor influencing the demand for passenger transport services. 
Yet interestingly, in Beijing, besides affecting demand for 
travel, high travel costs cause another problem on the journey 
speed of the minibus service. This works through a chain of 
interactions between costs and journey length and is explained 
as follows. First of all, as mentioned in section 4.5, because 
the minibuses charge a flat fare on a route basis regardless of 
the distance travelled, for a passenger who travels only some 
section of a route, the ride is obviously too expensive. 
Therefore it becomes more cost-effective to use the minibus on 
long trips rather than on short ones; in a way, the average 
travel distance by minibus is thus indirectly prolonged by its 
high travel costs and method of charge. Consequently, in 
reality, most minibus passengers are long-journey travellers on 
the route they are travelling (i.e. they are likely to travel 
from the beginning to the end of the route) (This coincides 
with experiences elsewhere, e.g., Kuala Lumpur). This 
therefore reduces the chances of unloading passengers en route 
(See, for example, JMP 1981). Furthermore, because the minibus 
carries fewer people than the conventional bus, it would 
normally stop less frequently than the conventional bus does. 
Since the minibus makes fewer stops, it can maintain a steady 
speed and thus can shorten the time needed for the journey. 
Hence, assuming other factors being equal, compared with the
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conventional bus which calls at all stops, the overall journey 
speed works in favour of the minibus; that is to say, the 
passenger's "in-vehicle journey time" by the minibus for the 
same distance would be shorter. This is one of the reasons 
which explain why, in Beijing, the minibus's journey speed is 
generally higher than that of the conventional bus and trolley.
Clearly, with small body the minibus is easy to manoeuvre, 
load and unload, quick to turn and can penetrate in small 
lanes. By contrast, due to its big and long body the 
conventional bus is difficult to move about, and even more 
difficult to overtake other vehicles. This is particularly true 
when travelling amongst huge armies of manpowered vehicles of 
various types, such as bicycles, rishaws, not to mention 
pedestrians. The slow movements or stationary presence of 
these small vehicles, in particular their rather undisciplined 
traffic behaviour, are often the main cause of traffic jams, 
which make the conventional bus become even more difficult to 
manoeuvre, noticeably during peak hours. In fact, it has been 
observed that, in general, travel by minibus can save up to 
one third of the time needed by the conventional bus for the 
same distance (Interview notes, 1990).
Perhaps it is important to note that, in low income 
developing countries, the perception of time saving on 
passenger transport services is somewhat different from that of 
developed countries. This is quite true in the case of Beijing 
in that there is an implicit distinction between what may be
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described as the passenger’s "in-vehicle time" and "in-vehicle 
moving time", meaning when the passengers are sitting on a 
vehicle in motion. Here, people tend to value the "in-vehicle 
moving time" rather than just "in-vehicle time" more important 
than the actual journey time needed from origin to destination. 
This can be illustrated by the example when passengers waiting 
inside a stationary vehicle. As mentioned earlier, often, when 
a minibus begins its journey from a terminus, the crew tend 
not to depart until most seats are occupied, some early-arrived 
passengers thus have to wait inside the vehicle, until the 
number of passengers big enough to make sense for the crew to 
start the journey. In the early morning hours when most
tourists have not yet begun their sightseeing activities, this 
kind of "in-vehicle waiting" could last for over thirty minutes 
in some cases. Obviously, for those who have been waiting 
inside the vehicle, the time spent for waiting seems less 
important but the value of "in-vehicle moving time" is what 
matters most. The fact that most minibus travellers in Beijing 
are not the Western style "Nine to Five" commuters explains why 
the "in-vehicle waiting time" is somehow tolerable. In any 
case, this has confirmed the point made by some writers that 
the value of time in Third World cities is unlikely to be high 
for the majority of passengers (See, for example, Fouracre et 
al 1979).
On the whole, small size is an obvious advantage for the 
minibus to achieve high travel speed in Beijing’s urban
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traffic. Furthermore, because the minibus carries fewer 
passengers while most of whom are long-trip makers, it makes 
fewer stops en route than does the conventional bus, as a 
result, it can increase passengers* journey speed. For the non- 
routed minibus, their adaptiveness in terms of space and time 
can reduce travellers* waiting time to a minimum.
5.3 Accessibility and Convenience
In any city, the physical structure and topography of land 
use are crucial factors which influence the demand for 
transport services as well as the pattern of traffic flow. 
Thus, the design of bus route network is important in providing 
accessible services, this is particularly true in developing 
countries where the buses are normally the only public system 
available. For minibuses, the greater choice of routes provided 
by them, especially their potential for penetrating residential 
areas along roads unsuited for large buses, may reduce average 
access time and provide convenient services (See, for example, 
Ely et al, 1985).
It has been mentioned in chapter II, that like most 
Chinese cities, the pattern of urban land use in Beijing is 
paradoxical to those of Western cities, e.g., London or Paris,
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whose centres are mainly a heartland for political, financial 
and cultural activities. Here in Beijing, the city centre is 
an area of mixed land-use and different activities, including 
residence. As a consequence of high residential concentration 
in the central zone, demand for passenger transport services 
there is potentially high. The high level of travel demand in 
the historical urban centre is reflected by the sheer volume of 
traffic it bears. For instance, the four City Districts occupy 
only 8.2% of total built up area, but they bear 28.7% of the 
city's traffic (excluding the Xians*) (Quan 1990b). It is also 
striking to note that, within these City Districts, the three 
large commercial centres of Wangfujing, Xidan and Qianmen alone 
attract a daily passenger flow of about 600,000 person/trips 
(Dong 1985). Again, as one can see, traffic levels within the 
central area are particularly high.
In addition to the high level of demand for travel, the 
high density of inhabitants also creates special needs in 
passenger services. According to a survey, in urban Beijing as 
a whole, the average vehicular journey distance by local 
residents does not exceed 6km (Quan 1990a). This suggests that 
the need for short journey transport services is particularly 
apparent. In order to meet the demand pattern, the average 
distance between bus-stops needs to be short and frequent 
stops may have to be made. Nonetheless, the conventional buses 
and trolleys in Beijing mainly ply, and in fact can only ply, 
along broad avenues of the city. They are particularly
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cumbersome to accelerate and decelerate, frequent stoppings 
would decrease travel speed. And since Beijing's trolley-buses 
require overhead-cable wiring, thus, technically speaking, it 
is not always possible to install them in the cramped 
residential quarters. Clearly, the disability of conventional 
buses for penetrating narrow street is due both to their poor 
routing, namely over-concentration on trunk roads, as well as 
to their bulky and unwieldy size. To borrow a technical jargon, 
both their "software" and "hardware" are incompetent in meeting 
the requirements of the real world. This kind of unsuitability 
is particularly obvious in the old city area, where the old 
streets are simply too narrow for any conventional buses.
By contrast, the small minibus is more penetrable to the 
streets and suitable for the travel pattern and, above all, 
superior in terms of access to trip destinations. Indeed, 
amongst various kinds of motorized vehicles except the taxi, 
the minibus is the only public passenger mode that can travel 
in the alleyways and be able to accelerate and decelerate 
comparatively easily. The fact that most local residents prefer 
to travel by minibus when carrying heavy luggage (interview 
note 1990) does indicate that with the minibus the passenger 
can minimize the walking distance required.
Urban travel often requires changes to be made on the 
journey between origin and destination, sometimes from vehicle 
to vehicle, sometimes from one mode to another. When changes 
are needed, delay is almost unavoidable. In Beijing, as in any
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other city, because of the uncertainty of the traffic 
conditions, it is not always easy for the buses to follow their 
schedules on time; as a result, services become dislocated, and 
passengers often have to wait at changing points. Each change 
does not only increases the time needed, but also adds a 
negative value of uncertainty to the trip. Owing to the long 
average interval between bus-stops and the poorly-linked 
transport facilities, modal changes in Beijing are particularly 
time-consuming.
In contrast to the need of making changes, the ability of 
being able to offer end-to-end services can boost the degree of 
convenience as well as of reliability of a system. Because of 
the comparatively penetrative route network and flexible style 
of service, most passengers need not make changes when using 
the minibus service. According to data recorded during a 
survey over changes made on the state-owned fleets, in 1988, of 
the 70,000 or so daily minibus passengers (including those 
using the routed and the non-routed services), 51,000 of them 
claim that they are able to reach their destinations on just 
one ride. Put in another way, about 72.47% of person/trips on 
the minibus system do not need to make any change in reaching 
their destinations (Table 18). It is estimated that this high 
level of non-changing services on the minibus system alone can 
altogether reduce a daily total of 84,000 person/trips caused 
by changes otherwise would have been made on other modes of the 
city's public transport system (BGPPTC 1988a). Above all, for
a total of just 600 or so minibuses, yet they manage to avoid 
so many unwanted changes, the achievement is undoubtedly very 
significant. On the other hand, for the independent minibuses, 
due to the fact that most of them are offering charter 
services, one would have little doubt that their passengers 
even have to make fewer changes.
In general, the accessibility and convenience of Beijing*s 
minibus services have been highly appreciated by those who use 
them. This is reflected in the comprehensive survey carried 
out in 1988 which took interviews on board the state-owned 
minibuses. A total of 37 thousand passengers were asked to 
rank the level of convenience in three categories. The results 
indicate that 49.22% feel the minibuses are very convenient; 
50.33% say they are convenient; only very few people do not 
think that they are convenient (table 19). Above all, 99.8% of 
the respondents say that the city should expand the minibus 
transport services further (BGPPTC 1988a).
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Table 18:
Changes Made When Travel By Minibus 
To Reach trip destination.
(on 16 April 1988)
Company (Need to change) 
(%)
(No need to 
(%)
change)
First Company 21.17 78.83 100
Second Company 36.61 63.39 100
Trolley Company 24.13 75.87 100
Rental Company 26.62 73.38 100
Total (BGPPTC) 27.53 72.47 100
Source: MAO & BGPPTC, 1988b.
N.B. a) data based on a one-day survey on the state-owned 
vehicles.
b) Information on Independent minibuses is not available
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Table 19:
Passengers * Opinions on the Level 
By Minibus (1988)
of Convenience
Grade %
Very convenient 49.22
Convenient 50.33
Not convenient 0.45
Total 100.00
Source: Office of Minibus Administration. 1988b.
N.B. a) data based on a one day survey.
b) information on Independent Minibuses is not available.
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5.4 Comfort of the Minibus Services
Analysis of modal choice shows that choice between two 
modes of transport is not determined solely by differences in 
travel time and cost. When time and cost are equal, passengers 
tend to show a preference for one mode or the other; they do 
not divide equally between the two. The bias is attributed to 
general "comfort and convenience" (Allport et al 1990). The 
last section has shown that the minibus service is convenient 
for all users in general, however, for sightseers, comfort is 
even a more important factor in determining the quality of 
transport service.
What is the most important indicator of comfort offered by 
a passenger service? One of the elements of comfort is the 
state of being free from containment, and thus the opposite is 
physical uneasiness. In Beijing, many of the travellers who 
choose to use other modes other than the conventional buses 
often appear to have been put off by their discomfort rather 
than slower speeds. When a passenger waits for a bus at a bus- 
stop served by both conventional buses and minibuses, he or she 
would normally make the modal choice by making a trade-off 
between comfort and costs of the two different modes. If the 
passenger is led to believe that the forthcoming conventional 
bus will be too overcrowded, then he/she may choose to pay a 
higher fare for the more comfortable and faster minibus when it
1.7f B
arrives. On the contrary, if he/she reckons the conventional 
bus might still be roomy, then he/she would stick to waiting 
for this slower but cheaper service. Clearly, for them, the 
value of time is less important than the value for money, and
more importantly, comfort, but not speed, is often the major
factor that can weigh against travel costs.
Overloading is the main reason causing uneasiness on board 
a passenger vehicle. In low income developing countries, often 
there is little practical enforcement to limit the number of 
passengers boarding an urban bus. As Allport et al (1990) put 
it, when the vehicle becomes "full" the limit is set by 
people's unwillingness or physical inability to force their way 
in (or to cling to the outside as in some cities). When
conditions reach this point, the demand for the service is 
restrained by sheer discomfort. Thus, the first to avoid using 
public transport, when it is like this, are presumably the old, 
the weak, women and children.
What displeases the passengers in using the conventional 
bus systems most in Beijing is that the buses are often too
overcrowded. Like the situation in Bangkok and many other Far 
Eastern cities, there is little distinction between peak- and 
off-peak times in Beijing. Bus-stops seem to be crowded 
constantly with long queues of travellers whilst the buses are 
unable to carry them with desirable efficiency. The internal 
design of an articulated bus or trolley bus in Beijing is 
rather like that of a train compartment of the London
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underground system, though the Beijing bus has even fewer 
seats. These few seats are located on the sides of the cabin 
and parallel to the driver's seat; while the middle space in 
between is supposed to hold most of the passengers as well as 
being the gangway. The entire design is for standing rather 
than sitting passengers. Apparently, the idea is to maximise 
the passenger capacity.
Although the supposed maximum capacity set is 137 
passengers, in practice, there is no such upper limit. Hence, 
when a bus arrives at the bus stop, the queue waiting there 
would normally break up, and the passengers then rush to the 
doors and force their way in. Consequently, it causes a sudden 
wave of heavy pushes and squeezes amongst the crowd. The bus, 
on the other hand, would normally take in as many people as 
it possibly can, until no more person can force him or herself 
in inside the vehicle. Hence, it may be imagined that, in many 
cases, in order to get on the bus, passengers need physical 
ability rather than self-discipline. Although at some busy 
terminuses, several "order-keepers" are installed on the spot 
to maintain people in queue, in practice, this kind of order- 
keeping is unlikely to be effective. (See fig. 24).
If getting onto the vehicle is already an undesirable 
experience, being on board it is no better in any way. In most 
cases, passengers are squeezed shoulder by shoulder inside the 
vehicle and unable to move about. Indeed, overcrowding on the 
conventional transport systems has almost become a norm.
l80
mFig. 24 A queue waiting for bus in central Beijing 
When a bus arrives people would rush onto it and the 
queue would normally break up.
Photo H Lam
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What is more, the intervals between bus arrivals are highly 
uneven and unpredictable. It is not unusual to see more than 
one bus arriving at the same time, or to have to wait for more 
than 30 minutes for a bus to arrive. All these problems 
existing in the conventional bus system have added to the sheer 
discomfort constantly experienced by their users.
In addition, the unrestricted intake of passengers on the 
conventional buses causes yet another problem. Because bus 
frequencies are so unreliable and passengers tend to vie for 
the first arriving bus, thus sometimes it creates an 
alternating crowding and underloading cycle between buses. For 
example, at a bus-stop, whilst the first arrived bus had 
swallowed up the majority of the waiting crowd, the next one 
which arrives a little while later after the first one has just 
gone may be left with few waiting passengers to pick up and 
hence under-loaded. The situation could go on like a 
successive cyclic movement since, after a group of passengers 
is gone, the bus stop will then be filled up with another group 
of potential passengers in a short period of time, forming 
another wave of pushes and squeezes when another bus arrives, 
while subsequently leaving the next one under-loaded. This kind 
of uneven distribution of passengers between service intervals 
often occurs in the less busy period of the day, when, in some 
cases, an articulated bus or trolley may be only half-loaded. 
Thus, by analogy one may infer that the average load factors of 
the conventional buses would not be too high, yet the overall
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quality of service in terms of comfort is far from being 
desirable.
By contrast, the services provided by the minibuses are 
more comfortable in a number of ways. Let us briefly look at 
the issue in a wider context. First, in developed countries, 
such as Britain, travel by minibus does not guarantee any
greater comfort than by conventional bus, rather, because of 
the relatively low load factors, seats are normally available 
on the conventional bus, thus the probability for a passenger 
to have to stand on board the bus is low, especially during off 
peak-periods. It is also argued that, with two large doors, 
passengers would find it easier to get on or off and thus more 
comfortable with the conventional bus than the minibus. On the 
other hand, as some writers claim, because of its small
body, the minibus is rather cramped. Thus, while highly rated
on factors such as frequency, accessibility and friendliness, 
minibuses are perceived less favourably in respect of 
pushchair/luggage space, ease of boarding (especially among the 
more elderly users) and overcrowding. Furthermore, with
minibuses, a higher proportion of passengers have to stand on 
board, and greater probability of passengers being left behind 
at stops (due to full load), than for bigger buses (White et al 
1987).
However, this is certainly not the case in many developing 
countries, where the majority of conventional bus travellers 
are standees, whereas in most cases a seat is guaranteed for
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any passenger on the minibus (Rimmer 1986a; Pendakur 1984). 
In Beijing, there are almost no standees on the minibuses. 
Everyone is seated. Occasionally when all the seats are taken 
up, the conductress would vacate her own seat for an extra 
passenger and then she herself would stand up instead. In this 
respect Beijing is different from Kuala Lumpur, whose minibuses 
are officially restricted to 16 seated passengers only but in 
practice carry up to about 10 standees (See, for example. White 
1980b).
With a seat on the minibus, the passenger is having more 
room to stretch him or herself out. This is particularly 
important for visitors who are unfamiliar with the city's 
geography, since most sightseeing passengers want to be seated 
with a proper view, and occasionally doing some map reading. 
In this way Beijing's minibuses can provide for the passengers 
something that the conventional buses and trolleys cannot 
cater for. Travel by minibus is apparently more comfortable 
than by conventional buses (See table 19). Furthermore, unlike 
Britain, where minibuses have often been seen as rather 
cramped for space, here in Beijing they are generally found to 
be more favourable for passengers with some luggage. This of 
course is not because Beijing's minibus is larger (in fact it 
is smaller than those 20+ seat models in Britain or Kuala 
Lumpur), but it is just because when compared with a much 
squeezed footing on board the conventional bus, a minibus seat 
is, in any case, undeniably ampler and more comfortable.
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In summing up, the minibus services in Beijing are
particularly attractive to sightseers and occasional users, 
whose travel times are more random and destinations more
scattered. However, they are less popular with the commuters, 
whose journey ends are usually more concentrated, for which
larger passenger carriers are more suitable.
Unfortunately, the argument does not stop here. There are 
other elements which are more important than just comfort and 
convenience. In low-income countries, discomfort in using 
urban public transport services is almost way of daily life. 
Many urban dwellers have already become used to and able
to bear this kind of experience. Quite understandably, for the 
majority of Beijing commuters, the most decisive factor for 
modal choice is the travel expenses involved, rather than
comfort. The high travel costs are one of the main barriers 
preventing the commuters from using the minibuses. In chapter 
VI there will be a further discussion about the effects of 
travel costs.
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Table 20;
Passengers* Opinions on Service Quality
(1988)
Grade %
Very good 37.64
Good 40.08
Reasonable 21.80
Bad 0.41
Very bad 0.07
Total 100.00
Source: Office of Minibus Administration, 1988b.
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5.5 The Effects of Ownership and Scale of Business
The last few sections have analysed the forces which make 
the minibus service superior to that provided by the 
conventional buses. The next two sections will concentrate on 
the financial viability of the transport business in Beijing. 
To begin with, let us recall the distinction between the 
minibus system in Beijing and those in other Far Eastern 
cities.
First, scale of business. In Beijing, apart from the 
independent fleets, the entire fleet owned by the Minibus 
Administrative Office is considerably large. This state-owned 
fleet alone is even larger than the entire system operating in 
Kuala Lumpur, which consists of many small privately-owned 
fleets. Second, ownership of business. As mentioned, although 
it may seem that there are two major forms of minibus ownership 
in Beijing, from a perspective of capital investment, there is 
little difference between state-owned and collectively-owned 
minibuses. For instance, no single individual is entirely 
liable for their financial performance and there is no way that 
a worker can "withdraw" his "shares" from the undertaking as he 
may wish to. As far as business premises and vehicles are 
concerned, they remain as "people's assets" or "public 
properties" as long as they exist. In this context, both types 
of organization are under state control in one form or another.
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Hence, each minibus may be considered as a single production 
unit in which the vehicle is the tool of production, the crew 
provide labour in return for wages from the state undertaking 
which owns the capital of production. (NB: The private
partnerships which developed during the 1980s are excluded from 
this category, though in the public transport sector, they are 
actually rather rare in Beijing).
Under both forms of organizational structure, everyone is 
an employee rather than an owner or a partner of the 
undertaking. In other words, whether the vehicle belongs to 
the Minibus Administrative Office, or to a cooperative, 
basically, the relationships between the crew and the vehicle 
do not differ. As far as the employees are concerned, there is 
no obvious differentiation in terms of working spirit between 
the two "different" forms of ownership. That is to say, there 
is no such thing that an employee of an independent minibus is 
much more loyal than his counterpart working for a state-owned 
company and thus he is more conscientious, as what has been 
widely acknowledged to have existed within the private 
transport sector in other Far Eastern cities (See, for example, 
Fouracre et al 1977, 1978, 1979; Rimmer et al 1980; Rimmer
1986a; Walters et al 1980; Weicher 1988).
Obviously, the analysis in production relationship has 
demonstrated the similarities between these two forms of 
ownership. Since the labour costs as well as mechanical 
performance for all minibuses are about the same, the operation
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costs for each vehicle would not differ too much; logically, it 
may be inferred that, there is little difference in overall 
costs between state-owned and collectively-owned undertakings 
at the micro production unit level (in this case, at the level
of each vehicle). Nonetheless, since the state-owned fleets
are large and collectively-owned fleets are small, what may 
have made operation costs different between them may only be 
found at the institutional level, that is when the whole 
undertaking is considered as a single production unit.
In order to find out the differences, it is necessary to 
look at the overall production costs involved for the 
undertaking as a whole. Unfortunately, under the Chinese 
business structure, acute information on production costs is 
hard to obtain for two reasons. First, as mentioned earlier,
most of the minibus fleets are part of a larger business 
establishment, in which all business branches share the same 
overhead costs and maintenance facilities, often there is no 
obvious record to determine the costs incurred by each branch 
separately for using these services. Second, the statistics 
recorded on maintenance work may not reflect the actual market 
value of the labour costs involved anyway, since the mechanics 
are paid on a fixed monthly wage rather than paid by the job. 
As a result, it is difficult to assess the exact costs incurred 
and hence calculate acutely the profitability of each branch 
within the whole enterprise.
Furthermore, the state-owned fleets are not operating
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under a real market mechanism, for there are zonal restrictions 
to protect and guarantee their interests, preventing possible 
competition from the county-based small undertakings. Taking 
all these into account, one may realize that, even though both 
large and small fleets are generally found to be earning high 
revenues, it is still not statistically possible to determine 
and compare the superiority, if any at all, that may have been 
derived from the scale of business at the institutional level.
Nonetheless, as widely claimed (see, for example, Walters 
1979a; Roth et al 1982, Rimmer 1986c; Roschlau 1989), there are 
no economies of scale in transport business; a large structure 
may not help to save production costs or increase production 
efficiency. In fact, as a common feature existing in most 
business enterprises in the socialist world, big organizations 
in China tend to employ large number of personnel based on 
complex structure and, in most cases, use more advanced 
equipment, hence they are more likely to incur heavy production 
costs. By contrast, small economic units mainly relying upon 
intermediate technology and simple business premises, may be 
able to keep capital costs low to a minimum. Indeed, in 
Beijing, most independent minibuses do not need a garage or a 
terminus compound; no investment is required for modern office 
equipment such as computers and so on. What is more, small 
undertakings employ fewer clerical personnel and thus incur 
less labour costs and departmental expenses. Logically, 
therefore, a small fleet without too much bureaucracy may, in
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general, be more generative in business operations.
In fact, the overall growth pattern of minibus business in 
the entire city may be used as guidance to distinguish the 
difference in vitality between large and small fleets. During 
the past few years, despite the zonal restrictions, county- 
based small fleets grew even faster than the state-owned large 
ones. The proliferation of these small fleets, to a certain 
extent, has helped to verify the authenticity of the "small is 
beautiful" argument which has been debated for so long and 
amongst so many dissenters.
The question now turns to a deeper level: If neither
ownership nor scale of organization can directly facilitate the 
financial achievement of minibus business, what then, if at 
all, has had considerable influence upon its performance?
5.6 Enterprise spirit
As discussed above, the smallness of vehicle and of 
company size is a positive factor for attracting patronage and 
for saving costs respectively. However, the amount of costs 
that can be saved as a result of smaller structure is somehow 
limited. Above all, patronage and cost saving alone cannot 
always explain the profitability of a transport system, just as
1 9 1
the case of Beijing*s conventional buses, which are so 
overcrowded yet still losing money. Indeed, what is more 
important for a business to be lucrative rests upon its ability 
to obtain optimum profit-margin. For minibus transport, 
smallness is only a feature of the mode of production, what 
benefit can be derived from applying this mode is altogether 
another issue. In other words, productivity is what makes 
matter different.
What is the driving force behind the high productivity of 
transport business? Experiences in Southeast Asian cities have 
indicated that the entrepreneurial spirit of operators, 
especially of the drivers themselves have a decisive role to 
play in stimulating higher revenues (See, for example, Roth 
1988; Fouracre 1977; Dick 1978, 1981; Pendakur 1984; Roth et al 
1984; Walters 1979b, Walters et al 1980; Rimmer 1980, 1986a; 
Lee 1989). Indeed, in Beijing*s case, the hard working spirit 
of the employees has been a crucial factor for high 
productivity, and subsequently high profitability. In order to 
illustrate this point, let us look at the working practices 
implemented by the minibus undertakings.
For the state-owned fleets, unlike the metro and the 
conventional bus systems, which exist as a welfare service, the 
entire service is run similar to a privatized business. 
Although the vehicles and premises are state-owned assets, the 
management and staff are operating under a principle of self- 
sufficiency. For the crews, instead of relying on a fixed
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monthly wage regardless of how they perform, each minibus is 
now given a quota on a daily basis. The current quota per 
vehicle per day is Y150 on average, though there are variations 
in accordance with differences in route allocated and duration 
of shift. In the light of this practice, if the quota is 
surpassed then the crew will be paid a bonus above the basic 
wage. If otherwise the ticket earnings are below the quota, 
then the bonus may be deducted or taken out, though the basic 
wage is somehow guaranteed. As one can see, compared with the 
previous "Iron bowl" policy, this practice is a small but, from 
a socialist perspective, considerable step towards further 
economic reforms.
The flexible style of minibus services is also an 
important factor for higher revenues. In orderlopick up more 
passengers and earn more money, the crews would decide the 
routes for themselves. For the non-routed services, the 
minibuses simply respond to instant demand. For those on non­
fixed routes (but with a 'home parking bay*), when necessary 
the crews would change their usual routes in accordance with 
fluctuations of travel demand during the day. Sometimes route 
diversions occur even with fixed-routed minibuses, often 
depending on the crews' judgments over potential passengers 
they may collect on the new route. By adjusting routes sensibly 
the crews can actually increase the possibility of picking up 
more passengers.
With this pragmatical route adaptability the crews can
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also save time and operation costs. Since the minibus services 
normally originate from either a railway station, a busy 
market, or a sightseeing spot where potential travellers are 
plentiful, it is therefore quite easy to fill up the vehicle 
with all the passengers wanting to go to a same destination, 
e.g. another beauty spot or transport terminus. When this 
happens, the crew would normally divert the route for the 
shortest distance instead of plying along the usual route, 
because there would be no need to collect more passengers en 
route. In that case, fuel consumption as well as journey time 
may be minimized. Of course, owing to this kind of diversions, 
there would be fewer minibuses running on the usual route, 
consequently the frequency there is reduced and services become 
unreliable, and thus average waiting time for those along the 
usual route is bound to increase.
By nature the collectively-owned undertakings are even 
more active in adapting the rewards system. Like their state- 
owned counterparts, the crews are also given a target to beat 
so that their industrious spirit can be stimulated. The only 
distinction is that each cooperative sets the quotas for its 
own crews, thus the levels among them may be different from one 
another. Nonetheless, the principle is the same; the crews are 
also expected to work for a bonus payment after the set quota 
is surpassed. It is argued that since they are supposed to be 
entirely self-sustainable (without a guaranteed basic wage), 
they are thus more likely to achieve higher labour efficiency.
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and consequently higher revenue per vehicle (interview notes 
1990).
Clearly, on the basis of the self-supporting principle, 
the crews have become more conscientious and responsible. They 
would make every effort to increase work efficiency and 
productivity by maximizing vehicle utility whenever possible. 
For instance the crews often choose not to waste time on a 
formal mid-day break, rather, they tend to have their lunch at 
the terminus when waiting for their turn to pick up passengers. 
In contrast, the crews of the conventional buses work against a 
fixed daily shift, during which there is a formal break when 
some would go home for meal and then turn back for the second 
half of the shift. Owing to these formal working practices, 
time is often being lost when changing shifts or making 
preparations. Thus in comparison, both vehicle utility and 
labour efficiency tend to be lower. Furthermore, unlike the 
minibuses, there is no real target for the crews to beat in 
financial terms. What may earn them a premium is normally 
dependent on whether they can show commitment to their job, 
such as their helpfulness and friendliness towards passengers, 
rather than how much they can collect from the ticket earnings, 
since the fares are so low that the business is losing money 
anyway.
However, it must be noted that, when considering labour 
efficiency in terms of number of crew members employed for each 
vehicle, then the conventional bus tends to be more favourable
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than the minibus. In theory, assuming a conventional bus can 
reach its full capacity of 137 passengers, with a three-man 
crew it has a passengers/crew member ratio of over 45/1. By 
contrast, with a two men crew the corresponding ratio for the 
minibus is only 8/1 when it is full. Now, as mentioned earlier, 
in practice, there is no upper limit for the conventional bus 
and whenever possible it would carry many more passengers than 
the supposed capacity; and since, compared with developed 
countries, the average load factors of the conventional bus and 
trolley can maintain considerably high due to the inadequacy of 
public transport facilities against the population in absolute 
terms, hence, even the minibus can reach full capacity in most 
of the time and thus has high load factors (Table 21), its 
ratio of passengers/crew member is, on average, still somehow 
lower than that of the conventional bus. Thus, with greater 
passenger capacity, it seems to have implied that on average 
the conventional buses and the trolleys are much more manpower- 
efficient in relation to passengers carried.
Nevertheless one must remember that, since the minibus can 
travel faster, the time needed for a turn-round journey would 
be shorter than that for the conventional bus; thus with higher 
frequencies the minibus may also be able to maximise its crew's 
labour efficiency as well as vehicle utility. Indeed, on a seat 
basis, the utility of the minibus is only marginally lower than 
that of the conventional buses. For instance, in 1988, each 
seat of the conventional bus system in Beijing carried 5,454
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persons and of the minibus 4,020 respectively, indicating a 
close ratio of about 15:12 (see table 22). Apparently, the seat 
utility rate of the minibuses is really impressive. 
Furthermore, since the conventional bus system is loss-making, 
whereby wages of the crew are dependent mainly on government 
subsidies anyway, its lower man-power requirements (passengers 
carried per crew member) would make no practical sense against 
a profit-making rival -- the minibus system. Above all, taking 
all sides of the argument into consideration, it is obvious 
that, for the minibus, the enterprising spirit of the staff is 
undeniably a more decisive factor for higher revenues.
Besides the crews* individual effort, the operators have 
also adopted Western management skills and innovative tactics 
in running the business. They are keen and quick in responding 
to new demand and market changes. One vivid example has been 
the launch of temporary services for an international sports 
event. In August 1990, about one month before the opening of 
the Eleventh Asian Games, the operators seized the opportunity 
to set up new routes to provide services between the city 
centre and the newly completed athletic village. With a return 
fare of Y7.0, it was both beneficial to the operators 
themselves as well as convenient for visitors who were eager to 
see the giant sports complex.
Another example is the tactic of advertising to boost the 
services provided. Since, in China, as in many other Third 
World countries, the image of imported technology tends to be
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more appealing to consumers than its native counterpart's, thus 
foreign made vehicles are especially put on for contracted out 
services to attract potential users, for whom smarter models 
often mean something unique for their special occasions or 
purposes. Although these two examples may look commonplace in 
the West, in a socialist system like that in China, they would 
not have happened anyway before the Economic Reform; and more 
or less they have contributed to the booming of the minibus 
business there.
On the whole, effective management and the rewards system 
implemented by the minibus operators are a boost to the efforts 
of the employees. So far, owing to the enterprising spirit of 
the crews, coupled with practical adaptability in the style of 
services, in most cases, the quotas are well achievable and the 
earnings remain steadily high. However, there are also other 
reasons, besides these, which contribute to the financial 
viability of the minibus business in Beijing. They will be 
discussed further in chapter VI.
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Table 21:
Load factors and utility rate over distance travelled 
(State-owned minibuses, 1988)
Company Loaded mileage/total 
distance travelled (%)
Daily load factors 
(%)
First Company 87.47 81.51
Second Company 94.44 81.78
Trolley Company 86.19 82.50
Rental Company 98.94 83.18
Total (BGPPTC) 90.33 81.77
Source: Office of Minibus Administration & BGPPTC, 1988b.
N.B. Information on independent undertakings is not available.
The table above indicates that over 90% of distance 
travelled is loaded with passengers. The average load factor of 
the fleet as a whole is as high as 81.77%. Overall the utility 
rates are high.
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Table 22:
Ratio of seat capacity of different modes
(in 1988)
Mode Persons carried/seat Load factor/seat
Metro 6,759 18.52
Minibus 4,020 11.14
Big bus & Trolley 5,454 14.94
Bicycle 649 1.80
Taxi 524 1.45
Social vehicle (including
private motorbike) 361 1.00
Source; after the "Comprehensive Report" of the BRIUPD 1990. 
N.B. The index value of social vehicles and private motorbikes 
is set at 1, comparisons are made on this basis.
The above table indicates that in 1988, on a seat basis, 
where each seat on the social vehicle could carry one person, 
each seat on a conventional bus carried about 15 persons and 
each minibus seat about 12 persons. The utility rate of social 
vehicles is therefore very low.
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5.7 Summary; the Important Elements
In summarizing the chapter, there are several important 
points discovered in Beijing's minibus service as below. 
First, on operation and structure:
(a) With small body and hence greater manoeuvrability, the 
minibuses can achieve higher average journey speed. And by 
applying adaptable routing and flexible schedules they can 
derive higher accessibility, in some cases, to narrow streets 
where their conventional counterparts cannot enter.
(b) At the individual vehicle level, all minibuses are 
equal in respect of operation costs and labour costs, 
regardless of ownership and scale of business.
(c) At the institutional level, small undertakings mainly 
using informal facilities may be able to save more overheads 
and clerical costs and be more efficient in business even under 
biassed zonal restrictions.
Second, on the factors which contribute to financial 
viability:
(a) The rewards practice generates entrepreneurial spirit 
of the staff and thus stimulates labour efficiency, allowing 
the maximum utility of vehicles.
(b) The minibus service is demand responsive (mainly to 
non-commuting users). With comparative superiority it is able 
to meet the requirements of their users (tourists) who are
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willing to pay higher for more comfort, in an environment where 
there are no alternatives of similar quality (e.g., the private 
car, affordable taxi services).
In short, the Beijing Phenomenon indicates that when 
financial responsibilities are held at the vehicle level, 
ownership plays no decisive role in profitability, and that 
there is no determinative correlation between scale of 
organization and business success. The dynamics behind 
financial achievement rests upon the generation of rational 
entrepreneurship and the implementation of effective management 
tactics. In this context, the enterprise reforms have, to some 
extent, improved the prospects of investment in industry in 
general; and the minibus sector is one of the public services 
which begin to move slowly from subsidy-dependence to self- 
reliance. Thus, while many commentators have argued that the 
profitability of paratransit is due both to ownership as well 
as small vehicle size, here in Beijing, the self-reliance 
principle is the cornerstone of business success. Under the 
rewards working system, the operators have actually generated 
a competitive environment for the employees to remain royal to, 
and ambitious with, an organization which they do not own.
However, it should be made clear that bureaucracy and 
overstaffing are often a by-product of state-owned enterprises 
in socialist countries but not necessarily of large 
institutions. In any case, the Beijing experience does not 
necessarily suggest that large scale undertakings are bound to
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be disadvantageous. The core issue lies in rational structure 
and effective management rather than scale. Nonetheless, in a 
competitive market, the optimal size of a transport undertaking 
may be set at the point where the highest utility rates of all 
the vehicles are realized with marginal profits.
Besides the factors mentioned above, the limited total 
seat capacity serving a rapidly increasing (permanent and 
floating) population which digests any public facility that is 
on offer also helps to explain the high patronage and 
consequently high turnovers. This is indeed a shadow of what 
had happened in Kuala Lumpur, where, according to Roth et al 
(1984), one of the consequences of the scarcity of whose 
minibuses was their windfall profitability.
The point about limited total supply needs further 
attention. How large should the total capacity be? This 
question concerns the negative side of paratransit. The next 
chapter will be trying to identify the constraints of Beijing's 
minibus system.
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Chapter VI
THE CONSTRAINTS OF BEIJING'S MINIBUS SERVICE
6.1 Introduction
In the last chapter it was argued that the financial 
gains of minibus transport in Beijing were due to a combination 
of different factors, including relatively higher service 
quality offered to passengers and the management tactics 
implemented. At the same time it was also suggested that owing 
to limited availability, users had to pay more for the service 
they consumed. There seems to be some unanswered questions 
which require further consideration.
Generally speaking, there are two basic elements for 
measuring the desirability of a transport service in an urban 
area (excluding other effects such as its contributions to 
social and economic developments): First, how well the system
serves the commuters (i.e. accessibility); and second, whether 
it serves them at the lowest possible costs (i.e. financial 
efficiency). The fact that in Beijing most minibus passengers 
are not commuters suggests that there are drawbacks with the
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system as a whole. These problems are particlil^arious when 
compared with the sophisticated systems in other Far Eastern 
cities. First let us look at the imbalance between demand and 
supply.
6.2 Dissonance between demand and supply
One important element for a passenger transport system to 
attract patronage is its overall accessibility to the catchment 
area it serves. Cities are different from one another in 
physical structure and land use: their streets are diversified 
in width as well as in quality; their patterns of residential 
distribution are varied in location and density. It is because 
of these disparities that the levels of travel demand between 
different streets as well as between different cities are 
varied. Hence, in order to meet different types of travel 
requirements, vehicles of varied shapes and capacities, and of 
different fleet sizes should be employed.
The design of a passenger network with appropriate types of 
vehicles is therefore very important. Bus-routes should be 
designated to different vehicle sizes according to capacity and 
demand. As suggested by the World Bank (World Bank 1986), 
large buses tend to be more suitable for routes where demand is
205
high enough to sustain frequent service and where the entire 
benefit of their more economic use of road space and energy per 
passenger can be realized, whereas small buses are more 
adaptable to narrow streets or in areas where demand is low.
In the last chapter, it was argued that in Beijing the 
minibus is more suitable for the residential areas of the city 
than the conventional bus, this is because the former can 
travel along narrow streets while the latter cannot and thus 
services provided by the former, in general, are comparatively 
more accessible to travel destinations. However, when 
considering the accessibility of a transport service, it is 
important to distinguish what a vehicle can perform and what 
level of service the entire rolling stock can provide.
In Beijing, one of the problems with the minibus system is 
its routeing. Although the small size is a visible advantage 
along narrow streets and more manoeuvrable amongst busy 
traffic, perhaps it is partly because both the urban minibuses 
and the conventional buses are owned and controlled by the same 
corporation, there is no rational control over which routes 
they may choose to run on; thus most minibuses have chosen to 
ply along the broad thoroughfares. As mentioned, in most cases 
they simply imitate the routes of the conventional buses, 
primarily linking busy business districts, rather than 
penetrating into residential quarters. The design of routes 
therefore has, to a large degree, limited the expectations of 
the system. Table 23 below shows the proportions of passengers
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carried by different forms of services.
Table 23:
Percentage of Passengers Among the Five Forms of 
Operation (state-owned minibuses 1988)
Form of service %
Non-fixed routes 48.66
Fixed routes 38.59
Tourist routes 6.21
Collective rental 5.29
Contracting out 1.25
Total 100.00
Source: Modified from MAO & BGPPTC December (1988a, 1988b). 
N.B. information of Independent minibuses is not available.
The figures indicate that currently the non-fixed routes 
carry the largest volume of passengers, followed by the fixed
routes in the second place. It should be noted that, the
number of fixed-route vehicles makes up only 24% of the total
fleet, yet they can carry as much as 38.59% of the total
passenger volume (BGPPTC 1988a); this perhaps demonstrates that
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most of the fixed routes are on trunk roads, where there are 
more potential public transport users. Clearly, trunk road
duplication may benefit long distance travellers, but not the 
local residents whose journeys are normally short and somehow
diversified in aggregate terms. By repeating the routes run by
the conventional buses, the minibuses may have helped to ease 
overcrowding on the conventional buses, but has not actually 
filled the vacuum of unserved streets left out by the
conventional bus network. Thus, the small vehicle which is more
suitable for narrow streets is now being used for broad 
avenues, where demand for travel is much heavier. In this
context, it is the wrong type of vehicle that has been 
allocated to serve the wrong place and thus, achieves little. 
Above all, it is the routeing but not the vehicle that is to 
blame.
What is more, as mentioned, the inadequate supply of 
vehicles against such a huge metropolis which they serve is
another major problem of Beijing's minibus service. At the time 
of writing the total number of minibuses is still under 1,300 
(including the county-based vehicles) and there are only 132 
designated bus-stops in the entire built-up area for the state- 
owned minibus fleets (BGPPTC 1988a). With these limited
facilities many residential streets are still uncovered by the 
network. Obviously, besides forcing up fares, limited total 
seat capacity has yet another negative factor affecting average 
frequency and reliability.,
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In general, from the user's convenience point of view, 
there is a major difference between an infrequent service, 
where the user needs, to know the timetable, and where that 
timetable may be changed from time to time, and a frequent 
service where the user can just go to the route at any time, 
without having to worry about timetables at all, in the 
knowledge that a bus will be along within a few minutes. Where 
headways are large, say every 20 minutes or more, it is usually 
assumed that passengers aim to catch particular departures. 
Reliability is then often measured in terms of missing buses 
and adherence to schedule distribution and the mean
lateness). For close headways it is usually assumed that 
passengers arrive at stops at random, and reliability is 
measured in terms of waiting times. With perfect reliability 
and no full buses the theoretical average waiting time is half 
the headway. In practice, the average is increased by missing 
buses and perturbation to the service (Watts 1990). Thus, 
without steady and desirable headways, a transport system 
cannot be said to be efficient. In order to provide convenient 
services, bus intervals should be kept at a mid-headway short 
enough to minimize travellers' waiting time.
In Beijing, because of the small rolling stock, the 
minibuses cannot provide a service frequency high enough to 
outstrip their conventional rivals. Although, for some fixed 
routes, the interval between services is supposed to be 10 
minutes, in practice, due to their "full-and-go" service style.
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the actual interval times vary greatly. Sometimes there are 
several vehicles leaving the bay at the same time; while other 
times the frequencies are lower than expected. As a result, 
the headways are unpredictable, and the overall reliability of 
minibus service is relatively poor. In reality, the average 
frequency of minibus service on some less busy routes is even 
much lower than that of the conventional buses and trolleys.
When compared with other systems, the problem of low 
frequency in Beijing is particularly obvious. For example, in 
a study earlier, it was found that in Kuala Lumpur, the hourly 
minibus frequency by route varied from 1.5 to 20, but along the 
major corridors where many routes combine, frequency was as 
high as 80 to 90 minibuses per hour, carrying up to 1900 
passengers. The frequency of service varied only slightly over 
the 16 hour service period (06.00 - 22.00 hrs) (JMP 1981). As 
one can see, although there are slightly fewer minibuses in 
Kuala Lumpur (about 500 minibuses - JPCL 1985), the city and 
its population (roughly 1 million people) are much smaller 
than the corresponding figures in Beijing, therefore its 
minibus system can provide much more frequent services than 
that of Beijing. Another example is in Cebu, the second 
largest city in the Philippines, where the service frequency of 
the jeepneys is very high. On some routes, vehicle flows exceed 
200 per hour, which translates to an average frequency of less 
than 20 seconds (See, for example, Roschlau, 1989). It should 
be mentioned that, although the system in Kuala Lumpur can
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provide reasonable frequent services to the users, as a result 
of the freeze on numbers, the minibus service, which was 
conceived as an all-seated service for long-distance commuters, 
has now become degraded by overcrowding and standing passengers 
(Roth et al 1984).
Clearly, in order to serve the population within a certain 
catchment area effectively, there must be an adequate^number of 
vehicles. For example, in Manila, where there are thousands 
of jeepneys and minibuses serving a population of 4 million 
inhabitants, most people are within 250 metres of public 
transport routes and enjoy frequencies of less than one minute. 
Users are offered a good level of service in terms of spatial 
coverage, frequency, reliability, speed, and cost. Even in less 
dense areas, motorized tricycles offer virtually door-to-door 
feeder service, connecting bus and jeepney routes (Roschlau 
1989). By contrast, the total number of passengers carried by 
Beijing*s state-owned minibuses in 1988 was only about 1% of 
the total passengers carried by the city's entire public 
transport system (BRIUPD 1990). Supposing the independent 
minibuses carried another 1%, then the total volume of minibus 
passengers would have been something just over 2% of all public 
transport users. Compared with other sophisticated systems in 
the Far East, e.g., the Hong Kong system, which had more than 
4,000 vehicles and carried a total of 103.9 million passengers 
in 1983 (JPCL 1985), the system in Beijing is poor.
In summing up, because of inadequate total seat supply.
ZU
Beijing's minibus system has two limitations: One, it is unable 
to cover the catchment area effectively to provide end-to-end 
services. Two, the system possesses no advantage in terms of 
frequency as those found in other Far Eastern cities. Overall, 
the problem may be attributable to ineffective planning between 
(minibus) transport and land use (population density and 
distribution).
Hence, although in the last chapter it has been claimed 
that those who were interviewed in the 1988 survey admired 
highly the convenience and accessibility of the minibuses, 
nonetheless, it should be pointed out that since the survey was 
carried out on board the vehicles, one may expect that most of 
the respondents were visitors rather than local commuters. In 
this way the results do not necessarily reflect the views of 
the local commuters. It therefore cannot be claimed that local 
residents would have felt the same. In fact the low level of 
patronage by local residents might perhaps suggest that the 
system as a whole is still relatively inaccessible, especially 
to the old city's neighbourhoods where local people reside (See 
table 24 next page).
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Table 24:
Composition of Passengers 
(State-owned minibuses
by Origin 
1988)
Passenger origin %
Floating population 79.99
Local Permanent residents 19.6
Foreigners 0.41
Total 100.00
Source; after MAO & BGPPTC December (1988a; 1988b). 
N.B. data of the independent minibuses are not available.
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6.3 Limitations in Service style. Customer Orientation and 
Operational Hours
In the last section, it was noted that if the minibuses 
were supposed to serve the local residents, the priority of 
route design should have been given not on the outlying trunk 
roads but, on the streets cutting through the residential 
neighbourhoods. However, the fact that the minibus operators 
chose to concentrate on trunk roads is perhaps because, in any 
case, they would never be able to cover every corner of the 
city with such a small rolling stock. Anyway, with heavy 
travel demand by the visitors on the major trunk roads, one 
would have every reason to doubt that the crews would bother to 
force their way into the labyrinth of small alleyways to 
collect the locals, who are often perceived as being less 
generous than the tourists when it comes to travel spending.
Another set of reasons which restrain the functioning of 
Beijing*s minibus system concern the characteristics of 
operation, hours of business and customer orientation. First, 
in respect of schedule flexibility, compared with some systems 
in other Far Eastern cities, the minibuses in Beijing still 
cannot be considered as being highly adaptable to actual travel 
requirements. Although most do not run to fixed schedules, 
the service style of many is more closely aligned with 
conventional buses than taxis. Instead of running constantly
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at a somewhat loose frequency and picking up passengers en 
route, they still follow a rather old-fashioned style, 
operating like a coach service starting from a specific 
terminus where they can queue up at the bay to collect 
passengers and depart until most seats are occupied. This 
practice wastes time and causes long delay for travellers, 
since as a minibus waits for its turn to pick up passengers, it 
is actually lying idle without any profitable engagement, yet 
at the same time, there may be potential passengers awaiting at 
bus-stops along the streets. Clearly, the potential ability 
of the small vehicle as a flexible passenger carrier has not 
been given full play, even though, in general they are 
relatively more responsive in places where demand is high 
enough to fill up the seats quickly.
Besides, most minibuses in Beijing, especially the state- 
owned fleets, operate mainly on a one shift basis. For the 
fixed-routes, the minibuses normally run from early morning to 
about 18.00 hrs, while the non-fixed routed ones run a 
relatively longer period, extending to about 20.00 hrs in the 
evening. For the tourist services, the minibuses are almost 
exclusively responding to the demands of the sightseers, which 
means that, some only run a few hours during the busiest time 
of the day, between 9.0 hrs to 17.00 hrs, when most tourists 
are on the move. Overall, their daily business time is short.
If short business hours have already caused low vehicle 
utility, then the low rate of operationally available vehicles
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makes the problem worse. For instance, during a one day survey 
in March, 1988, only 339 out of 510 vehicles owned by the MAO 
were put on service, a disappointingly low proportion of just 
66.47% of the whole fleet, roughly one third of the rolling 
stock was not operational (See, BRIUPD 1990). As a result of 
this short-hour service and limited operation, neither labour 
nor system can be utilized to its full capacity. This 
situation is particularly obvious when compared with other 
systems whereby the vehicles run long hours daily. For example, 
in Kuala Lumpur, the minibuses adopt a shift-working practice, 
in which the crew works one shift while the vehicle runs two, 
making a total of 16 hours daily. Another example is in Cebu, 
where most jeepneys operate 18 hours per day, from six in the 
morning until midnight, and few operate less than once per 
minute (See, for example, Roschlau, 1989). No doubt in these 
cases, the operators are able to maximize vehicle utility and 
hence marginal revenues.
Another dimension is customer orientation. It is generally 
accepted that travel purposes and hence the aggregate travel 
demand pattern in an urban environment would shift in 
accordance with the change of sunlight and that most night­
time trips are primarily home-social activity based. If this 
is really the case, then it would be very likely that any
tourist-orientated transport system would find its demand 
i
decreases after sunset, since most sightseeing activities are 
concentrated during the day time rather than in the evening or
a  6
at night. Hence, it is not surprising to see that, in Beijing, 
the demand for minibus travel gradually falls as the streets 
begin to light up. Based on this inference, it may be 
confirmed that, the one shift working practice and "day-light" 
concentration of minibus service in Beijing are actually a 
result of over-emphasis on tourism.
Clearly, the one-shift only operation can merely serve a 
limited market consisting of mainly the (tourists.J In fact, the ^  
over-emphasis on corridor roads is a result of excessive 
tourist-orientation. This is obviously a drawback in both
vehicle and labour utility, which critically limits the 
possibility of maximizing revenues. Nonetheless, if the 
assumption of "evening shift" of aggregate travel purposes is 
true, one may presume that, in Beijing, unlike the day-time 
period, a considerable proportion of night-time minibus 
travellers are local residents, who otherwise would have ridden 
the bicycle for their evening outings. In this context, the 
role of the minibuses does change in accordance with sunlight, 
improving considerably in respect of serving more local 
residents, even though it is still not for commuting.
While the majority of minibuses operate only a short 
period daily, on a few busy corridors the services do continue 
after dark. Many of these "evening services" are in fact run 
by the independent minibuses. This is because they are mainly 
engaged in non-routed and non-scheduled services without time 
control anyway, they tend to be more adaptable to changes of
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demand. Therefore, in comparison, their daily working hours 
are normally varied and on average, may well be longer than 
that of the state-owned fleets. Some crews may choose to run 
till the later hours in the evening as long as demand for 
minibus services remains, especially to serve people engaged in 
social and cultural activities, i.e., at cinemas, theatres, 
stadiums and so on. Thus, because of their higher rates of 
vehicle and labour utilities, it is not surprising to see that 
they are often more successful in financial terms.
In summary, due to its narrow objective and limited 
adaptability, the minibus system in Beijing is still under­
used, even though there are fewer vehicles while travel demand 
is heavy. On the whole, they can only provide a skeleton 
service to mainly tourists, and local residents on specific- 
purposed trips, with the choice of some higher qualities. 
(Note: table 25 and figure 25 illustrate the "occupations' of 
the passengers, not their "commuting purposes").
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Table 25:
Passengers Classified by Occupation 
(State-owned minibuses 1988)
Occupation %
Factory workers 37.82
Office clerks 30.60
Peasants 12.70
Commercial & Retailing personnel 6.26
Students 4.39
Military personnel 3.58
Retired people 2.21
Other 2.44
Total 100.00
Source: MAO & BGPPTC December (1988b).
N.B. data of the independent minibuses are not available.
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6.4 High Travel Costs: Subsidies to Conventional Modes and
Monopolization
Apart from inaccessibility due to limited total seat 
capacity and unsuitable routeing, the problem of high travel 
costs is an even more crucial barrier which prevents local 
people from boarding the minibus. As mentioned earlier, minibus 
travel costs in Beijing are very expensive compared with the 
conventional bus services. The differences in terms of fare 
charges between the two modes are so great that minibus travel 
has almost become a luxury for the ordinary Beijinger. Compared 
with what is charged in other minibus systems, the differences 
within Beijing's public transport services are particularly 
obvious.
One of the primary reasons for low fares for conventional 
bus services in Beijing is due to the government's policy of 
subsidizing the conventional transport services. In contrast, 
the minibuses are meant to be self-sufficient, which suggests 
that high fares are the only way to keep them going. An 
immediate and direct effect of this subsidization policy is the 
creation of a big gap in travel costs between conventional bus 
and minibus Services. This differentiation becomes even more 
significant if a combined monthly ticket is purchased for the 
conventional buses. Currently a monthly ticket for the entire 
conventional bus (including trolley) services in Beijing costs
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Y5.0 only; if the metro is to be included, then it costs just 
YIO.O. In addition to cheap rates, there are various 
concessions for students and some other sections of the 
community, who pay even less than the standard rates. 
Normally, for each single journey, a minibus fare could be
about 10 times that charged by the conventional buses for the 
same distance. However, since it is a flat fare anyway, a 
passenger who travels only some section but not the whole route 
may find it even more expensive. In other words, if only the 
length of the distance actually travelled is considered, then 
in some cases, the minibuses could charge as many as 15 to 20 
times more expensive than that charged by the conventional 
buses.
In order to illustrate this point further, let us look 
into the structure of travel expenditure in proportion to 
personal income, based on an hypothetical analogy. First, at 
present, the typical fare for a single journey on a
conventional bus on any route in Beijing is Y0.3, while a ride 
on the minibus on the same route would cost as much as Y2.0. 
Now assuming the monthly wage of a school teacher is Y150 
(which is the average amount for most teachers in China), on
average, about Y5.0 per day, then a single journey ride on
the conventional bus would cost about 6% of his/her daily 
income, whilst in contrast, a minibus fare would take as much 
as 40% of his/her daily wage. This level of travel expenses 
could mean much less expenditure on other goods and services
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if a minibus is used on a daily basis. Clearly, with a 
relatively low income per capita in contemporary China, a ten­
time gap between the two different bus services undoubtedly 
means a great deal to the average wage-earner, who in any case 
would choose the cheaper one rather than the much more 
expensive alternative for regular use.
What is more, it is worth mentioning that, although the 
subsidized conventional buses cost less to use, they are not 
necessarily cheap for the wage earner; because the low average 
travel expenditure may merely be a reflection of shorter 
average commuting distance in China; it should not be blindly 
interpreted as being lower than those found in the developed 
world where average commuting journey is much longer.
Because of the big gap, in effect, the conventional modes 
and the minibus system are barred from direct competition. 
For instance, owing to the differences in fares, even where 
both conventional buses and minibuses running on the same route 
and call at the same bus-stops, they are not really competing 
for the same passengers. Local residents and students, who are 
normally monthly ticket holders, tend to board the conventional 
buses only. While the visitors are more prepared to board the 
minibus. As a result of this separation, the targets for 
customers between these two systems are rather different. 
Since their customer-orientation differs from one another, 
neither mode can utilize seat capacity effectively in 
accordance with actual travel needs. And since each system
225
operates within a protected market, they would find it rather 
safe to demand high fares without serious challenge.
Another cause for high travel costs in Beijing's minibus 
service is the monopolistic' ownership of the minibus business. 
Although in Beijing it may seem that there are two major forms 
of minibus ownership and that those collectively-owned do 
belong to rather different cooperatives, in fact, as explained, 
all minibuses are "public properties" in one form or another. 
In effect, therefore, there is little vital competition amongst 
state-owned companies. In addition, the boundary restrictions 
have created further obstacles in the transport business in 
that an irregular proportion of the service provided by the 
county-based fleets is confined within their own territories. 
Thus the minibuses themselves hardly compete with one another 
directly in an open market. In theory, therefore, the state- 
owned minibus fleets in urban Beijing are to some extent close 
to a monopolistic system, under which the operators are able to 
charge fares as high as the passengers can bear and stick to a 
flat rate rather than charging according to different travel 
requirements.
Examples of such inelastic fare charges can be found, 
either with state-owned or collectively-owned vehicles. On the 
route from Yi-he-yuan (Summer Palace) to Beijing Railway 
Station, the effects of these restrictions are particularly 
obvious. Yi-he-yuan is one of Beijing's most famous scenic 
spots, located in the northeast sector of the city, just
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outside the built-up area; it is roughly 20km away from the 
city centre. Its bus terminus is often busy and crowded with 
passenger vehicles of various kinds. The main passenger flow 
from here is between the terminus and the Beijing Railway
Station in the city centre. Beijing Zoo, another major tourist
attraction, is midway between these two ends. Two minibus 
routes from Yi-he-yuan share the first section to Beijing Zoo; 
one of which then terminates at the Zoo, the other travels 
further on to the Railway Station. During peak times the fare 
for the Zoo is normally Y2.0 and the Railway Station Y3.5. The 
problem is that minibuses travelling directly to the Railway 
Station tend to stick to the fare of Y3.5 and aim at full-fare 
passengers rather than offering a lower fare for anyone who may 
wish to travel a shorter distance. Thus, passengers who want 
to travel to a destination within the first section up to the
Zoo would tend to board only the minibuses which end their
journey there, rather than those running further to the Railway 
Station, because otherwise the non-reducible fare rate would 
make the ride too expensive against the journey they intend to 
travel. It is for this reason that sometimes minibuses
travelling to the Railway Station have to start without full
capacity, with the hope of collecting full fare passengers at
the next one or two bus-stops, while there are still
passengers left behind, waiting for minibuses to the Zoo. What 
is more, since the possibility of picking up full fare 
passengers along the route is so unpredictable, it is not
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unusual for a minibus failing to fill up its vacant seats after 
leaving the terminus. As one can see, such inflexible fare 
charges could affect the load factors, subsequently the fares 
remain high for those on board the minibus yet at the same 
time, causing inconvenience for those passengers left behind.
Clearly, without complete and effective competition, it is 
difficult to expect fares to go down. This is different from 
other countries where minibuses belong to various owners, fares 
must be kept at a competitive level, for the drivers often 
have to negotiate with their potential passengers. In this 
context, state monopoly and market protectionism are the main 
obstacles for an enterprising transport industry. Coupled with 
this state monopoly is the shortage of total seat capacity 
against a huge market in absolute terms, as mentioned earlier, 
whereby the supply can hardly meet the demand for travel, and 
thus there is little need for the minibuses to compete with one 
another for passengers. Apparently, inadequate supply not only 
causes infrequency and inaccessibility, but also causes high 
fares.
Apart from monopoly and the inertia of the market, there 
are other factors causing high travel costs, some of them are 
mainly concerned with mechanical performance of the vehicles. 
As pointed out by Ely et al (1986), it has been widely accepted 
that the costs of bus operation are different with respect to 
bus size. Other things being equal, reducing the size of a bus 
reduces its operating cost much less sharply than the number of
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its seats. Thus, the cost per seat-km operated increases as 
the size is reduced. In the case of Beijing, in addition to 
low capacity, each minibus is manned by two people rather than 
one as in many of those in other Far Eastern cities;
consequently, it is not difficult to see why minibuses incur 
higher unit costs, and hence greater operating costs than the 
conventional buses do.
Even though the fares are high, the majority of the
respondents in the 1988 survey did not think so. Nearly two
thirds of them say that the fares are reasonable (Table 26 & 
fig. 26a). The reason for this confusing result is because a 
large proportion of minibus travellers in fact have their 
fares paid for them by their own organizations. For instance, 
during that one day when the survey was carried out, only 
55.76% of minibus travellers paid the fares for themselves,
while 44.24% had their fares paid for them by the 
organizations which they work for (BGPPTC 1988a). (See table 
27 & fig. 26b). This is because in China, it is common for 
companies to pay their staff travel expenses for performing the 
so-called "work duties', such as meeting business contacts and 
attending conferences. And for this reason, when an employee 
expects to have travel expenses paid by his or her 
organization, he/she would always choose the more comfortable 
means to travel, except the taxi, which is too luxurious and 
normally used by foreigners rather than by local people.
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Table 26:
Passenger Opinions on 
(1988)
Travel Costs
Grade %
Reasonable 
Expensive 
Very expensive
63.27
35.56
1.17
Total 100.00
Source; Modified from BGPPTC & MAO, 1988b,
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Table 27:
Percentage of Travel Expenses Paid By Companies
(16 April 1988)
Company At own expense Paid by company
(%) (%) (%)
First Company 51.67 48.33 100
Second Company 61.04 38.96 100
Trolley Company 53.28 46.72 100
Rental Company 63.65 36.35 100
Total (BGPPTC) 55.76 44.24 100
Source: BGPPTC & MAO, 1988b.
N.B. Information of the independent undertakings is not 
available.
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6.5 Summary: A Problem of Planning
Overall, in assessing the status quo of Beijing's minibus 
transport from a broader perspective, several important points 
can be drawn:
(a) The total seat capacity is too small against the size 
of the catchment area it serves and thus the overall 
accessibility is limited. Insufficient rolling stock also means 
that the system cannot sustain high frequencies on the routes 
where passengers' average waiting time may be reduced to 
minimum.
(b) As a passenger carrier the minibus is less efficient 
for trunk road mass movement (in terms of operation cost and 
energy consumed per passenger/km). Over-emphasis on corridor 
traffic thus restrains the superiority of the minibus in 
serving particular urban structure (narrow streets). It also 
creates unhealthy and unnecessary competition between different 
modes, while leaving out unserved vacuums on other routes.
(c) The "Leave when full" style of services lengthens 
passengers' waiting time and thus decreases journey speed. On 
the other hand, the inflexible fare charges prevent passengers 
from using the minibus for short journeys.
(d) The short business hours and narrow customer orientation 
restrain not only vehicle utility but also the operational 
capacity of the entire rolling stock.
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(f) Monopolization and market protectionism cause 
disincentives in the transport sector. Because of the absence 
of competition, operators are able to charge high fares beyond 
what most commuters can afford.
These are the main reasons why the system has failed to 
become a major commuter carrier as in other Far Eastern cities. 
While the tourists have to suffer exorbitant costs for the 
service, local citizens who seldom use them only receive little 
benefits. Thus, although Beijing*s minibus service has grown 
fast but its path is somehow "distorted" in relation to 
expectations. This is by no means to conclude that the growth 
is altogether unhealthy, but it merely refers to the limited 
contribution of the system in carrying urban commuters and the 
real beneficiaries of the service.
The next chapter will therefore attempt to discuss 
possible tactics to improve the capability and business 
efficiency of the minibus service in Beijing.
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Chapter VII
IMPROVING THE MINIBUS SYSTEM
7.1 Introduction
The last chapter has expounded the constraints of 
Beijing*s minibus system. As indicated, the main obstacles are 
related to planning policies. It appears that inadequate supply 
is a major cause of low frequency, unreliability and limited 
accesibility. Thus, how to resolve these problems rests, 
partly, upon sufficient supply. On the other hand, high travel 
costs are also a barrier preventing commuters from using the 
service. This chapter discusses the possible steps for 
upgrading the capability of the system for commuter use. These 
include expanding total supply, re-arranging operation tactics 
and restructuring fare rates. There is also a review on the 
effects of subsidizing public transport services.
Subsequently the chapter will round up the major points 
of the case study and comment on outcome of the hypothesis 
test. It will end with a brief summary on the objectives 
achieved, setting the scene for an overall generalization on 
paratransit in the final chapter.
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7.2 Balancing the Supply of Total Seat Capacity
As indicated earlier, the problem of Beijing*s minibus 
system is two-fold; limited accessibility and high travel 
costs; both of these are partly caused by inadequate total seat 
capacity. The question is whether these problems could be 
solved if there were more minibuses on the road. First let us 
examine the effects of fleet expansion on travel costs.
In some cities in Britain, e.g., Leicester, minibus 
conversions have shown that a frequent, convenient, and user- 
friendly bus service can attract people voluntarily back to 
public transport (Watts et al 1986, 1990). This, to some
extent, implies that if the minibus fleet within an urban 
environment is adequate and efficient, then the system could 
play a major role in moving commuters. What are the development 
prospects of the minibus transport in Beijing?
Presently Beijing*s minibus service is inadequate, though 
it looks set to grow. For the BGFPTC, plans have actually been 
made to increase the total number of vehicles throughout the 
1990s. According to official information provided by the 
Minibus Administration Office, it is estimated that by 1995 the 
state-owned companies will have 1,000 minibuses, compared with 
the present number of 600; a big step forward in fleet 
expansion. And after that, with a steady increase of more 
than 100 new vehicles every year, the corporation expects to
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double its entire fleet, bringing the total to between 2,000
and 2,500 vehicles by the year 2000 (BGPPTC 1988a),
Alongside fleet expansion undertaken by the state-owned 
companies, the collectively-owned operators will also try to 
increase their share in the market. However, owing to the 
limited availability of financial resources, their expansion 
may be more difficult to achieve. Above all, in socialist 
economies, only the state is able to raise the money and launch
a large scale business in a relatively short period.
Nevertheless, the BGPPTC*s plans for minibus transport 
development in Beijing look ambitious and concrete enough in 
attempting to tackle the current situation of minibus shortage 
in the city. The question is what will happen if there are 
more minibuses in service and will local residents use them? In 
order to find out these, it is necessary to examine what may 
happen to travel costs and to what extent accessibility can be 
improved if the total number of minibuses increases. First, 
let us look at any possible changes in travel costs.
Assuming other things stay the same, an increase of 
vehicle supply increases the total availability of seats. 
Provided the increase is really large enough to absorb most 
potential passengers who prefer the minibus to conventional 
bus, then one may expect that, at the point where supply 
exceeds demand, fare charges will reach a highest level, 
because demand is now saturated; further supply may only share 
the existing market and thus fares will begin to fall as the
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fleet keeps on expanding. In the case of Beijing, whilst most 
visitors use the minibus anyway, a decrease in minibus travel 
costs would probably attract some users from the local 
population, especially those who earn more. However, because 
of the higher operation and labour costs per seat, minibus
fares would remain higher than that of conventional buses, 
possibly still too high for commuting purposes. Thus most
commuters would stick to the bicycle, since they need to pay
almost no extra costs for bicycle travel beyond the initial 
costs of purchasing the vehicle.
In that case, it may be inferred that, increased minibus 
rolling-stock without necessary improvements may not deliver
benefits to the citizens as a whole. On the other hand, for 
the state-owned minibus service providers, as long as they can 
charge high fares due to the absence of competition, fleet 
expansion could still mean guaranteed turnovers for them and 
consequently for the parent company, namely the BGPPTC. For 
the independent operators, the more state-owned minibuses on 
the urban roads, the harder the battle they may have to face, 
unless there are revolutionary policies to legalize their 
operations in the urban zone.
Nevertheless, fleet expansion under effective management 
and pricing tactics may improve the efficiency of the system. 
Presumably there is an optimal level of supply at which the 
congestion effect is minimum, pricing regulations may thus be 
imposed so that fares are kept at a competitive level compared
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with those charged by conventional modes. Since most tourists 
tend to travel during the period between 10.00 hrs and 16,00 
hrs whilst commuters mainly travel in the morning and the 
afternoon periods, a two-level fare structure may be applied 
for the day time period. This is to separate the fare charges 
into two "time zones", namely "commuter rates" and "tourist 
rates"; whilst the former are to be kept at a level attractive 
to commuters, the latter may be left to a free market "self­
regulated" by the tourists' demand for travel. In other words, 
during the morning and afternoon "commuter rates" periods 
minibus fares are set at levels close to conventional bus fares 
so that commuters may trade off between a cheaper conventional 
bus service and a relatively more expensive minibus service; 
and in order to avoid tourists pouring into these periods, 
services should be provided for commuting ticket holders only. 
Besides the day time rates (including both the commuting and 
the tourist rates), an even cheaper "evening rate" may be 
adopted for leisure activities so that, on the whole, both 
local residents and visitors can benefit from the expanded 
minibus service in accordance with their needs and their 
ability to pay (see fig, 27),
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7.3 Towards An Optimum Rolling Stock
Another issue is how will accessibility be improved after 
fleet expansion. Since it is argued that the total minibus 
rolling stock is too small to be able to provide high frequency 
and sufficient services, what is the optimum size of the total 
fleet in the city likely to be? To answer this question, it is 
necessary to look at the negative as well as the positive 
effects brought about by large volumes of small vehicles in an 
urban area.
First of all, it is quite obvious that several small 
vehicles can reach different points at the same time whilst a 
big vehicle with the same capacity can only travel to one 
destination; thus a large fleet of small vehicles can cover a 
wider geographical area than a small fleet of only a few big 
vehicles. For example, in Manila and Jakarta, with thousands 
of small vehicles of various kinds, most areas are accessible. 
Nonetheless, at the same time, they also cause concern in 
several ways. Therefore there is a negative dimension for 
using small vehicles in urban passenger movement.
The congestion caused by small vehicles during peak times 
is often blamed for unsafe service and poor accessibility. In 
Kuala Lumpur, for instance, the minibus operators have been 
subject to severe criticism from several quarters. They have 
been criticised by the government for not operating as
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franchised, by car users for reckless driving, by passengers, 
who were packed in unsafe and overcrowded vehicles and by stage 
bus companies for unfair practices and competition (see, for 
example, Silcock 1985; White 1980a; Mogridge 1983). Although, 
in comparison, the present minibus fleet in Beijing is rather 
small, experiences from cities abroad do cause deep concern 
among the transport planners. In fact, over the past few 
years, the minibuses have been blamed for causing congestion in 
busy locations, such as markets and road junctions. It has long 
been pointed out that when platoons of minibuses queue at major 
junctions, greater manoeuvrability is of little advantage, thus 
giving little frequency advantage to travellers. Complaints 
have also been made over the rather undisciplined traffic 
behaviour of some minibus drivers whose illegal stopping and 
parking practices are often held as being responsible for 
traffic delays (BGPPTC 1988a; Interview notes 1990).
It is because of these criticisms, the development of the 
minibus system in the Chinese Capital is somewhat restrained. 
What is significant is that it nonetheless indicates a degree 
of dissatisfaction and discontent over the unrestricted 
increase of small vehicles in an urban environment. For the 
bicycle commuters who seldom use any form of public transport 
services, the more motorized vehicles on the roads, the greater 
danger they may face and the less the benefits they would 
obtain. Clearly, something must be done to reduce these 
problems.
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In theory, in respect of mass movement, the optimum 
rolling stock of a minibus system is proportionate to the 
optimum average frequency that the system can offer and 
disproportionate to the congestion it causes. In order to 
materialize the advantage of having higher average journey 
speed in a large urban area, it is necessary to achieve a 
balance between optimum frequency and minimum congestion, 
which requires a sufficient supply of vehicles with optimum 
utility rates. In the case of Beijing, a possible tactic is to 
encourage a free market mechanism for minibus undertakings to 
develop their own fleet on the basis of the government's fare 
regulation; that is to say, providers are allowed to increase 
their own rolling stock with fare charges subject to the "time- 
zone rates" mentioned earlier. Under such a free market 
minibuses continue to compete with other modes by trying to 
offer higher quality of service. Thus, as long as the average 
journey speed of the minibus remains higher than other means, 
and as long as the fares are still attractive for commuters to 
travel, there may still be room for more minibuses to enter 
the market. The market is said to be saturated at a point when 
service quality begins to fall, especially when average journey 
speed of all traffic decreases as a direct consequence of 
congestion caused by the increasing volume of minibuses; at 
which time further expansion would merely cause negative 
effects. Thus the optimum rolling stock of a minibus system 
may be illustrated by a simple equation as below;
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Ro = f(Sma) + f(Ctai) + f(Fc) 
where Rq = optimum rolling stock of minibuses,
f(Sma) = function of maximum average speed of traffic, 
f(Cjjji) = function of minimum congestion effects, 
f(F^) = function of competitive fare charges.
(N.B. f(Sma) ^ ^(^i) because congestion here refers to that 
caused by minibuses only).
If this analysis is correct, then one may see that at 
least until the "time-zone" fare rates are set, it is difficult 
to predict how large the rolling stock of minibuses should be 
in Beijing, since presently no one knows how attractive are the 
separated "commuter" and "tourist" services going to be. 
Clearly, in this context, practical management is decisive. 
However, because of the scale of the problem and other related 
dimensions, there is a need to tackle the planning issue from a 
wider perspective. The following section will be looking at 
the question of financial subsidies to public transport 
services in Beijing.
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7,4 Reviewing the Subsidization Policy
Ever since the start of the economic reform in the late 
1970s and the early 1980s, business enterprises in the People's 
Republic of China have been encouraged to take measures to 
oiperate in a competitive environment and slowly shift to a 
market-orientated system. Managers and workers are held to be 
more responsible for their performances. Following the reforms, 
Lhere have been considerable improvements within the public 
transport industry. Nonetheless, as mentioned, of the three 
major public transport systems in Beijing (metro, conventional 
buses and minibus), only the minibus undertakings are 
profitable, the other two are loss-making and still have to be 
subsidized heavily by the Government.
The problem with the conventional transport modes is that 
they are operated as a welfare service. In socialist countries, 
public transport is seen as a basic necessity and not a 
commodity and should thus be provided by the government at all 
costs. Subsidies are mainly provided via taxes and justified 
to be beneficial to the general public at large. Since it is 
held that there is no distinctive "higher-income class" in a 
socialist country and up to now no significant level of 
private car ownership in the city, every citizen could be a 
public transport user and consequently a potential beneficiary. 
What is more, it is also argued that, in reality, the
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conventional modes are the only facility that most of the 
ordinary Chinese, particularly those from other parts of the 
country, can afford to travel on in the capital. And since, 
unlike the local resident, the visitor cannot bring with him or 
her a bicycle into the city every time they come to the 
capital, cheap public transport services are thus believed to 
be the only alternative.
Hitherto, the fare charges of the conventional buses and 
trolleys have been frozen at the levels of the 1950s. The fares 
for the metro are kept even lower, at a flat rate of Y0.30 per 
trip, regardless of journey distance. On the whole, the fare 
rates of these "mass-transit" modes do not reflect the actual 
market value for the costs involved; they are almost a symbolic 
payment. This partly contributes to the failure of their 
business.
From an equality point of view, universal subsidization 
raises the issue of where the benefits actually go. At times 
it seems that the welfare service policy would benefit every 
citizen on equal terms, unfortunately when it comes to public 
transport services, it is not so. Instead of "something for 
everyone", the policy has actually made inequality more 
apparent. Whilst financial subsidies are supposed to be shared 
equally amongst all public transport users, it is obvious that 
the need for travel varies from person to person. Within the 
urban community for whom the transport services are 
subsidized, some people may have to travel every day, others
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may not need to use the public transport service at all. And 
since, in Beijing, indeed, in most Chinese cities, people live 
reasonably near to their work places and thus travel relatively 
shorter commuting distances, the bicycle is still the most 
convenient and economical mode for the local residents. 
Therefore subsidies may not reach the bicycle riders on equal 
terms, even though many of them live on the lowest level of 
wages. Apparently, universal subsidization to public transport 
service has not delivered equal benefits to every citizen. 
Non-users, and consumers of unsubsidized services are the 
losers who either receive no real benefits or else have to 
suffer from high travel costs for using the services they need.
Furthermore, under the universal subsidization policy, 
transport undertakings become almost totally dependent upon 
official resources and often structured under a complicated 
framework, characterized by superfluous personnel and 
bureaucratic trammels. Since jobs are guaranteed and wages 
fixed anyway, the staff work as a "timed-machine" with no 
entrepreneurial initiative; consequently, the quality of 
service cannot be improved.
As one can see, in Beijing, despite a series of attempts 
to improve the performance of the transport facilities, there 
have been no substantial strategies to restructure the market; 
so far the participation of the private sector in the public 
transport industry is trivial. Hence, the municipal authorities 
still have to pick up the largest part of the bill for their
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citizens* transport consumption. Along with increasing 
deficiency in service operation, the conventional modes 
continue to lose money. According to Quan (1990a), over the 
past few years the amount of subsidies given to (conventional) 
public transport in Beijing in order to keep it running 
exceeded Y200 million per annum; if the money for development 
projects are included, then the sum has reached a figure in the 
range between Y400 and Y500 million annually. Clearly, the 
public transport industry is one typical example of the **eating 
from the same big wok** syndrome. In this sense, one may reason 
that, the idea of subsidizing a potentially self-sustainable 
industry is no different to killing off the goose that lays the 
golden eggs.
Overall, it may be argued that the inertia of the public 
transport industry in Beijing is an outcome of the socialist 
planning philosophy. The main obstacles are as below;
(a) The pursuit of socialism in public service provision. 
This leads to the persistent channelling of financial resource 
to state-owned transport undertakings without ensuring 
substantial improvements on service quality and reaching the 
targeted users of the services offered; and
(b) The legacy of egalitarianism in economic activities. 
The enterprise reforms within the transport sector remain 
incomplete and thus unable to change the potential vitality of 
the industry.
It must be said that, however, not all subsidies are
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necessarily a bad thing. For instance, cross subsidization may 
be justifiable and sometimes even helpful. In Beijing*s minibus 
service, if a two-level fare structure is implemented, profits 
gained from tourist operations may be cross-subsidized to the 
commuter service, in case the latter is loss-making. This will 
keep the system working reasonably justified amongst all 
parties involved. In fact, subsidies are often found necessary 
in the urban public transport industry, especially in cities of 
developing countries where the majority of the poor cannot 
afford to use the public transport service. This will be 
touched again in the end of the chapter.
7.5 Implications and Significance of the Findings
As Jacobs et at (1986) have pointed out, different cities 
have approached the problem of providing for transport demand 
in different ways. There is evidence of a broad correlation 
between certain characteristics of the city and its transport 
and also between the demand for public transport and the level 
of supply.
It is observed that "paratransit" places much more 
reliance upon the market to help match supply to demand than 
does the conventional approach. Where operators are free to
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enter the business and to choose the vehicles, they will be 
able to respond more closely to the preferences of passengers, 
therefore it is not uncommon to find a variety of paratransit 
vehicles, which are likely to range from vehicles offering 
basic conditions at low fares to more comfortable vehicles at 
higher fares, providing different forms of services and 
competing fiercely with the conventional bus (Armstrong-Wright 
et al 1987), even though small vehicles are more likely to 
incur higher operating costs. Freedom of vehicle choice is 
thus an important factor in meeting with travel demands.
Because of the operator's intimate knowledge of road 
conditions, levels of demand, and operating costs, buses freely 
chosen by operators are far more likely to be cost effective 
and appropriate than vehicles specified by inflexible
government regulation.
In this context, the study of Beijing's minibus service 
has provided fresh grounds for paratransit in urban
transportation. To summarize the implications derived from the 
"Beijing Phenomenon", there are a range of issues to be taken 
into account in "paratransit" planning;
First, the optimum vehicle size should be made on the 
basis of several criteria, such as the traffic volumes to be 
carried, the capacity of the city's transport infrastructure, 
the vehicle's load capacity and its ability to penetrate in 
accordance with the demand for travel and topography. In 
populated metropolises where travel demand is high, larger
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sized minibuses (midi-bus) may be more suitable provided the 
roads are accessible. (Thus, in Beijing, larger vehicles, say, 
25 - 30-seaters may be more suitable).
Second, fares must be kept at a competitive level so 
that they are attractive and affordable for the majority of the 
citizens and to challenge the use of conventional modes and 
man-powered vehicles. Furthermore, since paratransit patronage 
is not only influenced by the price of the fare (cost for
travel) but also the way fares are charged, attention should be 
paid to the fare structure: when a flat fare is applied, it
would become more cost-effective for the passenger to use the
service for long journeys, whereas it may be uneconomical for 
short distance travel; short journey travellers (i.e. scattered 
residents) would choose other modes if available (in the case 
of Beijing, the bicycle). In large cities of the developing 
world where travel demands are varied and trip patterns
diversified, a graduated fare rate should be adopted in 
accordance with the variability of travel requirements. A flat 
fare rate may only be introduced on short routes and when it is 
still attractive compared with that charged by alternative 
public modes. In practice, therefore, a "pay what you ride" 
fare structure, whereby fares are charged according to distance 
travelled, is much more favourable than a "pay whatever you 
ride" structure in which a flat fare is demanded regardless of 
the distance. Meanwhile, services must be demand responsive in 
accordance with temporal and spatial changes.
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Third, in urban areas where public transport services are 
provided by several operators (or by a large number of small 
scale operators, such as in the Southeast Asian cities), co­
ordinations amongst drivers and operators can help to improve 
service efficiency and reliability. With stable frequencies, 
optimum headways on the routes may be maintained so that mean 
waiting time is reduced to a minimum, at the same time 
unhealthy competition can be avoided.
Fourth, in order to maximize the capability of paratransit 
in passenger movements, a market-signalled mechanism should be 
adopted. This may be achieved by relaxing entry control and 
encouraging the participation of different sectors to form a 
competitive business environment so that fares may be forced 
down to a level which reflects a state of balance between 
demand and supply and the affordability of the users.
Fifth, when transport organizations are privatized or 
expected to be self-supporting, in areas where residents are 
sparse or activities not attractive to travellers, demand for 
public transport may either be unstable or too low to be able 
to maintain economic services, refusals to service could occur; 
Subsidies may be required to maintain a basic service using 
probably smaller vehicles. Universal subsidies which are meant 
to support all citizens but often unable to reach them on equal 
terms, however, should be best avoided. Rather, money should 
be given to support the less accessible areas of the city and 
to the provider(s) on a basis of competitive tender; that is to
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say, subsidies are considered in accordance with particular 
geographical (spatial) rather than social (welfare) needs 
(i.e., low fares for all). Above all, some form of help is 
necessary in especially cities of developing countries, where 
most deprived areas are normally resided by the low-income 
group. Above all, rational subsidization would produce positive 
results provided the methods applied are appropriate.
Overall, the "Beijing Phenomenon" has implied that the 
minibus is potentially a dynamic mode for moving commuters in 
urban areas, provided appropriate planning tactics are
implemented. More importantly, it has demonstrated that 
paratransit undertakings can be made to be self-sufficient in 
socialist as well as capitalist countries, though not
necessarily under private ownership and in a small scale. 
Hence, the main factors which contribute to the success of 
paratransit may be re-written as below:
(a) small vehicles,
(b) entrepreneurial spirit,
(c) effective management tactics.
Although in Beijing's case there are also other minor 
factors contributing to the financial viability of the 
minibuses, the fundamental elements are nonetheless these three 
listed above. In this respect, the findings have indeed proved 
the hypothesis, and the objectives of the study are well
achieved. The next chapter will build on the findings to
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reaffirm the overall role of paratransit in cities of the 
developing world.
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Chapter VIII
A MODEL OF URBAN TRANSPORT PLANNING 
FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
8.1 Introduction
Urban transport is essentially the spatial representation 
of dynamics in cities. There are at the same time a multi­
dimensional projection of various underlying forces, such as 
economic objectives, safety considerations, environmental 
standards, energy use, land-use compatibility and maintenance 
of community lifestyle (Nijkamp et al 1987). The main goal of 
urban transport planning must therefore take all aspects of the 
urban society into consideration. In developing countries the 
need for a long term perspective is particularly fundamental.
The overall significance of the "Unconventional transport" 
lies in its emphasis on contributing to social and economic 
development. The aim of this final chapter is thus to sum up 
the role of paratransit in the developing world; and on this 
basis it will attempt to construct a model reflecting this 
special feature of the "Unconventional wisdom".
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8.2 As A Major Passenger Carrier
The ultimate objective of an urban passenger service is to 
offer the population transport services at a reasonable fare, 
good area coverage, regular and appropriate schedules, 
reliability, comfort, safety, energy efficiency, and to impose 
minimum hazards to the environment. Therefore, the choice of a 
solution to transport problems of many cities should be based 
on the particular characteristics of the city, such as its 
structure, its functions, its population size and so forth (UN
1989). Venice, for example, may be better served by motorboats 
and gondolas. Whereas Los Angeles is argued to be unsuitable
for light trains (See, for example, Richmond 1991). Thus city
form is likely to influence the type of public transport that 
may be employed.
It is now clear that, in Beijing, conventional buses tend
to be confined within broad avenues, whereas minibuses are more
suitable for narrow streets. This situation is similar to that 
of many other Third World cities, where trips tend to be short 
in distance, diversified in time and scattered in orientation. 
Therefore, although big buses may be more cost-effective to 
run, they are physically inaccessible to trip ends; on the 
other hand, individually mobile modes (motorbike/bicycle) are 
more accessible to travel destinations but rather congestive
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due to their inefficient use of road space. In comparison, a 
paratransit vehicle can be seen as a reduced version of the big 
bus or an enlarged version of the motorbike, though what it can 
achieve may become impossible for either of these. This
explains why paratransit accounts for as much as 60 - 70
percent of public transport output in some cities (See, for
example, Jacobs et al 1987).
The role of paratransit systems is demonstrated best by 
their performances in Southeast Asian cities. In Jakarta, 
public transport is provided by 2,000 public owned and 500 
privately owned large buses with a capacity of 80 - 120
passengers each, some 3,350 privately owned 20-seater minibuses 
and 2,000 private 10-seater microbuses. These buses carry 3.3 
million passengers daily -- 1.8 million in large buses, 1.3
million in minibuses, and 0.2 million in microbuses (Armstrong- 
Wright et al 1987). Overall, in Jakarta, nearly 50 percent of 
all public transport trips are by unconventional transport 
vehicles (Pendakur 1984). In Bangkok, in addition to big buses, 
there are an estimated 4,500 to 10,000 minibuses running on the 
streets (UN 1989).
On the other hand, in Manila, previous studies show that 
when all the work and school trips are considered (including 
walking), 8% walk, 10% go by car, 17% by bus, 60% by jeepney, 
and 6% by other means (motor-cycle, taxi, bicycle). When only 
the trips by vehicles are taken into account (that is, 
excluding walking), 25% go by private vehicles (cars and motor-
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cycles), 50% by jeepney, 15% by bus, 9% by tricycle and just 1% 
by taxi (Dent 1981). Earlier as the Metro Manila Transit 
Corporation failed to reach the stated objectives during its 
first full years of operation and incurred huge deficits, the 
paratransit industry grew rapidly. At the time, a total of 
4,800 jeepneys with a seating capacity for over 75,000 
passengers -- nearly double the number of seats provided by the 
Corporations *s fleet of 700 buses, has served the population 
effectively. In direct contrast to the intent of government 
policy and regulation, the number of buses in service in Metro 
Manila dropped between 1976 and 1980, while the number of 
jeepneys more than doubled. Concurrently, the volume of bus 
passengers declined by over 40 per cent while that of jeepney 
passengers steadily increased, until in 1980 about 85% of 
public transport passengers in Metro Manila used jeepneys (See, 
for example, Roschlau 1989). In Britain, too, one of the 
developed countries where the use of minibus transport is a 
relatively new phenomenon, the scale of operation to date has 
indicated that the minibus is far more than a feeder or a 
specialist service vehicle (Turner et al 1987).
Clearly, as suggested by the UN (1989), small sized buses 
are more accessible to neighbourhoods and thus can provide 
convenient services to the communities. Nevertheless, for the 
over-populated mégalopoles such as Cairo, Calcutta, Bangkok, 
Seoul, Jakarta, Shanghai, Beuenos Aires, Sao Paulo and Mexico 
City, a subway or surface rail system that suits very well to
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high density corridors might be the best solution for providing 
fast transport and eliminating traffic congestion in central 
areas; as it probably has done in Hong Kong. However, it 
should be stressed that, conventional transit and paratransit 
are not necessarily antagonistic; in fact, they can well be 
designed to collaborate with each other to form an integrated 
urban passenger transport system, in accordance with their own 
ability and suitability.
In conclusion, paratransit is indeed a major passenger 
carrier and thus a viable solution to many cities' transport 
problems.
8.3 Low Labour Costs and Employability
Leaving aside physical accessibility, another important 
feature of paratransit is its contribution to urban economy. As 
argued by Linn (1979, 1983), paratransit is not only a major 
passenger system in carrying people and improving the 
efficiency of urban public transport services but also promises 
to promote energy conservation, foreign exchange saving, public 
resource saving, employment generation, regional balance, and 
equity.
A previous examination of the structure of operating costs
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in cities in developed and developing countries has revealed 
some interesting differences: In the UK the major cost
component, about two-thirds the total, is that of staff, with 
maintenance and spares making up most of the remainder. 
Operating costs in the Third World cities are markedly 
different, with staff costs being about one-third the total, 
but with fuel and depreciation/interest costs being much 
greater than in the UK (Jacobs et al 1987). On the whole, from 
an international perspective, the ratio of manpower cost to the 
total cost is positively correlated with per capita national 
income, being about 70% - 80% of total cost in the advanced 
countries, 50% in Newly Industrializing Countries like 
Singapore, and in the range of 20% - 30% in Thailand, and the 
Philippines (Chujoh 1989).
In cities of the developing world, the transport sector 
normally absorbs a substantial proportion of the labour force, 
providing, in most cases, profitable jobs to the urban 
dwellers, especially to the poor (See, for example, Dick 
1981a). Compared with expensive conventional technology, 
paratransit is much more labour intensive. Small vehicles can 
provide more jobs than large ones at the same amount of capital 
invested. For instance, Dick (1981b) points out earlier that 
the capital cost of eight 11 passenger l^bemo)would be about the 
same as for one 90 passenger bus but, employment per vehicle 
being the same, direct employment would be eight times greater. 
Thus, in cities where manpower is cheap and plentiful, the
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ability of absorbing labour for the alternative of expensive 
high technology and capital, is not merely a matter of job 
creation, but also an achievement in respect of cost saving.
The paratransit industry is particularly labour-intensive 
is because of its multiplier effects in the urban economy. As 
Roschlau (1989) finds out, in the Philippines, paratransit 
undertakings directly employ a large number of staff, including 
drivers, conductors, luggage boys, dispatchers, mechanics, wash 
boys, and drivers' companions. Each tricycle, pedicab, 
tartanilla and urban jeepney normally has one full-time or two 
part-time drivers. Small buses and provincial jeepneys require 
a driver and a conductor, with large buses often employing a 
driver, conductor and luggage boy. Aside from this there is a 
large contingent of young boys who wash the units, and 
companions who act as de facto conductors by assisting the 
drivers, who in turn pay for their food while together. While 
this is in part the symptom of a more fundamental problem of 
underemployment, it also underlines the public transport 
industry's ability to absorb surplus labour in a useful and 
productive way. Furthermore, financing companies, motor vehicle 
dealerships, oil companies, parts suppliers, wholesalers and 
retailers, manufacturers, insurance agents and the government 
collect monetary benefits. Thus, while income distribution 
within the industry is far from optimally equitable, it reaches 
a substantial cross-section of the population.
In extreme cases, for example Manila, the 30,000 or more
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Jeepneys are a major source of employment. In 1975, about 7
percent of the city's population was dependent upon the Jeepney 
industry for their livelihood (Silcock 1986). In Hong Kong,
there are roughly 5,000 minibuses with more than 10,000 drivers 
(JPCL 1985). And in Surabaya, the number of people directly 
employed (either full or part-time) in the transport sector is 
of the order of 78,000 which represents about 9% of the 
potential economically active population (Fouracre et al 1978).
In the case of Beijing, since the BGPPTC itself is a 
multiple production organization, besides providing passenger 
services, it also produces vehicles and transport equipments 
and therefore employs a considerable number of employees; 
though, with about 600 vehicles, the total number of staff 
employed by the BGPPTC for the minibuses is just over 1,500 
(BGPPTC 1988a). On the other hand, there is no good information 
available showing the total number of people employed by the 
independent minibus undertakings. However, since many of them 
run on shifts, one may assume that each vehicle may therefore 
employ three to four persons on average. Again, with a total
of about 600 vehicles, altogether there should be about 2,000
employees. In sum, the total labour force engaged in Beijing's 
minibus industry is roughly 3,500 people.
Although, at an employees/vehicle ratio of about 3/1 for 
the entire fleet and with a two-man crew per vehicle, the 
minibuses in Beijing seem to be overstaffed and have lower 
manpower efficiency than one-man operation, and consequently
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causing higher travel costs for users, nonetheless, with a two- 
man crew instead of one, the number of jobs can be doubled. 
Of course, in a built-up area of more than six million people 
(excluding population in the Xians) the employability of the 
minibuses in Beijing certainly makes no significant sense. 
Nonetheless, in a country where employment is already a 
problem, an industry which can support the livelihood of so 
many people is perhaps something rather encouraging. Thus, the 
strength of argument manpower efficiency is really dependent 
upon the values perceived. To the Western operator, it would be 
important to reduce manpower requirements to a minimum. But if 
transport is to be seen as a potential provider of employment 
and as a seed-bed for small businesses, the case of the two-man 
operation is strengthened.
Therefore, in developing countries, overstaffing should 
not be considered merely a question of man-power deficiency, 
but also an issue of wealth distribution between employees and 
the users of transport services within the community. Above 
all, as some writers (See, for example, Silcock 1986) have 
suggested, few would seriously challenge the view that 
transport policy and investment should seek to maximize net 
economic benefits, though, how the costs and benefits are 
calculated, and what is an equitable distribution of them, are 
more contentious issues.
Clearly, pursuing the more modern equipment at the expense 
of paratransit is having the side effect of a substantial loss
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of employment opportunities, as well as the diversion of 
capital from potentially more productive fields. Therefore, in 
response to the widespread poverty in the third world, a number 
of international development agencies have declared their 
intention to assist the poor to become more productive. The 
World Bank for example, has stated that development efforts 
should especially try and provide better access for the less 
privileged to essential public services. Unfortunately, the 
intentions have not been matched by sufficient action in the 
field. Most transport plans and projects concentrate upon 
making the mobile more mobile and in so doing, scarce 
resources are allocated to the "needs** of the more privileged 
and already mobile sections of the community, thus enhancing 
their situation. Whilst the urban poor suffer the opportunity 
cost of such action by being continually deprived of sufficient 
resources to tackle their movement problems (Dimitriou 1982).
Apparently, this is an important point concerning the 
issue of equal opportunities in urban development. The next 
section will move on to discuss the social and economic 
perspective of transport planning policies.
262
8 .4 Transport Policy and the Urban Poor
The basic needs approach focuses upon critical human needs 
in terms of; health, food, education, water, shelter, 
transport, simple household goods, as well as non-material 
needs including: participation, cultural identity and sense of 
purpose in life (Linn 1983). In developing countries, the urban 
transport problem relates closely to the everyday life of their 
citizens. For the low-income group, the role of movement, as a 
means of furnishing access to other basic needs is obviously 
critical. Transport however, is not merely important to the
urban poor as a means of facilitating movement. Most important 
of all, urban transport policy can specifically contribute to 
alleviating poverty. Access to employment, health and schooling 
facilities for example, not only raises the quality of life to 
those previously deprived of access to such facilities, but
indeed increases their very opportunities of future survival 
(Dimitriou 1990).
In developing countries, typically for those who can 
afford public transport -- and perhaps a quarter of households
are below this threshold -- 10 to 15 percent of household
income is spent on transport, and sometimes up to 30 percent or 
more. Generally these low-income families spend proportionately 
more on public transport than others, while making fewer trips 
(almost entirely of an 'essential* nature) and usually on a
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poorer quality service (ADB 1989). They are thus at the margin 
subsistence which as Linn (1983) points out, makes them very 
sensitive to disruptions in their earnings brought about by 
inadequate transport policies.
Transport related problems among urban low income groups 
are exacerbated by rising transport costs and their need to 
travel long distances in search of employment. Given the rapid 
growth of cities, and the frequent location of low-income areas 
on the fringes of such settlements, low-income trip makers may 
have to travel much greater distances than they would wish. 
Such circumstances hamper their opportunities to engage in and 
contribute to economic activities of the city (Dimitriou 1990; 
White 1990). Not surprisingly, it is common for large fare 
increases to provoke civil unrest in low-income communities. 
Hence, for the urban poor, reductions in public transport costs 
open the prospect of gaining access to income-generating 
activities which represent their sole hope of economic 
advancement; and the efficiency of public transport reflected 
in the fare is thus seen to be of critical importance to them.
Furthermore, in many developing countries, rates of labour 
force growth are rising even in cases where fertility rates 
have begun to fall. The scope for increasing labour absorption 
in agriculture is often limited and, although there is 
substantial evidence of the growth of off-farm employment in 
rural areas (so that nonfarm jobs may account for between one- 
quarter and one-third of rural employment), job opportunities
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in rural areas cannot be expected to keep pace with potential 
rural labour force growth. Accordingly, much of the burden of 
labour absorption will fall on urban areas. In view of the 
probability that 62 percent of aggregate population growth 
between 1980 and the year 2000 will occur in urban areas, the 
estimate that about 16 million people have entered the labour 
force in the 1980s compared with 10 million in the 1970s, and 
the negligible agricultural employment growth of 0.27 percent 
per annum in the 1970s, what happens in the urban areas will 
determine the degree of success in meeting employment creation 
goals (Richardson 1987). The goal of employment creation is 
therefore a truly national goal.
The urban transport sector also consumes large amounts of 
public resources which have a high opportunity cost. After 
labour, fuel and materials constitute a major cost, especially 
where they are imported. Road transport in urban conditions 
typically consumes 30 - 40 percent of total road transport 
fuel, a proportion which will increase as urbanization takes 
place (ADB 1989). On the whole, fuel ranges from about 15 
percent to 20 percent or more of total costs in Third World 
operations, compared with about 6 percent in Britain (White
1990). Continuity of supply is thus critical in countries where 
foreign exchange reserves are limited. Hence, one of the main 
causes for concern about the strategy of conventionalism in 
transport planning is its disregard of the social opportunity 
costs of labour and capital. Clearly, urban transport directly
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influences both city efficiency, and thereby the national 
economy, and the welfare of city dwellers.
Therefore, besides policies on population control, the 
degree to which urban areas in the poorest countries can 
satisfactorily meet even the most basic needs of their 
inhabitants is closely based upon the development of a more 
efficient and effective transport system. Effective 
improvements, in turn, require a close understanding of the 
dynamic , and complex characteristics of such urban areas with 
their associated transport needs. A realistic but comprehensive 
transport planning approach is needed, one which is rooted in 
an understanding of the local context, offering a replicable 
method for identifying affordable and effective improvements 
and which holds the promises of increasing economic efficiency 
and, in particular, helping to meet the travel needs of the 
urban poor (Lockwood 1982).
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8•5 The Need for a Strategic Perspective
The transport problem is therefore dominated by the 
poverty of the majority and the gross insufficiency of 
resources with which to tackle the problem. However, as Rimmer 
et al (1986) point out, while poverty may be the reality, 
modernity must be the image. Despite the scarcity of 
resources, governments in many developing countries have 
continued to bestow upon their capitals the visible 
paraphernalia of a modern city. Nonetheless, experiences in the 
First World countries have indicated that the engineering-based 
approach for transport problems offers little success for the 
urban transport problem. Whilst the Third World cities have 
very limited resources their problems are as severe as that of 
the First World (Ely 1987). Whether modern equipment 
constitutes real solutions is another question, but it is 
irrelevant to developing countries since they cannot afford 
them anyway (Thomson 1983).
Therefore, it is quite apparent that solutions from 
developed countries are often transplanted to developing 
countries with little adoption or consideration for the 
differences in needs, values, resource availability, climate 
and so on. Such transplants typically use imported technology 
based on the capital/labour mix optimal in developed countries, 
require skills, foreign exchange, or other resources that are
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in short supply, and fail to take advantage of resources that 
are really plentiful (Carter et al 1984). What is more, the new 
high-capacity modes often reduce accessibility for the poor 
for they cannot easily penetrate the narrow lanes of low-income 
residential areas. The conventional wisdom also discriminates 
against the small entrepreneur and reduces the changes of 
individual prosperity of the citizens. It is also inequitable 
in that expensive transport systems tend to benefit the better- 
off urban residents, who use them most.
What is more, in respect of economic development, capital- 
intensive industries tend to be less creative in employment, 
except where jobs are generated as a consequence of multiplier 
effects of the investment. The problem is that they are often 
artificially stimulated at the expense of other industries. 
Clearly, the only possible solution for the transport problem 
in Third World cities -- apart from cities in a few oil-rich 
countries and the Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) -- is 
a low-cost solution, which in practice means extensive bus 
priorities, traffic management and traffic restraint, together 
with selective road improvements. Thus, the transfer of 
planning technology to the developing world must be accompanied 
by a drastic change of values; and the task of transport 
planning in developing countries must place stricter emphasis 
on cost-effectiveness (Thomson 1983).
Apparently, due to the limitation in resources supply and 
the need for social and economic development, transport
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planning has become an ever challenging issue in developing 
countries. The search for a philosophical model capable of 
helping to balance the two sides has thus become an urgent task 
amongst those working in the forefront of the planning 
discipline. The essence of transport models is to capture some 
important characteristics of the real world in a way that 
permits easy comprehension and manipulation to aid decision. It 
is based on this principle that the next section attempts to 
construct such a model.
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. 6 A Model of Resources Emphasis in Transport Planning;
According to Thomson (1977), there are 7 dimensions within 
the urban transport problem, shown as figure 28 below;
The Condition o f  Transport in Cities
1
E
The urban transport problem
The urban transport problem.
(After Thomson 1977).
Thus, where P = urban transport problem
P =  t + a + p + o + d + e + p k
(t = traffic movement; a = accidents; p = peak hour crowding
on public transport; o = off peak inadequacy of public 
transport; d = difficulties for pedestrians; e = environmental 
impact; pk = parking difficulties).
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Leaving aside the relatively less important resources, 
there are five major elements to be considered in transport 
planning: Capital, technology, labour, time and management.
The first three are functional elements measured in terms of 
economic availability; they vary greatly in accordance with the 
economic background of the city in question. The relationship 
between the three functional elements is that, within a given 
urban environment, the greater the availability of capital, the 
more modern the transport facilities may be acquired, and 
subsequently the less the manpower is needed to operate the 
public transport services (See fig. 29a).
On the other hand, being a useful resource, time is 
distributed equally across the land; it is a "neutral" property 
irrespective of geographical difference. Assuming the problem 
is manageable with the given amounts of functional resources, 
then time is certainly needed for the implementation of the 
plan; thus under this situation time always carries a positive
value. And, similar to value of time, the impacts of management
policies which refer to tactics such as business regulations, 
enterprise incentives, subsidization and so forth do not vary
as far as volume is concerned; management thus carries a
constant value over time rather than a functional one, for 
itself alone cannot solve the problem but may help to solve it. 
However, within any business, management is a must, be it good 
or bad; thus its value may either be positive or negative, but
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can never be equal to zero. Under these premises, the major 
elements in urban transport planning can be written as below:
(1) f(L^ + T? + C^) + tm
either > (T^ + C^)
or < (t 2 + c^)
or = (T^ + C^)
Where
f = the functional value of (the element, depending on 
the volume of the element in question; where f > 0)
L = Labour (measured in terms of economic availability 
e.g., low unit cost of labour, but not on quantity 
of manpower; where L > 0)
T = Technology (vehicles, equipment, infrastructure; 
measured chiefly in terms of their modernness; 
where T > 0 meaning there is no negative T value)
C = Capital (money for investment, for foreign exchange; 
especially for infrastructural provision; where 
C > 0 meaning there is no negative C value) 
t = time (time span needed for the implementation of 
plans, where t > 0) 
m = management (regulations, incentives, concessions and 
so on; measured in terms of effectiveness; where 
m ^  0)
(N.B. the inputs are emphasized on resources rather than costs;
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thus external costs such as pollution, congestion, and travel 
time and operating costs are excluded).
Although cities are different in various aspects so that 
the requirements for each of these elements may differ, 
nonetheless all cities have to rely on them in dealing with 
their transport problems. Obviously the functional elements are 
basic necessities; the square values of these elements confirm 
their fundamental importance. Put in another way, without the 
square, the algebra T with the condition T > 0 only emphasizes 
the number of vehicles; it could lead to the assumption that 
there is at least one vehicle (or some equipment) available; 
whereas using the square value is to symbolize the significance 
of quality as well as the quantity of the element, i.e., they 
are not simply vehicles, but vehicles of a certain quality.
It is recognized that transport problems (defined as 
above) in developing cities are more serious than those found 
in the developed world, yet generally the former have a much 
thinner financial base for vast investments. Developed cities 
tend to have more money and more advanced technology, whereas 
their labour force is an expensive, even though not necessarily 
scarce, resource. On the one hand, in the developing city, 
manpower is abundant, (often) ununionized and inexpensive, 
whereas capital is scarce and technology often has to be 
imported at considerable costs. Hence, comparing the two 
"worlds'*, the differences are obvious. Overall, the
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relationship between the transport problems of the developing 
city and the developed city can be illustrated as below:
(2) P^p > Pjj (on the criteria of the 7 dimensions
mentioned above)
Where
P^p = the transport problem in the developing city
Pdd - the transport problem in the developed city
Since cities differ in urban form and the pattern of land 
use, the transport problem of a city is also affected by its 
physical structure; that is to say, the urban topography, road 
condition, street pattern and so on may contribute to the ease, 
or the degree of difficulty of the traffic, thus the value of 
P, which consists of the seven elements listed above, in fact 
also implies the impacts of the city's physical structure in 
urban movements.
The bigger the transport problem a city has, the more 
difficult it is for a solution to be found, hence, from the 
perspective of problem solving, there is a converse 
relationship between a solution and the problem. (It does not 
mean, however, that if there is a big solution, then there must 
be a small transport problem in the city). Now, assuming the
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elements shown (1) above may, to a highest possible degree, 
constitute the factors for solving the urban transport problem, 
then
(3)
f(L^ + t 2 + Co) + tm
Where
S = solution for the problem 
f > 0 t > 0
m = constant f 0
According to this model, due to the differences in 
respect of resource availability, planning strategies employed 
by the First World and the Third World cities differ in the 
emphasis of resource allocation. In the developing city where 
wages are low, the opportunity cost of labour is substantially 
lower than that of technology. Thus, cheap labour is the best 
alternative for expensive technology, on the other hand the 
technology employed should be based mainly on innovative and 
indigenous grounds, so that the use of capital can be kept at a 
level affordable for the city in question. The substitution of 
cheap labour for expensive technology can thus help to release 
capital for investment in other sectors of the economy, which
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may also be of fundamental importance for the urban population.
Apparently, in developing countries, heavier reliance on 
human energy capitalizes on a resource which is locally 
abundant and "recyclable"; though, the emphasis on the labour 
component is by no means static; it will shift in time. As the 
city gradually develops, particularly in terms of economic 
advancement, the costs of labour will nonetheless increase as a 
result of higher wages; at the same time the financial 
capability of the city is strengthened. The city will now be 
rich enough to acquire more advanced technology and equip new 
facilities. In some cases the city itself may be able to
produce some needed technology locally. At this point the 
traffic is improved and the problem is temporarily stabilised. 
Because of the improved transport network the city grows
further in other productive sectors, e.g., industry, 
commercial, tourism and so on, it may become even wealthier so 
that its financial base is further strengthened. Put in another 
way, the urban economy is now reaching a higher stage.
Following a period of stability, owing to changes occurring 
in the urban arena, e.g., changes in population, landuse, 
economic activities and so on, new transport problems emerge; 
the current solutions are no longer able to cope with the new
challenges. A shift of paradigm in the philosophy of transport
planning is required. High wages mean that labour may no 
longer be considered as a cheap alternative so that more 
attention is paid to technology. Since the city is richer than
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before, it may be able to acquire perhaps the more up-to-date 
facilities. Now equipped with modern technology less labour is 
required for the transport systems in service; in some cases 
existing workers may even be laid off. Thus, the importance of 
each functional element shifts gradually with the economic 
advancement of the city. The richer the city becomes, the 
greater the emphasis may be placed on technology and capital, 
and the lower the manpower required.
Therefore, as indicated in figure 29b, the development of 
urban transport systems is indeed a continuing process in a 
spiral shape as time rolls on; transport systems progress from 
low-technology at the bottom to sophisticated systems at higher 
positions of the "transition cone"; each city is at a certain 
ellipse of the continuum. Whilst most developed cities have 
climbed up to high levels with smaller ellipses, indicating a 
smaller transport problem (as compared to that seen in the 
developing world), the majority of developing cities are still 
wondering around at lower levels with large ellipses 
symbolizing big problems. At each ellipse previous problems 
are solved, whilst new problems emerge in new forms; thus 
there is no ultimate end for the urban transport problem; 
rather the development of urban transport appears in a form of 
retrogressive-progressive waves. In another word, there may 
never be a tip at the top of the cone. On the other hand, the 
emphasis on the functional elements shifts with the size of the 
ellipse; the smaller the ellipse, the greater the emphasis on
277
Fig. 29a
'T h t  JevelopeJ ^ h e  d e \/e \o p in ^  cAttj
Fig. 29b
5
\b
6
§
rho. de\/i^ iop>^ d <2,^
T/?g'A/fC'
7 he Jev^lopimcj C it^
F i'^ .2 3 b  T h e S p ira^ l paitern op Resource. R e lîance /n T^'r\nspcrt Plctnnknj,
technology and capital. Although this transition process may 
be slow and the speeds of change may differ greatly between 
cities, the general pattern is nonetheless so modelled.
8.7 Paratransit: A Model in the Real World
Under the model described above, the developing city 
starts off to solve the transport problem with heavier reliance 
on labour, less on finance and technology, thus,
£(l 2 + ?2 + c2) + tm
(4) Sjp ^
^dp
Where
Sdp = solution for transport problem in the developing 
city
P^p = transport problem in the developing city 
(L^) > (T^ + C^) f > 0  t > 0  m = constant f 0
In this context, the paratransit is indeed a practical
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version of this model, (in China the capital cost of a minibus 
is much cheaper than that of a conventional bus). In terms of 
the three functional elements and management tactics, 
paratransit matches the requirements shown in the equation:
(5) paratransit = (L^ + + C^)
where L = informal labour, based mainly on neighbourhood or
kinship manpower sources, e.g., relatives and 
friends,
T = indigenous hardware, e.g. pecak, jeepney, samlor, 
minibus and other forms of small vehicles,
C = individual (family) or partnership business,
small scale investment, and f(L?) > f(T^ + C^), 
symbolizing the emphasis on cheap labour. Thus, the criteria 
for determining "paratransit" in this equation base mainly on 
the kind of vehicles used, the organizational structure of the 
industry, and on the emphasis placed upon each element. Take 
Manila's jeepney service as an example: most vehicles are 
manufactured or refitted with imported parts locally; and in 
most cases the size of the establishment is small whilst the 
employability of the industry as a whole is remarkably high. 
In this context, Beijing's minibus service also approaches the 
problem with similar tactics; even the state-owned fleets 
possess these features besides pursuing an informal working 
practice that normally seen only in the private sector.
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Thus, when applying paratransit to the model, the solution 
for the developing city will be:
function of paratransit + tm
^dp
where t > 0 m = constant ^ 0
m = relaxed control, competitive market mechanism, 
enterprise spirit, route association and so on.
As a method of tackling the transport problem in the Third 
World city where the issue of poverty alleviation is a major 
concern, the "paratransit solution" (Sp^) approaches the 
problem by aiming at both economic and movement objectives. On 
the other hand, in respect of public transport, the developing 
city is characterized by three major limitations: the problem 
of passenger movement; the lack of finance for investment; and 
the high level of unemployment (or low average income for the 
population). Put in another way, the tactical function of 
"paratransit solution" is to increase employment and improve 
mass movement, under the restraints of limited capital and 
high unemployment (plus the problem of movement). This function 
may be written in a mathematical form as below:
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Je + «p
(7) Spa
Pm + Fs + 0
where Sp^ = the ‘paratransit solution*
Jç, _ job creation, Mp = moving passengers;
= problem of movement,
Fg = financial scarcity,
Ü = unemployment.
Once the commuters become rich enough to afford higher 
fares, more advanced facilities may be required. Indeed, in 
respect of mass movement, as the city spreads further, there is 
also an obvious need for acquiring modern transport means to 
accommodate the increasing travel demand.
Indeed, the process of shifting emphasis on resource 
reliance in transport planning has happened Inmany countries. 
Hong Kong and Singapore are two of the best examples whose 
public transport systems have more or less evolved in this way. 
Although nowadays paratransit still constitutes a major 
component within the transport systems of these cities, there 
are now also metros, light railways and sophisticated 
equipment; whilst at the same time, the labour costs are 
gradually catching up with those of the West. By contrast, in 
the Less Developed Countries such as Vietnam, the use of 
paratransit vehicles is still predominant, reflecting the
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abundance of cheap labour being utilized in substitution for 
expensive means.
Above all, this model does not suggest that paratransit 
will lose its weight in the developed city, what it implies is 
that transport policies must follow the needs of the changing 
environment on the basis of the resources available. The 
essence of the argument is that in low-income countries, labour 
is a favourable asset that should be exploited appropriately. 
In this context, the model in fact hints that the 
unconventional wisdom which emphasizes on innovative and 
indigenous knowhow should be encouraged and prioritized in 
transport planning in Third World cities.
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EPILOGUE
Which Wisdom?
Although urban transport problems in developing countries 
may be perceived in a variety of ways, depending upon the 
location, wealth and motorization levels of the city concerned; 
transport policies obviously have to be planned in the light of 
urban development objectives, operating circumstances and 
resources available. Clearly, the argument over conventional 
and unconventional wisdom involves the following issues: the
availability of technology in terms of costs; cross­
subsidization to public transport; and employment creation for 
urban economic development.
The transport/development relationship is essentially a 
two-way interaction and the results of the interaction depend 
on the type of economy involved and on the level of development 
at which transport improvements are introduced. Development 
needs parallel attention to other sectors of the economy, such 
as mineral products, fuel, power production and agriculture and 
manufacturing industry. At a given stage of economic 
development, a certain optimum capacity level of transport 
facilities is required to enable the potential of the area to
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be developed. Insufficient transport may have serious adverse 
effects on the economy, while over-investment in transport can 
lead to waste and to the opportunity cost of not investing in 
other sectors (Cole 1987).
It is hardly surprising that foreign consultants tend to 
reject the unfamiliar pedicabs and jeepneys. As Rimmer et al 
(1986) suggest, foreign consultants and overseas-trained local 
planners with traffic engineering backgrounds instinctively 
look upon these simple vehicles as hindrances to smooth traffic 
flow and took little account of their very real, but less 
visible, advantages. This jaundiced view often reflates the 
thinly disguised role of foreign consultants as "trojan horse" 
to facilitate aid programmes for developing large-scale and 
capital-intensive public transport. The result is increasing 
dependence upon foreign technology, foreign capital and foreign 
skills —  the "Imperialism of urban public transport". 
Clearly, emphasizing on the conventional wisdom would further 
widen the gap between the wealthy and the poor; such a policy 
thus benefits little the majority of the population.
Transport policy in developing countries must therefore be 
directly and consciously linked to economic policy. The flow 
of technology and organizational forms from the international 
metropolis to the Third World town and village must take the 
local context into consideration. "There is a need for a 
prospective and longer term planning of urban development based 
on new concepts that will anticipate and integrate requirements
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for social and economic services" (UN 1989). Policies should be 
directed towards the introduction of intermediate technologies 
better suited for local communities, promoting greater 
efficiency in resource allocation by drawing upon 
entrepreneurial spirit and self-reliance.
In the past decades, the strength of the unconventional 
wisdom has captured the imagination and, more importantly, the 
financial support of many local, national, and international 
organizations (See, for example, Rimmer 1980). Buoyed by the 
steep increases in the costs of energy and operation, the World 
Bank insists that future lending for transport projects will be 
directed to low cost systems that will be flexible enough to 
cope with population increase and cost-effective in that an 
inefficient use of resources is not borne by those least able 
to afford them (Armstrong-Wright 1986). Overall, in
conclusion, one may argue that for developing countries, the 
"unconventional wisdom" does offer a feasible solution to their 
transport problems.
28 6
APPENDIX 1:
Performance of Asian Economies 1965 - 1985
Country 1985 per 
US$
capital (GNP)*
Relative to 
Philippines
Increase in per
capita GNP 1965 - 
1985 % per annum
Singapore 7,420 12.8 8
Hong Kong 6,230 10.7 6
Korea, Rep. 2,150 3.7 7
Malaysia 2,000 3.4 4
Thailand 800 1.4 4
Papua New Guinea 680 1.2 0
Philippines 580 1.0 2
Indonesia 530 0.9 5
Sri Lanka 380 0.7 3
Pakistan 380 0.7 3
China 310 0.5 5
India 270 0.4 2
Burma 190 0.3 2
Nepal 160 0.3 0
Bangladesh 150 0.3 0
Source: 1987 World Development Report, the World Bank
* In developing countries the cities invariably have larger 
recorded incomes per capita than the rural areas. Some 
countries have much lower urban/rural ratios than others and 
therefore have GNPs which substantially understate the wealth 
of their cities (Allport & et al TRRL CR188).
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APPENDIX 2
Comparison of Conventional and Unconventional Systems
Aspect of System Conventional Unconventional
Business Structure
No. of Providers Few (can be monopolistic) Many
Market Entry Usually difficult Easy 
(but may be 
regulated or 
subject to 
corruption)
Ownership Large organization 
(often state-owned)
Often small 
enterprises
Labour Often unionized Non-union,
sometimes
family
business
Costs
Capital High
(often involving
huge amounts of 
foreign currency
Usually low 
(may or may 
not need 
foreign 
currency
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(Appendix 2 continued from the preceding page)
Labour Variable, depending 
on staff to vehicle 
ratios
Low to 
moderate
Supply features
Technology More sophisticated 
(often imported)
Mainly
inter­
mediate
Vehicle size Long, big and some­
times articulated
Small and 
compact
Route/frequency Fixed in space and 
time
Tends to be
demand
responsive
Fares Fixed; often below 
required to cover 
costs
Tend to be
flexible
accordingly
Regulation and 
control Often easy Difficult
Source: Modified from 
the issues involved*.
Silcock D. 1986, *Bus or 
Transportation Planning
paratransit?: 
and Technology
vol. 10 pp.305-322.
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APPENDIX 3
Capital Cost of Urban Buses 
(1986)
Capacity
Purchase Price 
Excluding tax
Type of bus Seated Total (US$)
Minibus 12 20 25,000 )Usually
)production
Small bus 20 30 40,000 )line
)vehicles
Standard bus 40 80 50,000
Large single-deck bus 50 100 80,000
Large double-deck bus 80 120 100.000
Super-large double-decker 80 170 120,000
Articulated bus 55 120 130,000
Super-articulated bus 55 190 150,000
(wider variations in price can be expected, particularly where 
buses are locally assembled or locally manufactured).
Source: World Bank Study (see, Armstrong-Wright & Thiriez
1987).
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APPENDIX 4
Distance Travelled, Passengers & Load Factor per Vehicle
(Beijing's State-owned Minibuses)
(16 April 1988)
Company length travelled 
per vehicle (km)
passengers 
per vehicle
load factor 
(%)
First Co. 8.5 13.4 81.51
Second Co. 12.0 13.3 81.78
Trolley Co. 15.1 13.2 82.50
Rental Co. 28.5 18.3 83.18
BGPPTC (Total) 12.0 13.6 81.77
Source: Modified from 'The Collection of Major Data on the
Survey about Passengers'. December 1988b, BGPPTC & MAO.
NB: a) Data collected on one day basis.
b) Information on Independent minibuses not available.
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APPENDIX 5
Kilometres, Passengers & Earnings per Vehicle/Day
(Beijing's State-owned Minibuses)
(16 April 1988)
Company kilometres passengers earnings
(Yuan)
First Co. 96.74 133 183.48
Second Co. 124.11 130 234.23
Trolley Co. 131.24 98 185.40
Rental Co. 108.95 69 156.40
BGPPTC (Total) 115.31 119 188.57
Source; Modified from 'The Collection of Major Data on the 
Survey about Passengers'. December 1988b, BGPPTC & MAO.
NB: a) Data collected on one day basis.
b) Information on Independent minibuses not available.
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APPENDIX 6
Passengers & Earnings per Hundred Kilometres Travelled
&
Earning/passenger per Hundred kilometre 
(Beijing's State-owned Minibuses)
(16 April 1988)
Company No. of passengers earnings
(Yuan)
earning/passenger
(Yuan)
First Co. 138 189.66 1.38
Second Co. 105 188.73 1.80
Trolley Co. 75 141.27 1.87
Rental Co. 63 143.56 2.27
BGPPTC (Total) 103 172.20 1.68
Source: Modified from 'The Collection of Major Data on the
Survey about Passengers'. December 1988b, BGPPTC & MAO.
NB: a) Data collected on one day basis.
b) Information on Independent minibuses not available.
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APPENDIX 7
Earnings, Average Fare/Trip & Load Factors 
of Different Services 
(Beijing's State-owned Minibuses)
(16 April 1988)
Service No. journeys
made
Earnings
(Yuan)
Fare/trip 
(Yuan)
Load factors 
%
Fixed routes 891 19,789 1.31 86.51
Non-fixed routes 1,127 30,926 1.62 79.58
Tourist routes 106 10,208. 50 4.19 90.98
Collected rental 133 2,826. 50 1.36 64.80
Contracted out 77 1,973 4.01 49.56
Total 2,434 65,726 1.68 81.77
Source: Modified from 'The Collection of Major Data on the
Survey about Passengers'. December 1988b, BGPPTC & MAO.
NB: a) Data collected on one day basis.
b) Information on Independent minibuses not available.
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APPENDIX 8
Passengers* Opinions on Convenience
(Beijing*s State-owned Minibuses)
(16 April 1988)
Company No. of 
interviewees
Very
convenient
%
Convenient
%
Not
convenient
%
First 
Co. 15,037 45.43 54.23 0.34
Second 
Co. 13,506 52.92 46.67 0.41
Rental 
Co. 1,172 51.45 47.44 1.11
Trolley 
Co. 7,597 49.80 49.56 0.65
Total 37,348 49.22 50.33 0.45
Source: Modified from *The Collection of Major Data on the
Survey about Passengers*. December 1988b, BGPPTC & MAO.
NB: a) Data collected on one day basis.
b) Information on Independent minibuses not available.
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APPENDIX 9
Passengers* Opinions on Service Quality
(Beijing’s State-owned Minibuses)
(16 April 1988)
Company Very
good
%
Good
%
Average
%
Not good 
%
Bad
%
First 
Co. 36.75 41.36 21.69 0.20 0.01
Second 
Co. 36.95 37.91 24.43 0.53 0.18
Rental 
Co. 34.47 43.17 21.76 0.60 0.00
Trolley
Co. 41.10 40.91 17.38 0.62 0.00
Total 37.64 40.08 21.80 0.41 0.07
Source; Modified from *The Collection of Major Data on the 
Survey about Passengers*. December 1988b, BGPPTC & MAO.
NB: a) Data collected on one day basis.
b) Information on Independent minibuses not available.
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APPENDIX 10
Passengers* Opinions on Travel Costs
(Beijing’s State-owned Minibuses)
(16 April 1988)
Company No. of 
interviewees
Reasonable
%
Expensive
%
Very
expensive
%
First 
Co. 15,037 63.42 36.05 0.52
Second
Co. 13,506 64.01 34.32 1.67
Rental 
Co. 1,172 63.65 35.92 0.43
Trolley
Co. 7,597 61.58 36.70 1.73
Total 37,348 63.27 35.56 1.17
Source: Modified from *The Collection of Major Data on the
Survey about Passengers*. December 1988b, BGPPTC & MAO.
NB: a) Data collected on one day basis.
b) Information on Independent minibuses not available.
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APPENDIX 11
Making Change(s) in Reaching Travel Destination
(Beijing's State-owned Minibuses)
(16 April 1988)
Company Total of 
interviewees
Need to Change 
%
No need to 
change 
%
First Co. 10,573 21.71 78.83
Second Co. 13,506 36.61 63.39
Trolley Co. 7,597 24.13 75.87
Rental Co. 1,172 26.62 73.38
BGPPTC (total) 37,348 27.53 72.47
Source; Modified from 'The Collection of Major Data on the 
Survey about Passengers'. December 1988b, BGPPTC & MAO.
NB: a) Data collected on one day basis.
b) Information on Independent minibuses not available.
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APPENDIX 12
Fares paid by Passengers* Organizations
(Beijing's State-owned Minibuses)
(16 April 1988)
Company Total of 
interviews
At own expenses 
%
Fare paid by 
passengers * 
Organization 
%
First Co. 10,573 51.67 48.33
Second Co. 13,506 61.04 38.96
Trolley Co. 7,597 53.28 46.72
Rental Co. 1,172 63.65 36.35
BGPPTC (total) 37,348 55.76 44.24
Source; Modified from *The Collection of Major Data on the 
Survey about Passengers*. December 1988b, BGPPTC & MAO.
NB: a) Data collected on one day basis.
b) Information on Independent minibuses not available.
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APPENDIX 13
Passengers* Opinions on Further Development
of Beijing*s Minibus Service
(16 April 1988)
Company No. of 
interviewees
Very
important
%
Important
%
Not
important
%
First 
Co. 15,037 51.61 48.29 0.11
Second 
Co. 13,506 55.29 44.41 0.30
Rental 
Co. 1,172 51.20 48.12 0.68
Trolley 
Co. 7,597 55.87 43.98 0.16
Total 37,348 53.80 46.00 0.20
Source; Modified from *The Collection of Major Data on the 
Survey about Passengers*. December 1988b, BGPPTC & MAO.
NB: a) Data collected on one day basis.
b) Information on Independent minibuses not available.
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